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VOLUME II

362

FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS STUDIES--VIETNAM (U)

Ernest F. Bairdain, Ph. D. Edith M. Bairdain, Ph. D.

25 May 1971

Group 3 Downgraded at 12 Year Intervals; Not Automatically Declassified

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
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
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
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
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7710 Old Springhouse Road
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Psyop Research

PREFACE

This is Volume II of a two-volume research report entitled, "Psychological Operations Studies--Vietnam." Together, the two volumes constitute the final report covering the results of some 17 months of basic and applied research in psychological operations in Vietnam. The project was executed and the final report written on-site in the field during the period between September 1969 and June 1971, under the sponsorship of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense.

The present volume is devoted to the applied research component of the project. It reports on a number of specific research tasks designed to provide "quick response" to immediate psyop needs identified by a Project Advisory Group composed of representatives of the civil and military psyop community. The applied research tasks are generally of two sorts--collection and analysis of critical data from VC and NVA prisoners of war and defectors, and analysis of the impact of selected government publications upon the general public. A special feature of this volume is a report on the impact of the First Cambodia Operations on VC and NVA attitudes. Volume II also includes three classified appendices which belong with Volume I.

Volume I (Unclassified) deals mainly with basic research and theory, discusses requirements for developing psychological operations as an expanding body of scientific theory and method, and describes research conducted in conjunction with specific psychological operations campaigns. The basic research, focused on measurement of psyops' effectiveness, also tested salient propositions relating psychological operations and defection.

ACKNOW LEDGMENTS

This project was approved and funded by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Additional support was provided by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Vietnam under the direction of Edward J. Nickel, Minister-Counsel of Embassy for Public Affairs and Director of JUSPAO.

Thanks are due to the many officials from ARPA, JUSPAO, and MACJ3-11 who participated in a Program Advisory Group which provided sponsorship and guidance for two-thirds of the total effort.

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The project benefitted greatly from the wise counsel and insightful analysis of psyop problems provided by Martin F. Herz, Minister-Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs in Vietnam. The interest and support of ARPA-V Directors, Colonel Arthur F. Mitchell and Colonel Ephraim M. Gershater, and ARPA-V Program Managers, Lieutenant Colonel N.C. Sibley and Lieutenant Colonel Albert A. DeProspero was most helpful.

The understanding and assistance of Lawrence J. Hall, Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs and Deputy Director of JUSPAO; Arthur S. Hoffman, Acting Assistant Director of JUSPAO; and Francis S. Bourne, JUSPAO Research Officer were a major factor in being able to continue to press ahead even when things seemed most difficult.

Special thanks are due to Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, Commanding General of Military Region 3 and to Lieutenant General Hoang Xuam Lam of Military Region 1 for their generous assistance in the work devoted to measurement of psyops effectiveness. The many courtesies of Major General Tran Van Trung, head of the General Political Warfare Department, greatly facilitated the work.

The close cooperation of the Center for Vietnamese Studies, and its Director, Mr. Nguyen Khoa Phon-Anh made it possible to undertake many tasks that otherwise would not have been feasible.

The great ability and tireless dedication of Miss Le Thi Que, HSR's Vietnamese Research Supervisor, was a major factor in the timely completion of the study.

Suggestions received from Colonel Jess B. Hendricks, Chief of the Psyops Division in the Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph T. Tambe, Chief of the ARPA-V Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences who reviewed this manuscript in draft form, were greatly appreciated.

EFB EMB

SUMMARY

SHORT-RANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM QUICK-RESPONSE TASKS

Program II under Contract No. DAAH01-70-C-0217 was concerned with short-range problems. It was directed to investigation of urgent research questions of immediate concern to the psyop community. This program was integrated with the long-range program (Program I), directed to long-range research, to allow the greatest pay-off for overall goals.

The short-range research program (Program II) was composed of a number of subtasks to provide research support on problems the psyop community considered urgent. It was responsive to priority research needs defined by a Project Advisory Group (PAG), whose members represented ARPA, MACV, and JUSPAO, and received intensive effort from the time the first HSR scientists reported in country on 1 September 1969.

The PAG arrangement was welcome both because it promised to keep research in close concord with user agencies and their interests and needs and because the extraordinary research needs demanded the closest support and cooperation of both military and mission personnel. Performance and productivity of the research team under this program plan, if it was to respond effectively to the contract requirements, depended almost entirely on the ready availability of continuing liaison and support from the sponsoring agencies in Vietnam. This interaction was needed to insure access to facilities and to needed informational sources, and to provide accurate and timely information and assistance. The research effort had to receive current information regarding overall psyop objectives in Vietnam, and continual information regarding current psyop programs in Vietnam. Effective accomplishment rested upon timely receipt of this support.

事に行名言

The program was developed in response to the contractual requirement that a systematic program of applied research to provide continuing support of psyop objectives be formulated and initiated. Emphasis was focused on quick response to research needs by interdisciplinary team effort. This program was directed toward: (a) meeting research needs considered primary and urgent by the psyop research community; (b) using obtained data to feed into the development of a broad theoretical structure for psyop; (c) improving effectiveness of programs determined to be critical. This work was to be conducted within the framework of current operations with the guidance and support of the major elements of the psyop community.

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Procedure was structured to permit quick response to research needs expressed by the psyop community within the bounds of contractual requirements. Projects of primary interest to the psyop community were specified by the PAG by means of a formal task statement to the Director, HSR-V. JUSPAO and MACJ3-11 assigned priorities to each task. HSR then prepared a detailed method of approach, showing the research plan with time and manpower deduled. When mutual agreement existed on the task and work plan, HSR-V could begin individual task effort.

Each task, 1 through 7, involved the following steps:

- Step 1. PAG presented problem statement with priority assigned to HSR-V at a PAG meeting.
- Step 2. HSR-V furnished immediate professional research assistance to the requesting organization after verbal agreement of task acceptance. This provided quick response to urgent research needs. It also reduced the time required to bring all factors of the problem into consideration for interdisciplinary research treatment.
- Step 3. HSR-V prepared a research plan for interdisciplinary attack outlining the study or family of studies to be directed toward problem solution.
- Step 4. Research plan and coordination/support requirements were submitted to the PAG for approval or agreed revisions.
- Step 5. Research plan was implemented.

The tasks requested and scheduled under this program drew upon a reserve of two-thirds of the time of a team of six researchers. As each task was scheduled and completed the bank of man-hours remaining were drawn upon for subsequent tasks requested by the PAG until the total manpower loading allocated to this program had been furnished the using agencies.

ARPA Program II both fed into and drew upon ARPA Program I, a concurrent research study which, together with Program II, formed an integrated research effort.

Tasks Requested

Seven tasks were formally requested and detailed research plans were developed. These were:

- Task 1: Study of Obstacles to Defection
- Task 2: Study of Enemy Vulnerabilities
- Task 3: Psychological Factors of the Enemy Soldier
- Task 4: Factors Affecting Support for GVN
- Task 5: JUSPAO Publications Evaluation
- Task 6: Film Evaluation Process
- Task 7: Effect of Cambodian Incursion on the Enemy Soldier

This volume reports on each of these requested tasks, showing the research plan furnished, and the work accomplished in response to the changing needs and desires of PAG principles.

Constraints

The circumstances under which a study is conducted and particularly those which affect its time and pacing, shape the results. For that reason, certain factors in the inception and timing are relevant here.

No one of the tasks was allowed to follow the task research plan to completion. Changes in ongoing operational situations resulted in shifts of priorities assigned to research tasks or needs. A complete change-over of officials occurred in the three agencies participating in the PAG; the change in personnel was accompanied by changes in research interests.

Tasks 1 and 2 had been scheduled for a progress report in January 1970, and for consideration of the need for further effort on Task 1; Task 2 had been scheduled to continue throughout the year.

Because of the completeness of the results obtained on Task 1 and 2, it was the PAG's decision in January 1970 that objectives of both tasks had been met and the tasks were considered to be completed.

Unfortunately, this decision left the PAG without fully-coordinated and agreed task statements. Because it was clear that unanimous agreement existed in principle on the objectives of the tentatively formulated Task 3, "Psychological Factors of the NVA Soldier", HSR agreed to proceed on Task 3 while the specifications for this and other task statements were being worked out by the PAG. Tentative statements all called for greater effort than time and resources remaining on the contract could supply.

When it became clear late in April that neither of the two current top-priority tasks (Task Statements 3 and 4) desired by the PAG could be completed within the time remaining under the existing contract, HSR was asked to respond to the task statements without consideration of time restrictions. Task research plans which included work-flow diagrams for Tasks 3, 4, 5, and 6, submitted by HSR to the PAG on 30 April reflect that understanding.

In a PAG meeting on 9 May 1970, at the time decisions were to be made in the field on Tasks 3, 4, 5, and 6, a new and much higher priority requirement arose to investigate the effect of Allied Cambodian operations on the enemy (now designated Task 7). At the request of the PAG, all HSR research resources were rechanneled immediately to that effort, while other tasks were suspended but kept viable for resumption in an extension of the contract period desired by the sponsoring agencies. Phasedown operations, which would have to occur in the June-July period if the contract were not extended were also held in abeyance.

Task 7 accordingly received all of the HSR team resources. However, after data collection phases of Studies 1 and 2 under Task 7 had been completed and results of a brief preliminary analysis of the data had been presented to the sponsors, HSR was told that June-July phase-down operations for the field research team should go into effect, discontinuing Task 7 after completion only of the data collection phases of the first two subtasks. This stopped execution of Study 3, the reinterview study.

41

In August, the field period of the contract was extended to allow processing and reporting of already-collected data for Program II, and continued the performance period for Program I. At that time, HSR undertook the reinterview task under Program I, Effectiveness Studies, and issued field reports on the results; these reports are included in Volume I in the section devoted to case studies of psyop effectiveness.

This volume reports on each of the seven tasks as accomplished under the changing PAG requirements.

Each task consisted of several studies. As PAG requirements dictated release of studies as soon as they became available, twenty-two reports were published and delivered in the field. This volume contains essentially those reports, produced over a 13-month period, January 1970 - January 1971. They are brought together here under each major task with plan and procedure and information common to the entire task drawn into one section.

xiii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vi
SUMMARY
Tasks Requested
Constraints · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
PAG TASK 1, OBSTACLES TO DEFECTION
Summary and Introduction
Suggestions/Recommendations
Comment
Comment
Background
HSR Research Approach
Research Plan
Schedule
Procedure
Survey of the Literature
Interviews of Knowledgeable Individuals
Monitoring the Document Flow
Field Research
Results
Issues in Categorization
What are Obstacles?
Organization of Data
Conclusions
Reference List of Studies Relating to Obstacles
to Defection · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
PAG TASK 2, STUDY OF ENEMY VULNERABILITIES
Summary and Introduction
Major Findings
Major Findings
Comment
Problem
Background
HSR Research Approach
HSR Research Approach
Schedule
Procedure
Survey of the Literature
Survey of the Literature
Method
471-041-04

Interviews with Knowledgeable Individuals	64
Monitoring of Document Flow	64
Development of Data Collection Instruments/Procedures	68
Execution of Field Surveys	68
Results	70
Issues in Categorization	71
Organization of Data	86
VC Vulnerabilities	97
Primary: Deterioration of the Will to Fight	97
Secondary: Reaction Against Party Control	
Methods	99
Secondary: VC Feeling of Victimization	99
NVA Vulnerabilities	100
Primary: Trend Toward 'Generalized	
Disaffection"	100
Secondary: NVA Disillusionment in RVN	. 106.
Secondary: NVA Family-Centered Concerns	107
Conclusions	112
Reference List of Studies Relating to Enemy	
Vulnerabilities	119
PAG TASK 3, PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE	1
ENEMY SOLDIER	
Summary and Introduction	125
Problem	126
Background	127
HSR Research Approach	127
Research Plan	128
Staffing	129
Procedure · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	130
Development of Data-Collection Instruments/Procedures	130
Grouping of Questionnaire Sections	133
Pre-Military Service History.	133
Indoctrination/Propaganda	133
Trip to RVN	133
Controls/Exposure in RVN	134
Exposure to Allied Psyop	134
Stress in RVN	134
Contemplation of Defection	134
Motivators/Obstacles to Defection	134
Results	134
Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR1	137
Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR2	138
Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR3	140
Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR4	141
Profile of the VC Soldier in MR1	143
Profile of the VC Soldier in MR4	144
Profile of the NVA Rallier Received in the	
Republic of Vietnam	146

xvi UNCLASSIFIED

PAG TASK 4, FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN	
Summary and Introduction	153
Problem	154
Background	154
HSR Research Approach	156
Sub-task 4.1 - Preparation of Data Base	157
Sub-task 4.2 - Identify Attitudes Relevant to Support for GVN	157
Sub-task 4.3 - Survey Communications Media Impact	157
Patterns	101
Role of Information and Methods for Communications.	158
	158
Sub-task 4.5 - Prepare Consolidated Report	158
Research Plan	150
PAG TASK 5, JUSPAO PUBLICATIONS EVALUATION	•
Survey and Discussion	175
Summary and Discussion	175
Summary of Huong Que Study	175
Summary of Viet-Nam Ngay Nay (VNNN) Study	176 177
Summary of Long Me Study	
Summary of The-Gioi Tu-Do Study	178
Comment	179
Problem	180
Background	180
HSR Research Approach	180
Research Plan	180
Staffing	182
Procedure	183
Special Considerations	184
Literacy in RVN	184
Literacy Reported in the HSR Survey	185
Results	186
Huong Que Readership Survey	187
History	187
Intended Audience	187
Production/Distribution	187
Policy/Content	187
Staffing	188
Previous Studies	188
Survey	189
Audience Registration	190
Readership	190
Readership Characteristics	190
Preserences	191
Discussion of Survey Results	191
Definition of Audience	191
Percentage of Readership.	191
Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers	191
Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers	192
Frequency of Reading	192

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Viet-Nam Ngay Nay Readership Survey				193
History	•			193
Intended Audience	•		,	193
Production/Distribution				193
Policy/Content	•			194
Staffing				194
Previous Studies				195
Previous Studies				195
Audience Registration				195
Readership				195
Readership Characteristics				196
Preferences				196
Discussion of Survey Results				197
Discussion of Survey Results				-197
Percentage of Readership	•			197
Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers				197
Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers	•			198
Frequency of Reading				198
Analysis: Comparison of Viet-Nam Ngay Nay and th				1/0
			:	198
Commercial Press	•	• •	•	
The Vietnamese Commercial Press	•	•	•	199
Province Newspapers-Government Publications				200
Number of Commercial Newspapers				200
Commercial Press Circulation	•	• •	,	201
VNNN Compared to the Commercial Press/				
Province Newspapers				203
Long Me Readership Survey				206
History	•	• •	•,	206
Intended Audience				206
Production/Distribution	•		,	206
Policy/Content	•		٠	206
Staffing				207
Previous Studies	•			208
Survey	•		,	208
Readership	•		,	. 208
Audience Registration	•			208
Readership Characteristics	•		•	209
Preference	•		•	209
Discussion of Survey Results	•			209
Definition of Audience				209
Percentage of Readership	•		•	209
Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers	•		•	210
Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers			•	210
Frequency of Reading	٠			210
The-Gioi Tu-Do Readership Survey	•		•	212
History			•	212
Intended Audience	•		•	212
Production/Distribution	•		•	212
Policy/Content			•	212
Staffing	•			213

xviii

_	
Survey	214
Audience Registration	214
Readership	214
Readership Characteristics	215
Preference	215
Discussion of Survey Results	216
Definition of Audience	216
Percentage of Readership	
rercentage of Readership	217
Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers	217
Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers	217
Frequency of Reading	218
Conclusions	219
Huong Que	219
Viet-Nam Ngay Nay	219
Long Me	219
Long Me	220
PAG TASK 7, EFFECT OF CAMBODIAN INCURSION ON	
THE ENEMY SOLDIER	
THE ENEMI SOLDIER	
Summanus and Introduction	235
Summary and Introduction	
Problem	237
Background	238
HSR Research Approach	238
Research Plan	239
Staffing	241
Comment	241
NVA PW's Taken in Cambodia: May-June 1970	242
Objectives	242
Background	242
Results	242
General Conclusions	- 248
North Vietnamese Army Prisoners Captured in the	
Republic of Vietnam During the Allied Cambodian	
Operations: May-June 1970	250
Objectives	250
	250
Background	
Procedure	251
Results	251
Enemy Conviction that Cambodia is a "Safe Haven"	251
Conclusions	252
Enemy Reaction to Surprise Allied Entry in	
Cambodian 'Safe Haven'	254
Impact of Allied Psyop on RVN-based NVA	256
Effect on Enemy Indoctrination/Propaganda	
	256
Machinery	
RVN and Cambodia	260
Attachment A	263

vix UNCLASSIFIED

Viet Cong Prisoners Captured in the Republic of Vietnam	
During the Allied Cambodian Operations: May-June 1970	264
Objectives	264
Background	265
Procedure	265
Results	265
Enemy Conviction that Cambodia is a "Safe Haven"	265
Conclusions	266
Enemy Reaction to Surprise Allied Entry in	
Cambodian "Safe Haven"	268
Impact of Allied Psyop on RVN-based VC	270
Effect on Enemy Indoctrination/Propaganda	
Machinery	270
Comparison of Responses of VC PW's Captured in	
RVN and NVA PW's Captured in RVN and Cambodia	274
Attachment A	278
APPENDIX I: CASE STUDY FOR TINH THUONG (AFFECTION)	
	281
·	
APPENDIX II: CASE STUDY FOR OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT	
CAMPAIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)-	
CLASSIFIED TABLES	369
APPENDIX III: SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION	
REQUIREMENT CONCERNING PSYOP	
EFFECTIVENESS	375
Eliboration	J.J

LIST OF CHARTS, TABLES, FIGURES

PAG TASK 1, OBSTACLES TO DEFECTION

Chart 1	Document Summary Report	13
Table 1	Composite List of Obstacles to Defection	18
Table 2	Descriptive Parameters of Studies Relating to Obstacles to Defection	23
Table 3	Obstacles Identified from Literature on Defection	29
Table 4	Card-Sort Procedure, Rally/Surrender/Capture	31
Table 5	Recurrent Publications: Intelligence Relating to Obstacles and Vulnerabilities	39
PAG TASK	2, STUDY OF ENEMY VULNERABILITIES	• .
Chart 2	Document Summary Report	65
Table 6	Composite List of Enemy Vulnerabilities	72
Table 7	Vulnerabilities: Descriptive Parameters of Studies in Bibliography	83
Table 8	Vulnerabilities Classification	89
Table 9	Military Service/Trip to RVN: Attitudes	102
Table 10	Combat Experience, NVA PW's	1 0 5
Table 11	NVN Indoctrination vs RVN Exposure: Comparison	108
PAG TASK	3, PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ENEMY SOLI	DIER
Chart 3	Man-Month Allocation Chart: Phase 1	148
Chart 4	Man-Month Allocation Chart: Phase 2	149
Chart 5	Workflow Chart	150

xxi

PAG TASK 4, FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN

Chart 6	Man-Month Allocation Chart	166
Chart 7	Workflow Chart 4. 1	. 167
Chart 8	Workflow Chart 4.2	168
Chart 9	Workflow Chart 4.3	169
Chart 10	Workflow Chart 4.4	170
Chart 11	Workflow Chart 4.5	171
PAG TASH	5, JUSPAO PUBLICATIONS EVALUATION	
Figure 1	Number of Newspapers and Periodicals (1963-1968)	202
Figure 2	Newspaper Circulation, 1963-1968	204
Chart 12	Man-Month Allocation Chart	221
Chart 13	Workflow Chart	222
PAG TASE	TO, FILM EVALUATION PROCESS	
Chart 14	Man-Month Allocation Chart	231
Chart 15	Workflow Chart	232
APPENDIX CAMF	K I: CASE STUDY FOR TINH THUONG (AFFECTION) PAIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)	
Figure 3	III Corps Tactical Zone/III Corps (Now MR3) showing four provinces involved in Campaign Tinh Thuong	291
Table 12	Binh Duong Province Vis "Affection Campaign" Activities	295
Table 13	Weekly and Campaign Totals of Principal Count in "Affection Campaign"	297
Table 14	MACV "Monthly Tabular Report of PSYOP Activities Summary" for III Corps	300

xxii

Chart 16	Normal Weekly Average Comparison for Leaflets Dropped in III CTZ (May-December 1969)	301
Chart 17	Normal Weekly Average Comparison for Broadcasts in III CT2	302
Table 15	Descriptive Listing of "Affection Campaign" Printed Material	303
Table 16	Prisoners of War Collected from Campaign Provinces	305
Table 17	Prisoners of War Collected from Campaign "Selected Areas	307
Table 18	Prisoners of War Collected from Campaign Provinces	308
Table 19	Ralliers by Category and Province as Noted in "Weekly Report"	309
Table 20	Ralliers by Province as Recorded in Chieu Hoi "Returnee Report"	310
Table 21	Ralliers per Month from Provinces in Campaign Area and III CTZ for 1969	312
Table 22	Enemy Units in Special Area During Campaign	314
Table 23	Known Enemy Strength in Four-Province Area at Start and End of Six-Week Campaign Period	315
Table 24	Total Enemy Strength in III Corps, November and December 1969	316
Table 25	Tactical Pressure Exerted on Enemy in Special Area 15 November-31 December 1969	317
Table 26	Self-Initiated Tactical Pressure on Enemy in Special Area 15 November31December 1969	319
Table 27	Tactical Pressure in Ground Contact Experienced by Enemy in Four-Province Area in Six-Week Campaign Period	320
Table 28	Prisoners and Ralliers Reported Within a Four-Province Area 15 November-31 December 1969	321
Table 29	Medical Needs in Respondent's Unit During Trip to RVN	323

xxiii

Table 30	Respondent's Own Medical Needs	324
Table 31	Arrangements for Food on Trip to South Vietnam	3 27
Table 32	Food Supply While in South Vietnam	328
Table 33	Attitude Toward Expected Treatment	329
Table 34	Understanding of Prisoner Status	330
Table 35	Obstacles: Need for Information on How to Defect	332
Table 36	Obstacles: Need for Knowledge on How to Defect	333
Table 37	Exposure and Attention to Leaflets	335
Table 38	Exposure and Attention to Loudspeaker	336
Table 39	Tactical Pressure Felt by Respondent Unit Attack	338
Table 40	Tactical Injury Received by Respondent	339
Table 41	Prior Consideration of Defection	341
	II: CASE STUDY FOR OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT AIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)CLASSIFIED TABLES	
Table 19	Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement Items for Operation Searchlight	371
Table 42	Estimate of Enemy Strength at time of Operation Searchlight in MR1 and in Periods Preceding and Following	372
Table 43	Tactical Operations Data, MR1	373

unclassified

PAG TASK 1

STUDY OF OBSTACLES TO DEFECTION

PAG TASK I

STUDY OF OBSTACLES TO DEFECTION

Summary and Introduction

- (U) The objective of an eight man-month study was to attempt to identify major "obstacles to enemy defection" and discover means of overcoming such "obstacles".
- (U) Research activities included a survey of available pertinent literature, monitoring of an available flow of intelligence data, interviewing of knowledgeable individuals, development of data-collection instruments and procedures, and field research to collect current data.

Major Findings

(U) 1. Obstacles to defection is not a concept that has been treated directly in the literature; it has been treated indirectly under such terms as "deterrents" or "elements of cohesion". No unified nor widely accepted definition of obstacles to defection or obstacles was identified in the literature or by interviews; neither are definitions offered in any of the available military official or quasi-official dictionaries.

Obstacles were therefore defined as (1) reasons why an enemy soldier would not want to defect or desert and (2) reasons why it would be difficult for him to do so if he should want to defect or desert.

(U) 2. Using the concept of obstacles defined in "1" above, fifty-two representative obstacles were identified in the literature, usually in the context of a discussion of "deterrents to defection" or "elements of cohesion".

3

The fifty-two representative obstacles were characterized by many different levels of generalization and very varied frames of reference. In order to eliminate duplications and varied ways of stating the same issue, an input-output procedure was used to organize the fifty-two obstacles.

(C) 3. Two "primary" and one "secondary" types of obstacles were identified.

Primary obstacles are defined as psychological/emotional states of an individual; the two primary obstacles are:

- a. Fear of harm to the self by either side,
- b. Fear of punitive action against one's family.

Secondary obstacles are defined as attitudes/beliefs/opinions of an individual; the secondary obstacle is:

a. Belief/faith/dedication to the notion of ultimate victory.

All other literature-identified obstacles are regarded as "contributory conditions" which are not, in isolation, of sufficient significance to be considered as obstacles and which function to create or enhance the actual "obstacle".

(C) 4. Data obtained from field research fully supports the existence and significance of the three major obstacles identified.

Suggestions/Recommendations

- (C) 1. Apply the concept of targeting and tailoring to the obstacles rather than to the audience and situation.
- (C) 2. Task a group of qualified individuals to design standardized procedures to be used by the enemy when attempting to rally or surrender and standardized procedures for friendly troops actions when receiving a rallier or prisoner.

(C) 3. Using the standardized procedures and instructions described above, formulate single unitary training programs for military personnel, government personnel and civilians to instruct them in procedures for dealing with all types of defectors. Coordinate with ARVN and FWMAF,

Execute the training/orientation program as quickly as possible beginning with all military and paramilitary personnel. Publicize this training program extensively.

- (C) 4. Develop and use a limited number of the best-possible quality messages describing standardized procedures to be used when attempting to rally and emphasizing on a realistic level that use of the recommended procedures makes it possible to rally or surrender move safely.
- (C) 5. Test thoroughly, by use in the field, themes analogous to, "Surely your family will accept some discomfort to help you stay alive so that you can be together again?"

Comment

- (C) 1. A serious question is raised in regard to the productive utility of the currently-favored concept of targeting specific groups and tailoring specific messages or appeals.

 The trade-off is the distinction between:
 - Using many different appeals thought to be specifically appropriate for many presumably different groups, and
 - b. using a restricted number of messages with a very small number of themes all addressed to all individuals.

- (C) 2. Evidence from this study and from the perspective of extensive management and corporation studies would favor option "b" (see above). The generalized approach would enable time, manpower, and effort (that otherwise would be needlessly devoted to design, development, production, distribution, control and use of materials with a restricted audience) to be devoted to:
 - --- intensive attention to quality and quality control of the total product (whether whole psyop programs or single messages),
 - --- intensive planning, guidance, and control of the use of the products,
 - --- intensive timely control checks on effectiveness of the product in use.

The generalized approach also facilitates:

- --- quicker reaction time on all design, production, and distribution functions.
- --- quicker adaptation to sudden changes, newlyperceived needs, or changed requirements.

The generalized approach, implemented properly can:

- --- reduce manpower needs.
- --- reduce production and operating costs through increased volume and decreased wastage.

An additional unique advantage is:

- --- the need for exceptional expertise and competence is reduced to a minimum.
- --- conversely, the products of the most competent and qualified specialists will have the broadest possible distribution and greatest potential for productive impact.

- (C) 3. Two omnipresent major complaints from psyop managers and workers are:
 - --- it is extremely difficult or impossible to get adequate or even useful information about "target audiences".
 - --- there is a severe shortage of qualified knowledgeable psyop personnel (not to mention difficulties in determining who is or is not knowledgeable).

Recommendations 1 and 2 above, when properly implemented, would reduce both problems to near-minimum proportions.

(U) Objectives of a study of obstacles to defection were identification of major obstacles to defection and identification, if possible, of means to overcome these obstacles.

Problem

(U) MACV requested that HSR attempt to identify major obstacles to enemy defection and suggest means of overcoming such obstacles. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 1, Priority 1: In order to determine specific methods for overcoming the major obstacles presented in the way of defection, conduct studies responsive to the following needs:

The determination of specific methods for overcoming major obstacles placed in the way of defection is a problem that has been given first priority by MACV. The research should be directed toward the discovery of particular ways of exploiting the vulnerabilities to achieve a particular end. Interrogation reports should receive analysis, particularly the most recent interrogations, and new interrogations conducted to the extent necessary. Alternative approaches should be posited and the effectiveness of each evaluated. The evaluation of alternative methods should be made on the basis of experiments conducted under field conditions when the situation permits. At the least, alternative approaches should be checked out in Chieu Hoi and POW Centers in a controlled fashion.

Backg round

(U) While much research time and effort had been expended over a number of years on the question of determining means to persuade the enemy to defect, those factors -- situational, psychological, environmental -- which counter the decision to do so had not received systematic study. MACV in concert with JUSPAO felt this question represented the most urgent research need in Vietnam in 1969.

HSR Research Approach

- (U) A series of activities was undertaken concurrently and sequentially in the attack on this problem. In the interests of efficiency to avoid duplication of effort, relevant findings from research studies available in Vietnam were brought together with the thought that a list of obstacles brought out in previous research should serve as a baseline. Concurrent tasks included monitoring an available flow of intelligence data, interviewing knowledgeable individuals, developing data-collection instruments and procedures, and conducting field research.
- (U) The research plan presented to the PAG responded fully to their task statement. Work completed after four calendar months was considered by the PAG to have filled their requirements and findings had suggested a new task to which they wished effort directed (characteristics of the enemy soldier). The complete research plan submitted is shown below; work was stopped and the task considered complete after sub-task 7.

Research Plan

- 1. Survey documents and studies, both published and unpublished, available in the psyop community which are relevant to the problem.
- Interview knowledgeable individuals within the psyop community who have worked within the areas relating to the research problem.
- 3. Review interrogation procedures used with personnel whose responses are relevant to this problem.

- 4. Elaborate, modify, and redesign questionnaire and interview instruments.
- 5. Administer questionnaires, conduct interviews, and develop standardized procedures.
- 6. Conduct logical and statistical analysis of results as appropriate.
- Develop appeals directed toward overcoming obstacles hypothesized from results.
- 8. Conduct studies in the field throughout the four tactical corps zones where conditions permit.
- 9. Evaluate results qualitatively, logically, and statistically.
- 10. Prepare a matrix of those findings which, on validation, indicate obstacle/situation correlation and means of overcoming these obstacles.
- (U) Schedule. Effort on this task began within the first month after start of contract and continued through the fourth month for eight and one-fourth man-months effort in the initial phase. In the fourth month, an interim report was issued. This report provided research results obtained to that date, and as provided in the plan, recommended continuation. However, sponsors felt their urgent question had been answered.
- (U) The initial phase of Task 1, which ran concurrently with other tasks in both programs was assigned one man-month effort in September, two and three-fourths man-months in October, and four and one-half man-months in November and December for a total of eight and one-fourth man-months. This task also received all relevant in-puts from other concurrent efforts during the period.

Procedure

- (U) Four major activities were used to investigate the question of obstacles. These were:
 - 1. Survey of available pertinent literature.

- 2. Interviews of available knowledgeable individuals.
- 3. Monitoring of available current document flow through Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).
- 4. Design, development, testing, and field v.e of separate comprehensive, compartmentalized, computer-compatible questionnaires for North Vietnamese Army (NVA) prisoners (PW), NVA ralliers (Hoi Chanh), Viet Cong (VC) PW's and VC Hoi Chanh. Because of the nature of some of the issues that all participating agencies wished to have treated (involving difficult distinctions in definition of terms), it was necessary also to develop a means of by-passing some language translation problems. A cardsort technique was developed, field-tested, and put in use which reduces the requirement for verbalizing the distinctions. Surveys of NVA ralliers and prisoners were conducted between September 1969 and January 1970.
- (U) All four activities proceeded concurrently; the literature survey and interviews were begun first and emphasis was shifted later to monitoring the document flow, development of data-collection instruments, and to field operations to obtain current data. Several additional activities included a survey of interrogation procedures currently in use, consideration of their effect on prisoner of war (PW) responses, and recruitment and training of Vietnamese interviewing teams.
- (U) Each of the four no jor activities is described in individual sections which follow.

Survey of Literature

(U) A survey of the literature concerned with obstacles to enemy defection was conducted, limited to documents physically available in Saigon with publication dates prior to 1 September 1969.

- (U) Four data sources were utilized; these were:
 - a. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) library.
 - b. Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) files.
 - c. Military Assistance Command J3 (MACJ3) Information Center.
 - d. Military Assistance Command Vietnam Civil Operations Rural Development Support (MACV CORDS) Information Center.
- (U) Personal inquiries were made, and trails or chains of contacts were pursued to investigate the possible existence of additional higher classified documents. Some such documents were found to exist, but since the contents did not appear to add significantly to either "obstacles" or "vulnerabilities" already identified, these documents are not treated in this report.
- (U) A total of more than 3500 documents was available at the four locations. All of these titles were searched, and 115 documents were selected for screening in abstract. These were read, and 42 were identified as containing information on the subject of enemy defection. These 42 studies and reports were reviewed in detail.
- (U) Detailed information relevant to defection was summarized on forms designed for the purpose. (See Chart 1). Statements relevant to the study definition of "obstacles to defection" were abstracted and listed. It was from these records that data analysis began.

Interviews of Knowledgeable Individuals

(U) A total of 14 individuals were interviewed formally and many others were interviewed informally to obtain their views on obstacles. The individuals interviewed were selected mainly on the basis of current or past involvement in the field of psychological operations and on the basis of availability. Initially, it seemed possible that much valuable information and many useful insights might be being lost because of short tours of duty, frequent changes of assignments, and generally rapid turn-over.

CHART 1. DOCUMENT SUMMARY REPORT (U)

Reviewer Date

(U) A. Title:

(U) B. Source:

Author:

Agency:

Classification:

(U) C. Date of Publication:

Date of Research:

(U) D. Research Problem:

(U) E. Research Approach:

(U) F. Principal Conclusions:

(U) G. Abstract of Recommendations of Author, if any:

(U) H. Comment: Ideas for Further Consideration; Fruitful Research Directions (recommended by reviewer):

(U) I. Related or Subsequent Work, or Relevant Sources (known to reviewer):

(U) J. List Statements of following (as defined by author):

1. Susceptibilities

2. Vulnerabilities

3. Obstacles

On balance, the interviews were not productive. Most of the items mentioned were essentially restatements of issues gleaned from existing literature or were personal impressions based on anecdotes or single instances. In all cases, the individual interviewed had been too busy with other matters to investigate the incident or insight for purposes of validation.

Monitoring of Document Flow

- (U) Through the Office of Policy, Plans and Research (OPPR), a request was made within the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) that copies of all documents possibly pertinent to enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to defection be forwarded to the research team on a daily basis. The request had two purposes: One was to identify the best sources of current intelligence data relative to obstacles and vulnerabilities, and the other was to assess the kind, amount, utility, and timely availability of such materials. This information was needed to provide perspective on other activities contemplated for the future.
- (U) The following three recurrent publications, which are unclassified and which originate in JUSPAO, were received regularly:
 - 1. "Principal Radio Reports from Communist Radio Sources" (published daily)
 - 2. "Saigon Press Review" (daily)
 - 3. "Vietnam Documents and Research Notes" (periodic)
- (U) Publication 1 contains translations of communist radio broadcasts. Publication 2 contains translations of news headlines and editorial comments from Vietnamese and Chinese daily newspapers published in Saigon. Both publications provide some useful background information about certain aspects of the current situation but little that is specific to the subjects of enemy vulnerabilities or obstacles to defection. Publication 3 presents excerpts from captured documents plus background information and interpretation; some are quite relevant.

- (U) Other recurrent publications are received irregularly; these are:
 - 1. "Combined Document Exploitation Center Bulletins" CDEC (published daily)
 - "Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report" (daily)
 - 3. "International Press Service Correspondent" (periodic)
 - 4. "Mission Press Releases" (periodic)
 - 5. "Vietnam Roundup" (periodic)
 - 6. "Wireless File" (daily)
- (U) In this group, Publications 1 and 2 are confidential; the others are unclassified. Publication 1 is originated by CDEC and contains descriptions of captured documents. Publication 2 is originated by either CDEC or the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC). CDEC issues translations or captured documents, and CMIC issues knowledgeability briefs concerning information potential of prisoners of war and returnees, and transcripts of interrogations of PW's and returnees.
- (U) Captured documents are screened at CDEC for exploitation potential and some are sent to JUSPAO daily. Interrogation reports are sent to JUSPAO daily. These two types of material, which are occasionally received by the HSR Research team, represent the raw material used in the work of almost all intelligence analysts, Psyop analysts, etc., in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).
- (U) The sources of these materials were investigated to supplement the materials received within JUSPAO. A list of fifty-eight recurrent reports based on materials from these two sources is included in Appendix I.

Field Research

(U) During September and October, HSR Research team personnel participated in a questionnaire survey of 60 NVA Hoi Chanh, and played a major role in a survey of 24 NVA PW's. The results of these combination surveys and pre-tests of the questionnaires used showed clearly

15

that new and radically different questionnaires and procedures would have to be developed for at least four specific groups, i.e., NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's, and VC Hoi Chanh. These are described in the report of Task 3, "Enemy Characteristics".

- (U) The questionnaires were designed to cover significant aspects of the NVA/VC life that are appropriate and feasible for treatment in such surveys and are composed of independent sections which can be used alone if desired. The new NVA PW questionnaire was given to 50 NVA PW's in late December and early January at the III Corps PW camp at Bien Hoa.
- (U) In the course of development and translation of the questionnaires into Vietnamese, it was established that there is a considerable disparity between the Vietnamese and English languages in the range of distinctions or nuances that are possible for many key words. As a partial solution of this problem, an essentially behavioral card-sort technique was developed, field-tested, and used to supplement questionnaire data. This is also described in the Task 3 report. The card-sort procedure was used with 50 NVA PW's in early January.
- (U) The time available for processing of the results of field interviews of NVA PW's and ralliers was not sufficient to make a complete analysis for this report. However, data which bear on specific deterrents, or "obstacles to defection", were selected and treated in isolation to provide a check on the validity of literature-obtained items and their current applicability.

Results

(U) In the survey of prior research results, it was found none of the documents used the term obstacles to defection. However, various documents dealt primarily or secondarily with deterrents to defection,

Goure, L. "Inducements and Deterrents to Defection: An Analysis of the Motives of 125 Defectors"

elements of cohesion, 2 etc. For this survey, obstacles were defined as follows: (1) reasons why an enemy would not want to defect or desert, and (2) reasons why it would be difficult for him to do so if he wanted to. Using this definition as a criterion, a total of 14 documents were found to specify directly or indirectly obstacles to enemy defection.

- (U) A composite list of the obstacles to defection was prepared (see Table 1), a list of the 14 studies and reports which contained statements of obstacles to enemy defection was compiled (see References, p. 47 and a table indicating the descriptive parameters of each study was constructed (see Table 2). Periodic reports were not within the survey's scope; the cut-off date for documents surveyed was 1 September 1969.
- (U) There were certain constraints on the way in which the literature survey had to be done. Absence of a comprehensive master list or accessible and adequate information as to contents made necessary a manual title search plus the exercise of reviewer judgment when a document was selected for screening, for detailed review, and for abstraction of obstacles to defection which were not explicitly stated. Consequently, some pertinent documents may have missed review or relevant information implicitly stated in some reviewed documents may not have been extracted.
- (U) The documents from which the list of obstacles was extracted reported studies of two types: (a) analyses of already-existing data, and (b) analyses of data collected specifically for the study.
- (U) Studies done by elements of the United States Mission in Vietnam were generally of the first type, using already-existing data which consisted largely of captured documents, interrogation reports, field reports, intelligence summaries, previous studies, and returnee reports. Studies of the second type were usually performed by research contractors. For these studies, new data collected specifically for a study was usually of the interview/questionnaire type and was often supplemented by use of already-existing data. Most contract studies were oriented toward Viet Cong personnel while U.S. Mission element reports tended to deal with the NVA personnel. Documents covered the time period from 1964 to mid-1969.

² Kellen, K. "A View of the VC: Elements of Cohesion in the Enemy Camp"

TABLE 1

COMPOSITE LIST OF OBSTACLES TO ENEMY DEFECTION

Code No.	Obstacle	Reference No.
1	Control of contact between troops and villagers and between troops and their families	9, 10
2	Destruction of leaflets and efforts to drive away loudspeaker planes	9, 10
3	Punishment for reading or keeping leaflets, listening to radio broadcasts, or reading newspapers from GVN areas	9, 10
4	Belief that those who serve VC for a long time in responsible positions are not included in GVN offers of amnesty and good treatment	5
5	Thinking Chieu Hoi program is only for rank and file soldiers and minor cadre	4
6	Mental conditioning via cadre-managed self-criticism sessions and official propaganda	
7	The 3-man cell and practices of self- criticism	3, 8
8	Difficulty of getting away from one's unit	2

Code No. Key:

No. 1-49 VC

50 - 74 NVA

75 - 99 VC/NVA

TABLE 1 (Con't)

Code No.	Obstacle	Reference No.
9	Fact that with 3-man cell system, one is rarely alone	9, 10
10	Strict supervision of military and civilian movement in VC-controlled areas including VC checkpoints requiring VC personnel in transit to produce official identification and orders	
11	System of surveillance and control	5
12	Surveillance and organization	8
13	Difficulty of leaving a region under tight VC control and lack of knowledge of a route leading to GVN-controlled area and reasonably free of VC check points and risks of being shot at by VC or ARVN	3
14	Attempts to improve vigilance concerning desertion in a unit where a desertion has occurred	11
15	Fear of arrest by GVN on way to rally	5
16	Fear of GVN punishment, mistreatment, torture, execution, reprisals	2, 3, 5, 9, 10
17	Cadres' fear of being singled out for severe punishment	9, 10
18	Fear of reprisal against would-be rallier if caught on way to rally	. 2
19	Fear that defection will provoke reprisal against family and friends, especially in	s 2

TABLE 1 (Con't)

Code No.	Obstacle	Reference No.
20	Fear that family or friends of ralliers in VC-controlled areas will be censured or harmed	9, 10
21	Fear for physical safety after leaving Chieu Hoi Center	9, 10
22	VC practice of publicly condemning by name persons who rally and making state ments that rallying is a heinous crime, ralliers are bad characters, ralliers are deluded, ralliers are motivated by base feelings, ralliers are trying to escape punishment for crime	. •
24	Need of cadres for a professional future with GVN	9, 10
25	Devotion to VC cause based on career incentives	1
26	Opportunity for education, self-improve- ment; advancement in Communist forces without much education	3
27	Lack of career and educational opportunities with GVN	3
28	Channel of upward mobility for the poor and uneducated provided by VC	9, 10
29	Nationalism	8
30	Loyalty to the nation, the people, the re- volution, one's unit and comrades	9, 10
31	Trust in leaders	8
32	Sense of mission	8

TABLE 1 (Con't)

Code No.	<u>Obstacle</u> 1	Reference	No.
33	Expectations of victory or at least non- expectation of defeat	8	
34	Belief in ultimate victory because of fighting for the cause	3	
35	Need of cadres for a political rationale for defection	9, 10)
36	Lack of legitimate political alternative to support	3	
37	Spirit of self-sacrifice and political and disciplinary control instilled via 3-man cell	7	
· ·	****		
50	Cadre attempts to keep troops away from villagers and people of SVN to prevent cotradiction between what troops have been told and reality	n-	
51	Maintenance of morale and discipline through indoctrination and criticism/ self-criticism sessions	14	
52	Indoctrination and control by 3-man cell and criticism/self-criticism sessions	12	
53	Continued indoctrination at every oppor- tunity during and after infiltration	14	
54	NVA has no choice but to remain with his unit in SVN because of lack of knowledge SVN's geography and not knowing where t look for sanctuaries in SVN and resentme of southern villagers and peasants agains helping him	in o ent	

TABLE 1 (Con't)

Code No.	Obstacle	Reference No.		
55	When NVA soldier rallies or surrenders, he does not know what actions are taken against his family in NVN	14		
56	Belief that it is treasonous even to allow capture and that it is better to die in glory than to live in shame	1, 9, 10		
57	When an NVA soldier rallies, he becomes a traitor to his unit	14		
58	Fatalistic acceptance of situation and propect of violent death	1		
59	Acceptance of service in south as neces- sary action against foreign aggressor and as a responsibility from which there is no escape			
60	Belief that U.S. invaded Vietnam to exploit and that role of North is to liberate southern brothers	it 14		
61	Belief that communists will win; Americans, like French, will be expelled; American public will not allow war to continue	14 		
62	NVA troops don't know of Chieu Hoi program or don't know that it is for them	6, 9, 10		

75	3-man cell system and self-criticism con- trol mechanisms, plus frequent reinforce- ment sessions in the field			
76	System of self-critique, intensive politica inductrination, and 3-man cell	1 13		

OBSTACLES: DESCRIPTIVE PARAMETERS OF STUDIES RELATING TO OBSTACLES TO DEFECTION

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I - INTERVIEWS

- (U) Issues in Categorization. A total of 52 items, mentioned in the literature, were not specifically described as obstacles but were, in the context of discussion related to obstacles to defection, often described as deterrents or elements of cohesion, etc. It should be noted that inclusion in the appended list of obstacles does not imply agreement that the item is indeed an obstacle; it does signify that the item was indicated to be or was treated as an obstacle by the original author.
- (U) It is possible that a considerable body of literature which bears some general relationship to the overall issue of obstacles to defection and enemy vulnerabilities may exist, although it is unlikely to contain much that is current or timely in connection with this particular war or particular type of war. Many of the references in the literature are circular, i.e., A quotes B who quotes C who quotes A. Also, several documents are based upon data collected and previously reported upon by other writers or are based on the same sets of data or documents. In summary, it does not appear probable that further search of the literature would produce significant new additions.
- (U) What are Obstacles? "What are obstacles?" remained a question even after conclusion of a sizeable search of pertinent literature. The various types of official and semi-official dictionaries produced by several military services do not offer definitions for obstacles to defection or for defection.
- (U) The assortment of obstacles produced by a search of the literature represented a rather disorganized set of statements on many different levels of penetration or generalization by individuals with diversified points of view who have used markedly divergent frames of references.
- (U) There is considerable range in the degree of consequence or significance of specific findings. The range is from broad generalizations to specific minor issues.
- (C) Organization of Data. As a first step in ordering and organizing the list of obstacles in a meaningful fashion, similar items were grouped. In spite of great variation in study procedures and research instruments, the obstacles reported fall into six basic categories, although there are many differences in detail. The six categories and samples of entries in each category are listed below.

Fear of Harm to Self

- --- Fear of GVN punishment, mistreatment, torture, execution.
- --- Fear of reprisal against would-be rallier if caught on way to rally.

Fear of Harm to Family or Friends

- --- Fear that defection will provoke reprisals against family and friends, especially in VC-controlled areas, or in NVN.
- --- Fear that family or friends of ralliers in VC-controlled areas will be censured or harmed.

Fear of Damaging One's Future

- --- VC practice of publicly condemning by name persons who rally and making of statements that rallying is a heinous crime ---.
- --- Channel of upward mobility for the poor and uneducated provided by VC.

Physical Difficulty of Getting Away

- --- Difficulty of getting away from one's unit.
- --- Fact that 3-man cell system, one is rarely alone.

Idealism

- --- Belief that it is treasonous even to allow capture or that it is better to die in glory than live in shame.
- --- NVA acceptance of service in south as necessary action against foreign aggressor and as a responsibility from which there is no escape.

Control and Blocking of Information

- --- Control of contact between troops and villagers and between troops and their families.
- --- Punishment for reading or keeping leaflets, listening to radio broadcasts, or reading newspapers from GVN areas.
- (C) Each group was sufficiently homogeneous to deserve a label such as "Fear of Harm to Self". This category contains such simple specific statements as "fear of arrest on way to rally" (which is not necessarily a genuine deterrent since the implication of expectation of what follows after arrest is the genuine deterrent but is not specified) or "Fear of GVN Punishment, Mistreatment, Torture, Execution".
- (C) Use of this level and type of categorization, which is the most sophisticated level identifiable in the literature, highlights some of the problems in terminology. In the category labeled "Fear of Damagir" One's Future", one item is "inability of the rallier to go home to a VC-controlled area" and a second item is "VC practice of publicly condemning by name persons who rally and making statements that rallying is a heinous crime...etc."
- (U) The way in which the two obstacles are described raises the question of "which is the 'real' obstacle". One obstacle is a causal factor -- a punitive threatening practice of an enemy organization directed towards an individual partly or wholly under its control. The other obstacle is an effect -- a resultant factor -- i.e., the state of fear or apprehension created in the individual by the threat.
- (U) From the standpoint of counter-propaganda, an important question is raised: "What level of approach to, or manner of description of obstacles represents a meaningful, systematic, and informative method of identification and categorization of obstacles which facilitates identification of appropriate and effective counter-action?"
- (U) Because of the disorganized nature of the findings and the considerations discussed in the preceding paragraph, the findings were analyzed in terms of cause/effect and input/output.

- (C) Table 3 contains the 52 so-called obstacles identified, grouped by similarities or relationship of type of control method and associated positive and negative motivations; by the resultant perceptions of states, conditions, or products of the existence and application of the controls and motivations; and by the nature of the impact of these perceptions on the major aspects of the individual enemy, i.e., physical (the body), behavioral (actions), logical/intellectual (thoughts), attitudes/beliefs/opinions (predispositions and orientations), and the resultant psychological emotional state. The number preceding each entry in the body of Table 3 is the code/identification number shown in Table 1 (page 18); the number in parentheses following each item is the identification number for the publication containing the item (see References, page 47).
- (U) The list of obstacles obtained from the literature survey -- a list of items identified as obstacles to defection -- was found to include all items identified in discussion with knowledgeable individuals and almost all items identified through monitoring the flow of pertinent documents through JUSPAO. Therefore, items obtained from knowledgeable individuals and the JUSPAO document-flow do not appear as entries in Table 3. Analysis of the individual types and of the relationship among the various descriptions of obstacles indicates that the items which fall into the Psychological/Emotional category are the aspects of any individual's total make-up which are the true obstacles to defection. Items in the Attitudes/Beliefs/Opinion column are of secondary importance where there is not a corresponding emotional state but all of the other items identified in the literature as obstacles have only a "contributory" role. Essentially, the contributory items are actions or conditions that function to create or enhance the psychological state that is the true obstacle.
 - (C) The two primary obstacles to defection are identified as:
 - 1. Fear of harm to the self by either side
 - 2. Fear of punitive action against one's family

The "secondary obstacle" is identified as:

- 1. Belief/Faith/Dedication to the notion of ultimate victory
- (U) Results obtained from the card-sort technique offer validating evidence for the existence and significance of the three obstacles described here (see Table 4).

	COMPANIA TTPS ANTONIA	
Hantal/Topological Construction/Provention	Payerest/Interviews1	Secondary Retiretors Families/Section
91. Industrianties and essival by 3-man calls orities and calf- orities consists (12)	St. Chire obsample to long troops may from villages and people of SN to prevent contro- diction between what troops how been tald and runlity (3a)	30. Impalty to the actions - the people - the propie - the providen - and out to - end mercules (9, 10)
53. Continued industri- mation at every open- tunity during and after incliteration (1b)		29. Inticontine (8)
6. Hestal conditioning via cody-connegod calf- criticism occasions and official propagasis (7)	37. Spirit of colf-mori- fice and political and disciplinary control in- stilled vin 3-can coll (7)	25. Devotion to TC ename based on curver impan- tives (1)
76. Spoten of salf- critique, intensive industrimation, and 3-man sall (33)		26. Opportunity for obsertion; milt-improv- ment and advancement in Communicat Ferrors without much advancement (3)
7. The 3-cam call and practice of salf-oriti- cism (1, 8)		35. Seed of coders for a political reticule for infection (9, 10)
12. Servillence and organization (3)	l. Control of contact bettern troops and vilingers and between troops and their Stani- lies (9, 10)	
Si. Reintenance of me- ale and discipline through industriantion and articlaring calf- oriticism essentian (14)	23. W practice of pub- licity conduming by mans pursues who rully, and subing extensants that religing to a heisenes orise, rellizors are and descritors, rellizors are delabel, rellizors are networked by home feelings, rellizors are excepting punishment for crimes (9, 20)	The Read of outres for a probactional friends with CVH (9, 10)
II. Spotes of surveil- lease and control (5)	10. Strict operation of military and civilian arrangely W cheekpoints requiring W prompal to produce W ID and orders (5, 20)	
75, 3-ann cell system and cell-criticism; reinforcement in field (1)	16. Attempts to Supreme vigilance in with where decertion operated (11)	
	2. Sustantion of Losfisto and officts to drive emp leadsymbol plants (9, 30)	
). Punishment for residing or temping inclining. Mo- tending to mile brendments, or residing memorane from 600 arms (f _p 30)	,

METER/PICEUPTS OF CONTINUES

Personne Dituntions
Designation of Society
Structure/Conticted

33. Expertations of vistory or at least manexpertations of defeat (6)

26. Channel of upwell modelity for your and understand (9, 10)

27. last of ourser and orangeland opportunities with CD (3)

js, last of legitimate political alternative to support (3)

7. Fruit that with 3-com sall system, one to syrate plant (7, 10)

55, then as 30% soldier rellies or surrenders, he does not know what sotions are taken against his Smally in 378 (16)

22. Instillty of relliers to go home to a W-contralled area (2)

8. Millioulty of getting may from early unit. (2)

33. Michaelty of lawing a region under thick W control and lask of least place of a revolution of the a STE-controlled area and renormally five of chestpoints and rists of being about at by TE or NYE (2)

df. Mil troops don't know of Chian hai program or don't know it to for thee, too (6, 9, 20)



TABLE 3 . OBSTACLES

THE PARTY OF CONTRACT		THE OF PERSON			
Arms Structions mater of botton MicroTresitions	Boiss	<u>Pakari orga</u>	Inginal/ Intellectual	Attanuess' Soliefo/Seiniges	Papetulagion1/
Dame of states (8)			50. We freelistic acceptance of situation and prospect of violant death (1)	the Subbot to utilizate victory because of fighting for the jack most (j)	
Americal of view for at least aver Actions of defeat (3)	·		57. We exceptance of service to continue of services to continue assisted foreign agreement and as responsibility from which there is no concept (1)	do. Bailed that U.S., Loredd TH to explain 15 and that rade of Borth in to liberate avoidage brothers (Ib.)	
Shannal of spenned Stay for your and Souted (9, 10)		,			
last of career and malous opportunities (STS (1)					
Rack of legitimate Mank alternative Import (3)					'
Short which yourse El sprission, and Lo Solly alasso (9, 10)			Sh. Wit has me choice but to remain with his well in 570 because of June of the choice of 570's gregoryly and not insuring there to less for simulation.	SL. Balief that Su- meden will win. Americans, like French, will be expelled, imerican pusits will not allow not to continue (ik)	19. Peer that defec- tion will provide reprints equint feeing and friends in TO-enteralist orem or in HTH (2)
then on MR soldier Dies or convenience, in is not lines wint sections is not lines wint actions is beam applied this sky in MTS (3h)			in SVS and recomment of southern villagers and peaceuts for help- ing Man (1)		SO, Four that Smally or friends of relliers in VC-controlled arone vall to openered or homed (F, 10)
nability of relliers po here to a TC-com- alled eres (2)					21, Four for physical angles after leaving Orien Set center (9,10)
Mifficulty of gotting by from easi's waith (2)					18. Poor of reprised against wealth or rel- lier if cought on my to relig (2)
h. Bifficulty of lawing region right W broken light W broken and last of immunities of a route lasting to 200-easterlies area of resembly free of between the right of the state of the sta	,		S. Thinking Chien Bed, program in only for year and file soldiers and minor eader (h)	h. Balder that these the nerve IV for long time in responsible justifies were not lo-think factory and good transment (5)	37. Output Stop of budge closeled one for service poster- ment (9,20) 35. Their of amount by 600 on may to make (5)
(3) 1. Illi treeps dui't mee Chien but propen or Put turn 15 to for thee,	•		57. When on 19th colding	M. Baltac was so to	Mr. Prop of 670 punish- land, relativeshing,
(4, 9, 30)			to become a tracker to like such (14)	Si. Salini that it is branching upon to allow appears or that is in bother to the laplary ten to live in done (1,5,10)	(2,3,5,1,28)



OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION	Leaders say is Accept- able	Leaders say is Honor- able	Family will be Affected	Would do This
Find an opportunity to get away from				
your unit,				
Present yourself to GVN or GVN Allies	•		*.	
Accept re-education by the GVN, and	401	a et	A C 84	
Volunteer to work with or enter military service.	y 4%	2%	46%	16%
Find an opportunity to get away from				
your unit,	-	i.		Ÿ.
Present yourself to the GVN or GVN Allies,		,		
Accept re-education by the GVN, and	٠,	÷		
Be a GVN civilian (subject to the draft)	. 2%	***	46%	16%
Leave your unit and assigned duties,	,	•		•
Hide away from your own side and the	,	•		
GVN and GVN Allies, and				
Do not return to your unit or duties.	8%	2%	46%	16%
Find an opportunity to get away from		;		•
your unit,	•			
Present yourself to the GVN or GVN	٠		•	
Allies, and			•	
Request classification as a prisoner-	6%	2%	44%	18%
of-war.	076	276	4470	1070
When in battle with the GVN or GVN	•			•
Allies,			•	•
And it is not yet known who will win the	•			
battle,		•	•	
Decide to stop fighting although you cour continue,	ıld			
Allow yourself to fall into the hands of				
the GVN or GVN Allies, and				
Request classification as a prisoner-				
		•		

TABLE 4 (Con't)

	OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION	Leaders say is Accept- able	Leaders say is Honor- able	Family will be Affect-ed	Would do This
	When alone among many GVN or GVN				•
	Allied troops,				
•	Decide not to try to escape or continue fighting,			•	
`•	Allow yourself to fall into the hands of				
	the GVN or GVN Allies, and				. •
•	Request classification as a prisoner-of	·			
	war.	14%	2%	38%	26%
				,	•
	In combat when situation is hopeless,		• • • •		
•	Decide to stop fighting to avoid being	•			
	killed, Allow yourself to fall into the hands of				
Ī	the GVN or GVN Allies, and		·		,
	Request classification as a prisoner-of			•	•
•	war.	12%	2%	34%	32%
-	When exposed to GVN or GVN Allied				
	troops,		•	•	. •
	And you have no weapons or ammunition	•	•		
•	Decide to stop fighting to avoid being killed,	•			. •
-	Allow yourself to fall into the hands	·.	•.		•
	of the GVN or GVN Allies, and		•		
-	Request classification as a prisoner-of	_	_	,	
	war.	18%	6%	32%	44%
_	When your unit is surrounded, unable	•	•		
	to escape, and heavily outgunned,			• •	
	Decide to stop fighting to avoid being			•	
	killed,	, ,		•	•
-	Allow yourself to fall into the hands of			٠.	
	the GVN or GVN Allies, and		:	•	••
-	Request classification as a prisoner-of		•		
	war.	10%	4%	32%	40%

TABLE 4 (Con't)

	Leaders say is Accept- able	Leaders say is Honor- able	Family will be Affected	Would do this
When unconscious, dazed, or in shock, Seriously weakened by illness or wounds	•			
 You are found and made a prisoner by				
the GVN or GVN Allies, and you	•			
 Request classification as a prisoner-				
 of-war.	58%	22%	14%	74%

- (U) These results and the consistent similarity in pattern of the results of other similar studies are convincing evidence that both the fears and the beliefs are the product of long-term pervasive and intensive conditioning through repetitive indoctrination, propaganda, and a total monitoring system not unlike the clan chief house leader block captain ward boss organizational surveillance system that was so common in large U.S. cities early in the twentieth century. Whether in RVN or NVN, the monitoring ability provided by a network of "organizations," "associations," and "groups" starting as early as age six with the Children's Association, the ability to confer or withhold basic necessities of life, plus a sophisticated program aimed at the "common man" although controlled by a "power elite," combine to represent very powerful and effective means for both "thought control" and "behavior control" from birth to death.
- (C) Results obtained from a questionnaire study of 50 NVA PW's provided equally strong validating evidence for the primary and secondary obstacles identified here.
- (U) A sample of 50 NVA PW's was asked: "When you (surrendered/were captured), what did you expect would happen next?" The responses were:

Would be imprisoned	4%
Feared being shot at	4%
Would be beaten	14%
Would be tortured	2%
Would be beaten and tortured	16%
Would be beaten and killed	14%
Would be beaten, tortured, and killed	2%
Would be killed	24%
Other responses (no answer, etc.)	20%
Total	100%

- (U) In summary, of the total sample 72 percent expected at least to be beaten; 40% expected to be killed. If the percentage is based only on those who gave an answer, the corresponding percentages would be 90 percent and 50 percent.
- (U) When those who answered the previous question were next asked: "Any specific reasons why you expected this?" the responses were:

Leaders say so	15%
Others say so	17%
All prisoners are treated so/	
captors want information	18%
Revenge/anger/willfulness	17%
Not sure captors follow policy	
(leaflet promises)	5%
"I was beaten up"	8%
Other responses (no answer, etc.)	20%
Total	100%

- (U) In summary, 67 percent gave answers which, in context, appear to be derived directly from indoctrination and propaganda. Again, if the percentage is based only on those who gave an answer, the corresponding percentage would be 85 percent.
- (U) The questionnaire offers internal validation of these figures by cross-checking with another type of question.
- (U) When asked: "Were you ever told anything about the way GVN treats prisoners?" the answers were:

During political indoctrination o	r	
training in NVN	•	28%
By other sources		40%
To	tal	68%

(U) When asked: "What kind of treatment was said to be given to GVN prisoners?" the answers were:

Very bad		36%
Bad		26%
Normal fairness		0%
Good	•	2%
Very good .	•	0%
Other (no answer, etc.)		36%
•	Total	100%

(U) Again, 65-70 percent of the PW's gave answers which indicated their beliefs or fears to be directly in line with indoctrination and propaganda to which they are subjected. If the percentage is based only on those who answered, 97 percent said "Very bad" or "Bad" treatment.

Conclusions

- (U) In an earlier section of this report it was noted that the so-called obstacles identified in the literature represented descriptions of causal factors, resultant conditions, intermediate states, by-products of causal factors, etc. The question was raised, "What level of approach to, or manner of description of obstacles represents a meaningful, systematic, and informative method of identification and categorization of obstacles to defection which facilitates identification of appropriate and maximally effective counter-action?"
- (U) The highest level of analysis or categorization previously applied to the general question of obstacles and vulnerabilities was "grouping by similarity". In the present study grouping by similarity served mainly to highlight the way in which problems in interpretation were created by variability in terminology and level of description or analysis.
- (C) When the data was organized in systematic, meaningful fashion, the answer to the test question became obvious immediately. It is not realistically possible to eliminate the causal factor, i.e., to stop the enemy from his practice of public condemnations; therefore, effort toward this practice is wasted. It may be possible to attempt to deal with the resultant effect of the causal factor (the threat or control) -- the fear of public condemnations held by individuals. These fears which reside in the individual are the true obstacles and they are of a nature that could possibly be changed. Therefore, the individually-based element is the obstacle and it is upon the individual psychological/emotional state that psyop should be focused. This fact is not evident in the manner in which the majority of obstacles are described in the literature.
- (C) Analysis of the material presented in Table 3, reinforced by the results of field research, identified two Psychological/Emotional factors which can be termed primary obstacles; these are:
 - a. Fear of harm to the self by either side
 - b. Fear of punitive action against one's family

One secondary obstacle, an Opinion/Belief/Attitude factor is:

a. Belief/Faith/Dedication to the notion of ultimate victory.

(C) In summary, the stated (or the to-be-inferred) psychological/ emotional state of the individual represents the only true obstacle and is the aspect that must be focused upon and attacked by the psychological operator in any attempt to nullify or overcome obstacles to defection.

(U) TABLE 5

RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS: INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES TABLE 5 (Cont.)

,						• .	•
HSR	Y e	o Z	9 Z	÷	* X	ç	* *
by HSR	°Z	Š.	°Z	°Z	S.	Š.	Ĉ.
Frequency	Daily	Weekly	Daily	Weekly	Daily	Periodic	Weekly
Type of Data	Report	Report	Report	Summary	Trans	Summary	Summary
Content	Combined Interrogation Center/Combined Security Committee - Saigon Infor- mation	Attitude Survey Information	Delta Military Assistance Command IV Corps, Intel- ligence Information	Delta Military Assistance Command IV Corps, Intel- ligence Information	Captured Document and PW/Returnee Interroga- tion Information	Force Development In- formation	Activity Information
Classi- fication	KIN/C	Þ	U	U.	Ü	S	U
Origi- nator	CSCS	CORDS	DMAC	DMAC	CMIC/ CDEC	USARV	USARV
T i t le	7. CIC/CSCS Report	8. CORDS Weekly Attitude	9. DMAC Daily Intelligence Summary	10. DMAC Periodic Intel- ligence Report	11. DOD Intelligence Infor- mation Report	12. Force Development by Branch Printout	13. G2 USARV Briefing Notes

40

RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS: INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES TABLE 5 (Con't.)

	T i t l o	Origi- nator	Classi- fication	Contents	Type of Data	Frequency	Rec'd by HSR	for HSR Task
14.	HAC Daily Intelligence Reports	HAC	Fouo	Headquarters Area Com- mand Report of Saigon	Report	Daily	° Z	0 Z
15.	15. Hamlet Evaluation Re- port	CORDS	Ů,	Friendly/Unfriendly/Con- tested Hamlet Status	Evaluation Monthly	Monthly	°Z	Yes
16.	J2 Monthly PERINTREP MACV	MACV	Ŋ	Intelligence Information	Summa ry	Monthly	S S	Yes
41	J2 Weekly Summary In- MACV telligence Estimate Up-date	MACV	s/c	Intelligence Information	Summary	Weekly	°Z	¥e.
18.	MACV COC (Command Operations Center) Daily Journal	MACV	U	Report of each Military Incident (violence) and Results	Report	Daily	o Z	° Z
19.	MACV Daily Bulletin	MACV	U	Report of Daily Activities	Report	Daily	°Z	o N.
20.	MACV Intelligence	Brief MACV	υ	Intelligence Information	Summary	Weekly	°Z	Yes
21.	21. MACV DISUM	MACV	s/c	Intelligence Information	Report	Daily	%	Yes
22.	MACV Monthly Psyop Report	MACV	υ.	Payop Information	Summary	Monthly	S.	Yes

RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS: INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES TABLE 5 (Con't.)

•	RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS: INTELLIGEN	responding to					Reg Rec'd	Value
		Origi-	Classi-	4 4 4 5	Type of Data	Frequency	by HSR	HSR
	T i t 1 e	nator	fication					
23.	MACV Periodic Intel- ligence Report	MACV	S	Intelligence Information	Summary	Periodic	o Z	Ye.
24.	MACV Weekly Psyop Report	MACV	υ	Psyop Information	Report	Weekly	%	Yes
25.	NILO Reports I, II, III, IV CTZ's	NILO	Ö	Intelligence Information from Navy Liaison Intelli- gence Office	Report	Daily	°Z.	Ye.
.92	Order of Battle Sum- mary	MACJ-2	U	Order of Battle Information	Summary	Monthly	°Z	Yes
27.	PSA Intelligence Re- ports, IV CTZ	CMAS	Ü	Province Senior Advisor Intelligence Information	Report	Daily	°Z.	o Z
28.	Riverine Area Intelli- gence Officer Report	COMNA V FOR V	υ	Intelligence Information	Report	Daily	o Z	No O
29.	SF Company Reports I, II, III, IV CTZ's	5th SF	U	Operations Information from Special Forces	Report	Daily	S	e N
30.	Special Police Reports	Salgon Special Police	υ	Activity Information	Report	Weekly	Š.	* •

42

TABLE 5 (Con't.)

RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS: INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES

	H + 1 0	Origi- nator	Classi- fication	Content	Type of Data	Frequency	Rec'd by HSR	for HSR Task
31.	SRA VC and NVA Radio and Press Propaganda	MACV 7th AF	0	Radio and Press Informs-	Analysis	Weekly	°Z	Yes
32.	Tactical Scale Area Analysis	547th Engr Plt	O	Geographic-oriented Infor- mation	Analysis	Periodic	o X	o.
33.	US Mission Weekly Re- port	Embassy	υ	Activity Information	Report	Weekly	o Z	Yes
34.	34. US Senior Advisor, 9th ARVN Div Intelligence Report	DMAC	υ	Intelligence Information	Report	Daily	°Z	Š.
35.	USARV Daily Army Operations Summary	USARV	Ü	Operations Information	Report	Daily	<u>0</u>	° Z
36.	USARV Daily Bulletin	USARV	Þ	Activity Information	Report	Daily	°Z.	°.
37.	USARV Daily Intelligence Report	USARV	U	Intelligence Information	Report	Daily	o Z	Yes
38.	Vietnam Intelligence Summary	7th AF	υ	Intelligence Information	Summary	Weekly	°Z.	S.

43

TABLE 5 (Con't.)

RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS: INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES

							Reg Rec'd	Value
	T i t l e	Origi- nator	Classi- fication	Contents	Type of Data	Frequency	by HSR	HSR
39.	I Field Force Intelli- gence Report	I FF VN	υ _:	Intelligence Information II Corps	Report	Weekly	o N	Yes
40.	1st Marine Div Report	1 MarDiv	υ	Activity Information	Report	Daily	o Z	°Z
41.	II Field Force Periodic Intelligence Report	II FF VN	U·	III Corps Intelligence Infor- mation	Report	Weekly	о 	Yes
42.	III Marine Amphibious Force Intelligence Sum.	III MAF	ပ	I Corps Intelligence Infor- mation	Report	Daily	°Z	°Z
43.	III Marine Amphibious Force Interrogation Rpt.	III MAF	Ü	Interrogation Information	Report	Periodic	o Z	°Z
44.	III Marine Amphibious Force Intelligence Rpt.	III MAF	Ų	Intelligence Information	Report	Weekly	^o Z	Yes
45.	III Marine Amphibious Weekly Psyop Report	'III MAF	υ	Psyop Information	Report	Weekly	o N	Yes
46.	4th Infantry Div Daily Intelligence Summary	4th Inf Div	ΰ	Intelligence Information for Binh Dinh and Kontum Pro- vinces in II Corps	Report	Daily	%	s.

S	Value for HSR Task	Yes	Yes	Yes	!	Yes	Yes	S.	X cs
LITIE	Reg Rec'd by HSR	%	Š.	Z	t 1	o Z	°Z	°Z	S S
/ULNERABI	Frequency	Summary Bi-Weekly	Weekly	Weekly	Diacon- tinued	Weekly	Weckly	Periodic	Weekly
CLES AND	Type of Data	Summary	Report	Summary	Summa ry	Summary	Summary	Report	Summary
LICATIONS: INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES	Contents	Intelligence/Psyop Infor- mation	Intelligence Information from Special Forces	Intelligence/Psyop Infor- mation	Intelligence Information	Intelligence/Psyop Infor- mation	Intelligence/Psyop Infor- mation	Interrogation Information	Intelligence/Psyop Infor- mation
ELLIGE	Classi- fication	U	U	υ	SNF	υ	U	U	υ
IONS: INI	Origi- nator	4th Psy- op Gp	5th SF	6th Psy- op Bn	7th AF	7th Psy- op Bn	8th Psy- op Bn	9th MID	10th Psy- op Bn
RECURRENT PUBLICAT	T : t 1 c	4th Psyop Bi-Weekly Intelligence Summary	5th Special Forces Weekly Intelligence Summary	6th Psyop Battalion Intelligence Summary	7th AF Weekly Air In- telligence Sunmary	7th Psyop Battalion In- telligence Summary	8th Psyop Battalion In- telligence Summary	9th MI Detachment In- terrogation Report	10th Psyop Battalion Intelligence Summary
		47.	48	49.	.50	51.	52.	53.	54.

TABLE 5 (Con't.)
RECURRENT PUBLICATIONS: INTELLIGENCE RELATIVE TO OBSTACLES AND VULNERABILITIES

Origi- Classi-	•			Rec'd	
•	Contents	Type of Data	Frequency	uy HSR	HSR
XXIV C I C Corps	I Corps Army Intelligence Information	Report	Daily	o Z	o Z
55th C Into	Information from Military Intelligence	Report	Weekly	°Z	o Z
173rd Airborne Brigade 173rd C Int. Daily Intelligence Sum- Abn Bde fromary	Intelligence Information from Binh Dinh Province in II Corps	Report	Daily	o V	°Z
525th MI Defense Intel- 525th C/CNF Inf ligence Information Re- MI	C/CNF Information from Military Intelligence	Report	Weekly	82	°Z

4.6

UNCLASSIFIED

55.

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PAG TASK 2

STUDY OF ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

PAG TASK 2

STUDY OF ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

Summary and Introduction

- (U) The objectives of a study originally scheduled to continue for l1 calendar months throughout the contract term were identification, assessment, and selection of "vulnerabilities" of target audiences for exploitation.
- (U) Research activities included a survey of the literature, monitoring of an available flow of pertinent current documents, interviewing knowledgeable individuals in the psyop field, development of data-collection instruments and procedures, and field research to collect current data.

Major Findings

(U) 1. "Vulnerabilities" and "exploitation of vulnerabilities" have not been reported widely in the research literature.

In the absence of a usable official operational definition of the term, "vulnerabilities were defined as (a) aspects of VC/NVA that have a negative effect on VC/NVA personnel and (b) aspects of GVN that have a positive effect on VC/NVA personnel.

- (U) 2. One hundred and thirty representative vulnerabilities identified in the literature were compared with the vulnerabilities identified through interviews with psyoperators and by monitoring the current document flow, and were cross-checked against field research data. The 130 "vulnerabilities" represented a very widely diversified assortment of observations pitched at many different levels of generalization within many different frames of reference.
- (C) 3. In order to eliminate duplications and varied ways of describing the same phenomenon, a modified input-output analytic procedure was used to organize the "vulnerabilities" in meaningful fashion. As a result of this procedure, vulnerabilities were redefined and classified as:

"Primary Vulnerabilities" - a state of increased receptivity or lowered resistance to specific modes and contents of communications having general applicability to the majority of an enemy (or friendly) audience.

Primary vulnerabilities result from, and their existence is inferred mainly from, psychological/emotional states which are the primary determinants of human behavior in a stressful situation. Psychological/emotional states are therefore the "primary mediating factor" for "primary vulnerabilities".

"Secondary Vulnerabilities" - represent a state of increased receptivity or lowered resistance to specific modes and contents of communications that has any or all of the following characteristics: there is a markedly lesser degree of change in receptivity or resistance, applicability is markedly less pervasive, and mediating factors are of less significance than those related to primary vulnerabilities. Secondary vulnerabilities result from, and their existence is inferred mainly but not exclusively from attitudes, beliefs, and opinions which, compared to emotional states, have less ability to influence significant behavior in a stressful situation.

Both primary and secondary vulnerabilities are the resultants of many complex interacting factors. The primary vulnerabilities and primary mediating factors operate in a more extended time frame but, in the case of truly shattering external events, can come into existence with great speed because psychological/emotional changes can occur immediately or overnight.

In general, what has been treated as "vulnerabilities" in the literature is now identified as "primary mediating factors", "secondary mediating factors", and "contributory mediating factors".

(C) 4. Two primary vulnerabilities, each with related primary mediating factors, were identified, one applicable to all VC and one applicable to all NVA. For each primary vulnerability, two secondary vulnerabilities and their related secondary mediating factors were identified.

The primary VC vulnerability is:

a. Greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about the near-term future.

The related primary mediating factor is:

"Generalized deterioration of the will to fight" resulting from a feeling that in the current situation he has little to gain and much to lose. The feeling is caused by his perception of the present situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding.

Secondary VC vulnerabilities are:

a. Increased readiness to give credence to messages which indirectly reflect recognition of his current plight and feelings and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of Party controls and which remove uncertainty about the near future to the greatest extent possible by description of rally or surrender procedures and what is to be expected afterward.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Negative reaction against Party control methods" which are becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application and which affect him, his relatives, and his fellow VC.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indirectly indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change his situation.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Feeling of victimization" resulting from interaction of many factors, chief of which are the increasing drain created by progressively greater levies upon all VC to fulfill quotas that once may have been realistic when the VC population was larger but which are now oppressive in view of the reduced number of NLF supporters, and the disappearance of hope of victory and any tangible form of reward for service and sacrifice for the "liberation" cause.

The primary NVA vulnerability is:

a. Potential for receptivity to messages which indirectly confirm and complement the sources of a
generalized disaffection; receptivity is discussed
in terms of potential because the available evidence supports only the notion of a developing
trend toward erosion of morale and allegiance to
the cause rather than any active rejection.

The related primary mediating factor is:

"Recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and paucity of positive rewards" in a situation that may result in a long-drawn-out half-war. The modest amount of current information available does not suggest active resistance or rejection of the "liberation" cause.

Secondary NVA vulnerabilities are:

a. Decreased resistance to acceptance of messages which indirectly reflect existence of disparities between NVN indoctrination and RVN reality. There is no evidence as yet that this receptivity in itself is adequate to cause any widespread positive reaction to messages suggesting such drastic and final actions as rally, surrender, self-assisted capture, etc.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"NVA disillusionment in RVN" which may occur on the infrequent occasions when the NVA comes into contact with RVN civilians or receives other visual evidence of disparities between indoctrination-derived notions and what is actually seen.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify taking an action that will benefit both the NVA soldier and his family.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Family-centered concerns" which stem from an extremely complicated interrelationship of obligation and dependency. The preservation of his relationship to his family is perhaps the single most important concern in the life of the North (or South) Vietnamese soldier.

All other literature-identified "vulnerabilities" are regarded as contributory mediating factors which may function to enhance the effect of vulnerabilities.

(U) 5. Data obtained from field research supports the existence of the kinds and degrees of vulnerabilities listed in Conclusion 4.

Suggestions/Recommendations

- (C) 1. Give formal endorsement or formalize a procedural requirement for use of the definitions, terminology, and classification system described here, in order to provide a consistent and systematic base for theory and practice in psyop communications.
- (C) 2. Apply the concept of targeting and tailoring to the vulnerabilities defined in Part 4, Major Findings. This results in targeting the largest possible audience possessing the highest potential for receptivity with a message appropriately tailored to the sub-factors given in the description of each vulnerability.
- (C) 3. Gain the advantage represented by cumulative "build-up" and "familiarity" effects of repetitive use of the same high-quality messages by developing and using only a limited number of best-possible-quality messages for each issue treated in psyop communications.

Devote the man-hours saved through reduction of the design and development workload to a quality assurance program during development -- not after distribution.

(C) 4. Task a group of qualified individuals to design standardized actions and procedures for any type of "friendly" involvement in a rally, surrender, or capture situation; the product of this task must cover the subject down to the lowest level of detail in operation instructions -- policy statements are not needed.

55

(C) 5. Formulate and implement a uniform coordinated education program for all friendly forces, government personnel, and civilians. Implementation does not mean handing out booklets.

If a top GVN or U.S. official would involve himself and set the pattern by personally conducting a training session -- even if it is for his cabinet or staff -- it would be a very valuable psyop effort.

The content of this program should be the standardized procedures described in "4" above plus emphatic descriptions of all laws, penalties, sanctions, etc., that can be identified as pertinent to such situations. Maximum publicity should be given to implementation of these activities. Execute the training/orientation program as quickly as possible beginning with all military and para-military personnel.

- (C) 6. Develop and make massive repetitive distribution of one or two leaflets devoted to the themes:
 - a. "The worth of your family is known well -- their friends will not reject them just because you had the misfortune to fall into GVN hands."
 - b. "Surely your family will rejoice in accepting some discomfort to help you stay alive so you can all be together again."

Comments

(C) 1. A serious question is raised in regard to the productive utility of the concept of targeting specific groups and tailoring specific messages or appeals.

The trade-off issue is the distinction between:

a. Using small quantities of many different leaflets aimed at many small groups of people, developed in many different locations by many different people who possess many different levels of expertise and many differences in viewpoints in an attempt to exploit various specific enemy characteristics identified through local limited research efforts or by personal intuition which are thought to represent significant vulnerabilities. Or,

- b. Country-wide coverage with large amounts of a small number of messages of the highest quality, produced by the best qualified, most knowledge-able, and best-informed professionals working with a small number of carefully-validated themes which have the greatest impact on the most widespread vulnerabilities, selected on the basis of carefully executed research and testing.
- (C) 2. Research evidence from this and other studies indicates that much greater effectiveness can be hoped for under the conditions described in option "b" above. Centralized control of policy and operations combined with a generalized approach to psyop communications will enable time, money, and effort (that otherwise would be needlessly devoted to design, development, production, distribution, control and use of materials with a restricted audience) to be devoted instead to:
 - -- intensive attention to quality and quality control of the total product,
 - -- intensive planning, guidance, and control of the use of the products,
 - -- intensive timely control checks on effectiveness of the product in use.

The generalized approach also facilitates:

- -- quicker reaction time on all design, development, production, and distribution functions,
- -- quicker adaptation to sudden changes, newly-perceived needs, or changed requirements.

The generalized approach, implemented properly, will:

- -- reduce manpower requirements,
- -- reduce development, production and operating costs through increased volume and decreased wastage.

An additional unique advantage is:

- -- the need for individuals at all levels of involvement who possess exceptional expertise and competence, and who either are not available because of competing requirements or who do not exist because of the comparatively short history of intensive psyop activities, is reduced to a minimum,
- -- conversely, the products of the most competent and qualified specialists available will have the broadest possible distribution and greatest potential for productive impact.

Finally:

-- The many advantages inherent in the smaller centralized effort, when responsibility for psyop is transferred to RVN agencies, are obvious.

(U) Objectives for a study of enemy vulnerabilities were detection, assessment, and selection of vulnerabilities of target audiences for exploitation. The study had been requested for top priority research effort scheduled for approximately 18-19 man-months spread over almost 11 calendar months. This report represents approximately ten man-months effort spread over slightly more than four calendar months. It was presented to the Project Advisory Group as an interim report, but was considered to furnish a complete response to the question.

Problem

- (U) MACV requested HSR to conduct a continuing investigation of enemy vulnerabilties. The PAG Task Statement:
 - Task 2, Priority 1: Provide research directed toward detection, assessment, and selection for exploitation of vulnerabilities of target audiences to GVN/US/FWMAF psychological operations.
- (U) This task is considered continuous with high priority for the duration of the conflict now going on in Vietnam. The effectiveness of appeals for defection, in all probability, is dependent upon the interaction and adequacy of exploitation of the maximum usable number of enemy vulnerabilities as these vulnerabilities change with changing situations.

Background

(U) Despite the attention given the subject of vulnerabilities and the exploitation of vulnerabilities, it had not been widely reported in the literature. Succeeding command personnel in Vietnam had expressed an urgent need for information on this point in succeeding reports of priority requirements for the Vietnam mission.

HSR Research Approach

(U) Systematic attack on the problem included survey of the literature, monitoring an available flow of pertinent current documents, interviewing knowledgeable individuals in the psyop field, developing data-collection instruments and procedures, and conducting field research.

Research Plan

- 1. Survey available reports of work, already completed in Vietnam over the past two years, on the identity of enemy vulnerabilities.
- 2. From the results of this survey, abstract the list of vulnerabilities reported from previous research surveyed.
- 3. Interview knowledgeable people within the psyop community to obtain expert opinions on vulnerabilities; this highly qualified source is ordinarily lost because of the rapid turnover of personnel.
- 4. Analyze current data and conditions and attempt to project upcoming situations in terms of changing conditions within which appeals might be made and in terms of the kind and size of exploitative effort that might be productive.
- 5. Subject the list of vulnerabilities obtained to re-evaluation in the light of constantly changing efforts and new situations. Explore the possibilities for developing means to rank the set of vulnerabilities so obtained in terms of their relative importance and their exploitability.
- 6. Scan the flow of reports from available sources and scan the week-to-week working papers coming out of current interrogations on a continuous basis for data bearing on vulnerabilities emerging from this source.
- 7. Based on the literature survey and on analysis and monitoring of interrogation reports, develop a classification system applicable to vulnerabilities.
- 8. Design and develop needed questionnaires and interview forms and procedures appropriate for various types of subjects.

- 9. Working with personnel and staff of the Center for Vietnamese Studies and with Vietnamese government agencies (to the extent possible under deadline pressures) and with interested U.S. military and government units, execute surveys employing these forms and procedures as needed to fill gaps in available information and for early exploration of suspected trends.
- 10. Summarize, analyze, and interpret the data gained in these surveys.
- 11. Report on each separate study as soon as possible after completion.
- (U) Schedule. Tasks specified in the research plan were to be filled over the entire contract period. Work on Task 2 was begun in the first month after start of contract and was to be continued through the contract period. It was coordinated with and integrated with Task 1 during the first four-month period, when the PAG, on receipt of this report, prepared as an interim report, determined that the task had been completed.

Procedure

- (U) Systematic investigation of enemy vulnerabilities during the initial four-month period involved five major activities:
 - 1. Survey of pertinent available literature.
 - 2. Interviews with available knowledgeable individuals.
 - 3. Monitoring of the current available document flow through JUSPAO.
 - 4. Development and field-testing of four separate comprehensive, compartmentalized, computer-compatible question-naires for NVA POW's and Hoi Chanh, and for VC POW's and Hoi Chanh. Because of requests for research treatment of a set of Vietnamese terms which represent very fine distinctions, it was necessary also to develop a means of by-passing some language problems. A card-sort technique, designed to reduce the need for verbal communication, was developed, field-tested, and put in use.
 - 5. Field surveys using inherited and newly-developed datacollection instruments for studies of NVA POW's and NVA Hoi Chanh.

61

- (U) Four of the five major activities were conducted concurrently; emphasis initially was on the literature survey and on interviews with knowledgeable individuals in order to quickly gain perspective on current vulnerabilities. During this time two field surveys were made with sample groups of NVA PW's and Hoi Chanh using questionnaires obtained from or designed largely by other sources. When the inadequacies of the existing questionnaires became clearly evident, effort was shifted to focus on design and development of questionnaires, procedures, and other types of data-collection instruments. At the same time, arrangements were made to begin monitoring the flow of documents through JUSPAO to evaluate their utility as a source of data on current "vulnerabilities".
- (U) During this time, a survey was made of interrogation procedures in current use to consider their effect on POW responses to subsequent interviews. Also, a team of Vietnamese interviewers was recruited and trained in the use of the newly-developed questionnaires and card-sort procedures.
- (U) Additional questionnaire surveys were conducted in the field as soon as the newly-designed questionnaires were completed.

Survey of the Literature

(U) A survey of literature relevant to enemy "vulnerabilities" was conducted. The survey was limited to documents physically available in Saigon with publication dates prior to 1 September 1969.

Definition of "Vulnerabilities"

- (U) The issue of adequate definition of the concept and nature of "vulnerabilities" -- and especially the proper mode of definition and description of a vulnerability when identified -- had to be considered before the literature survey could begin.
- (U) The Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage (JCS, August 1968) provides the following definition of "vulnerability":

"The susceptibility of a nation or armed military force to any action by any means through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight diminished."

(U) Also defined in the same dictionary is the term "vulnerability study":

"An analysis of the capabilities and limitations of a force in a specific situation to determine vulnerabilities capable of exploitation by an opposing force."

(U) In the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) dictionary definition of "vulnerability", the term "susceptibility" is a key word but no definition is given in this or any other official military dictionaries. A reference which approaches being a definition of "susceptibility" -- found in the Psyop Manual -- does not have official endorsement but was the only one found in the available literature:

'The susceptibility column contains information relative to the odds in favor of communicating successfully with the particular target group at a particular time about a particular subject ... consideration is also given to the unfulfilled wants, needs, and feelings of the target group. Care must be exercised not to confuse susceptibility with accessability."

(U) The U.S. Army Field Manual, FM 33-1, defines susceptibility as:

"Target audience potential for being influenced through PSYOP."

- (U) Because of the broad scope and non-specific nature of available definitions, for the purposes of this literature survey vulnerabilities were defined as follows: (1) aspects of VC/NVA that have a negative effect on NVA/VC personnel, and (2) aspects of GVN that create a positive reaction in NVA/VC personnel.
- (U) It is especially important to note that this definition was created from a first cursory survey of the content of the literature and was constructed solely to take the best possible reading of past and current treatment of vulnerabilities; it is not necessarily the definition recommended as a result of this study.

Method

(U) Among the sources covered, four major sources were: (1) the Advanced Research Projects Agency library, (2) the Joint United States

Public Affairs Office files, (3) the Military Assistance Command 13 Information Center, and (4) the Military Assistance Command - Vietnam Civil Operations Rural Development Support Information Center.

- (U) Inquiries were made also to investigate the possible existence of higher classified documents. Of those found, inspection did not disclose any material that added significantly to the list of "vulnerabilities" already identified; therefore, these higher-classified documents are not treated in this report.
- (U) A total of approximately 3500 documents was available; all of these titles were searched, and 115 documents were selected for screening. Abstracts and other descriptive material in these 115 documents were read and 46 were identified as containing information on the subject of enemy vulnerabilities. These 46 studies were reviewed in detail. Detailed information relevant to defection and to vulnerabilities was summarized on forms designed for the purpose (see Chart 2). Statements of vulnerabilities were abstracted and listed. It was from these records that data analysis began. A total of 22 documents were found to directly or indirectly describe enemy "vulnerabilities." (See References, p. 119.)

Interviews with Knowledgeable Individuals

(U) A total of sixteen individuals were interviewed formally and informally to obtain their views on current or enduring "vulnerabilities". The interviewees were selected on the basis of present or past involvement in psyop and on the basis of availability. It had seemed probable that, in the absence of any formal machinery for creating an "institutional memory", much valuable knowledge must be being dissipated because of short tours of duty and frequent changes in assignments. When it became evident that the interviews were not producing significant items not already discovered in the literature, the interviewing was discontinued.

Monitoring of Document Flow

(U) Through the office of Plans, Policies, and Research, a request was made within JUSPAO that copies of all documents possibly pertinent to enemy "vulnerabilities" or "obstacles to defection" be forwarded to the HSR research team on a daily basis. The request had two purposes:

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CHART 2. DOCUMENT SUMMARY REPORT (U)

Reviewer Date

(U) A. Title:

(U) B. Source: Author:

Agency:

Classification:

(U) C. Date of Publication: Date of Research:

(U) D. Research Problem:

(U) E. Research Approach:

(U) F. Principal Conclusions:

(U) G. Abstract of Recommendations of Author, if any:

(U) H. Comment: Ideas for Further Consideration; Fruitful Research Directions (recommended by reviewer):

(U) I. Related or Subsequent Work, or Relevant Sources (known to reviewer):

(U) J. List Statements of following (as defined by author): 1. Susceptibilities

2. Vulnerabilities

3. Obstacles

UNCLASSIFIED

one was to identify the most productive sources of current pertinent intelligence data relative to "vulnerabilities" and "obstacles", and the other was to assess the kind, amount, utility, and timely availability of such materials. This information was needed also to develop perspective on other activities contemplated in the future.

- (U) Three recurrent publications, which are unclassified and which originate within JUSPAO, were received regularly:
 - 1. "Principal Radio Reports from Communist Radio Sources" (daily)
 - 2. "Saigon Press Review" (daily)
 - 3. "Vietnam Documents and Research Notes" (periodic)
- (U) Publication 1 contains translations of communist radio broadcasts. Publication 2 contains translations of news headlines and editorial comments from Vietnamese and Chinese daily newspapers published in Saigon. Both publications provide some useful background information about certain aspects of the current situation but little that is specific to the subject of enemy "vulnerabilities". Publication 3 presents excerpts from captured documents plus background information and interpretation; some are quite relevant to "vulnerabilities".
 - (U) Other recurrent publications were received irregularly; these are:
 - 1. "Combined Document Exploitation Center Bulletins" (daily)
 - 2. "Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report" (daily)
 - 3. "International Press Service Correspondent" (periodic)
 - 4. "Mission Press Releases" (periodic)
 - 5. "Vietnam Roundup" (periodic)
 - 6. "Wireless File" (daily)
- (U) In this group, Publications 1 and 2 are confidential; the others are unclassified. Publication 1 is originated by CDEC and contains descriptions of captured documents. Publication 2 is originated either by CDEC or the Combined Military Interrogation Center. CDEC issues translations

of captured documents, and CMIC issues Knowledgeability Briefs concerning information potential of prisoners of war and returnees, and transcripts of interrogations of PW's and returnees.

- (U) Captured documents are screened at CDEC for exploitation potential and some are sent to JUSPAO daily. Interrogation reports are sent to JUSPAO daily. These two types of material, some of which were received occasionally by the research team through JUSPAO and some of which were not received at all, represent the raw material from which almost all intelligence analysts, psyop analysts, etc., in South Vietnam work.
- (U) The sources of these materials were investigated to supplement the materials received within JUSPAO. Fifty-eight recurrent reports and their sources were identified as potentially useful. After a review of files of each of these sources of reports, it was judged that thirtytwo of the recurrent reports would have potential value for the "vulnerabilities" task. Coverage, abstraction, and maintenance of files of these reports which were not included in the flow of documents which have been monitored, would have required much more time than could be allocated; therefore, arrangements were not made for regular receipt of these documents. A list of the fifty-eight reports is in Task 1, Table 5. In the event the direction of future works should indicate the desirability of obtaining these documents, preliminary arrangements were made to expedite access to or receipt of most of those that might be needed. It would be expensive in terms of man-hours but would almost certainly be productive in terms of (a) increasing confidence in inferences and findings by providing cross-checks for current field research data, and (b) through providing current research-data cross-checks, thereby shortening the length of time required to accumulate evidence in a quantity and of a quality and consistency that permits conclusions and justifies actions.
- (U) In summary, monitoring the flow of documents through JUSPAO proved to be a valuable means of cross-checking on "vulnerabilities" reported in the literature. For instance, some of the literature-identified vulnerabilities continued to be reported with varying frequencies, some had disappeared, and some not mentioned in the literature had been identified in the document flow.

Development of Data-Collection Instrument/Procedures

- (U) Results of participation in surveys using questionnaires obtained from other sources or questionnaires designed in large part by other participants showed clearly that new and radically different questionnaires and procedures would have to be developed for at least four specific groups; i.e., NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's, and VC Hoi Chanh. These and their development are described in the report of Task 3, "Enemy Characteristics". The new questionnaire for NVA PW's and ralliers was composed of independent sections, each of which could be used alone or in any combination of sections depending on the focus of interest.
- (U) As a partial solution to the problem of maintaining "conceptual equivalence" in working between different languages, an essentially behavioral card-sort technique was developed, field-tested, and used to supplement questionnaire data. Development of this instrument is also described in the Task 3 report.

Execution of Field Surveys

- (U) In mid-September 1969, HSR research personnel participated in a quick survey of 60 NVA Hoi Chanh using an already-available question-naire and early in October, participated with several groups in testing 24 NVA PW's. HSR personnel completed the analysis of the utility of the questionnaire and the summarization and analysis of the data. Results from both the Hoi Chanh and the PW studies are reported in HSR Working Paper Number 1.
- (U) Results of the two studies described in the preceding paragraph emphasized the urgent need for appropriate data-collection instruments. New questionnaires and procedures were designed and developed as mentioned in the preceding section titled "Development of Data-Collection Instruments and Procedures".
- (U) During December 1969 and January 1970, newly-developed questionnaires were given to a sample of 50 NVA PW's and 11 NVA Hoi Chanh. A scheduled survey of 50 NVA Hoi Chanh could not be completed because of delays in translation and printing. A scheduled survey of 50 NVA PW's in II CTZ was delayed for more than three weeks because authorization

to enter the Pleiku PW camp was delayed when the request for authorization somehow became lost in the administrative machinery. The Pleiku study was completed later when the access authorization was received.

(U) The card-sort task or procedure, designed to reduce language problems, was given to 50 NVA PW's.

Results

- (U) Vulnerabilities were identified through a search of the pertinent research literature, monitoring of the current pertinent document-flow, interviews with knowledgeable workers in the field of psyop, and by field surveys.
- (U) The documents from which the list of enemy "vulnerabilities" was extracted reported studies of two types: (A) analyses of existing data, and (B) analyses of new data collected specifically for research projects. Type A studies, the kind usually done by elements of the U.S. Mission in Vietnam, consisted largely of captured documents, interrogation reports, field reports, intelligence summaries, previous studies, and returnee reports. Type B studies, generally done by contractors, usually collected new data through interviews and/or questionnaire surveys, supplemented by use of already-existing data. Publication dates of these studies covered the time period from 1964 to mid-1969; periodic reports were not within the survey's scope, and the cutoff date for documents surveyed was 1 September 1969.
- (U) It was found that many of the references in the literature are circular, i.e., X quotes Y who quotes Z who quotes X. Also, several documents are based upon data collected and previously reported upon by other writers or are based on the same sets of data or documents.
- (U) A total of 130 items was found to fit the definition of vulnerabilities well enough to be so identified. Many were not specifically described as "vulnerabilities" but were more or less obviously considered to be "susceptibilities" or "vulnerabilities" in the context of the discussion. It should be noted that inclusion in the listing of "vulnerabilities" does not imply agreement that the item is indeed a "vulnerability"; it does signify that the item was indicated to be or was treated as a "vulnerability" by the original author.
- (U) Certain constraints exist from the way in which the literature survey had to be done. Due to the large number of documents available coupled with the absence of a comprehensive master list or accessible and adequate information as to their contents, a manual title search was necessary to locate documents potentially of interest, obtain the documents, scan and accept or reject for further review, and conduct an intensive analysis of the documents judged to be pertinent. Special attention was required for those documents in which vulnerabilities were not explicitly stated. The

possibility of human error or lack of agreement between reviewers could not be eliminated; consequently, some pertinent documents may not have been reviewed or relevant information implicitly stated in some reviewed documents may not have been extracted.

- (U) It was concluded that a considerable body of literature which bears some general relationship to "enemy vulnerabilities" exists but it is unlikely to contain much in addition to what has already been found that is current or timely in connection with this particular war or particular type of war.
- (U) A composite list of 130 enemy vulnerabilities was prepared (see Table 6); a bibliography of the 22 studies and reports which contained statements of enemy "vulnerabilities" was compiled (see References, p. 119) and a table indicating the descriptive parameters of each study was constructed (see Table 7).
- (C) <u>Issues in Categorization</u>. As a first step in ordering and organizing the "vulnerabilities" in a meaningful fashion, similar items were grouped. In spite of great variation in study procedures and research instruments, the "vulnerabilities" identified can be grouped in eleven basic categories on the basis of similarity of type or content though there are many differences in detail. The general categories and samples of each category are listed below:

Threats to Personal Survival

- --- Fear of death
- --- Dislike of being sent on missions

Threats to Family Survival

--- Execution or arrest of family members by VC

Physical Deprivation

- --- Hunger
- --- Lack of shelter and rest

Affectional and Social Deprivation

- --- Homesickness
- --- Growing Alienation of the people

(C) TABLE 6

COMPOSITE LIST OF ENEMY VULNERABILITIES (U)

Code No.	Vulnerability	Bibliography No.			
1	Fear of death	17			
2	Fear of being killed	7.			
3	Exposure to attack	4			
4.	Exposure to combat	1			
5	Air harassment	8			
6	Military Pressure	10			
7	Harassment by allied forces	9			
8	Fierce battles and heavy losses	17			
9	Dislike of being sent on missions	13			
10	Inability of VC to protect hamlets	6			
11	Battle, bombardment, noise, pressu	ire 13			
12	War weariness	3			
13	Sweep operations, disruption of supplies, and forced movement	18			
14	Hunger	13			
15	Inadequate food	13			
16	Beri-beri	13			

Code No. Key:

No. 1 - 124 VC

125 -174

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	Vulnerability	Bibliography No.
17	Sickness, malaria	13
18	Inadequate medical supplies and car	e 13
19	Ragged clothing	13
20	No mosquito nets, no mats	13
21	Pay not received	13
22	Personal hardships	1
23	Personal hardships	7
24	Growing hardships of life	3
25	Inability to sustain hardships and privations	17
26	Living conditions too low or difficul	t 17
27	Being constantly on the move	13
28	Execution or arrest of family member or friend	7
29	Family economic hardship	
30	Family deprived of basic needs	13
31	Concern for welfare of family and relatives	1
32	Decline in family income	7
33	Separation from family	13
34	Prolonged separation from home and families	3
35	Homesickness	7
36	Resentment over denial of home lea	ave 7

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	<u>Vulnerability</u>	Bibliography No.			
37	Growing alienation of the population	8			
38	Fear or resentment of being punish for a shortcoming	ed 17			
39	Resentment at being punished or criticized	13			
40	Criticism and punishment	7			
41	Forcible recruitment into VC	7			
42	Feeling of having gained nothing from service to VC	7			
43	Feeling of being exploited by VC for benefit of the Party with no reacare for the individual and no personal benefit	1 13			
44	Conclusion that personal sacrifices for the Front have been insufficient rewarded				
45	Dissatisfaction with taxes	7			
46	Dissatisfaction with taxes	13			
47	High VC taxes	7			
48	Fanaticism and intolerance	13			
49	Dislike of feeling of being mistrust and under constant surveillance	ed 13			
50	Restrictions on freedom of move- ment and individual liberty	13			
51	Degrading stricture of control over own party members	13			

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	<u>Vulnerability</u> <u>E</u>	Biblingraphy No.			
52	Increasingly ruthless recruitment methods	3			
53	VC recruiting and force	8			
54	War atrocities	13			
55	Ruthlessness, cruelty, brutality with which VC treats those not their friends	13			
56	Resentment over maladroit terroris	sm 13			
57	Denial to villagers of full access to provincial market	13			
58	Sacrifice of the interests and well- being of the people to the interests of the apparatus, i.e., callous indifference in demanding fulfill- ment of quotas and requirements	6			
59	Loss of faith in victory	7			
60	Declining faith in victory	8			
61	Feeling that VC cause is hopeless and that GVN will win	13			
62	Conclusion that Front cannot win	6			
63	"Temporary difficulties of the revo tion" caused by allied sweep activit or tight encirclement				
64	Increased U.S. military effort	8			
65	Military effectiveness of GVN	3			

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	Vulnerability	ibliography No.			
66	The moving into an area of large numbers of allied forces and evidence they will stay	13			
67	Continuing defection and desertions	8			
68	Friction between military and civ- ilian cadre	6			
69	Disagreement about military strate and tactics between northerners and southerners				
70	Conflictbetween puritanical, dog- matic, political-solution-oriented ideology of older VC and technocrate reform-oriented ideology of younge VC	-			
71	Poor performance and morale amorale lower-ranking cadre	ng 8			
72	Instances of nepotism	13			
73	Instances of cadre being rewarded with more land or other personal advantage	13			
74	Instances of discrimination against persons of higher social origins	13			
75	Failure to be promoted	13			
76	Dissatisfaction with superiors	17			
77	VC responsibility for continuation of the struggle and its destructiveness				
78	Improper implementation of policie	s 17 j			

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	<u>Vulnerability</u>	Bibliography No			
79	Bureaucracy and indifference among	g			
	leading cadre toward soldiers' dif-	•			
	ficulties and hardships	17			
80	Dissatisfaction with military policy	17			
81	Lack of democracy in critique				
	and self-criticism sessions	17			
82	Dissatisfaction with VC policies				
,	and aims	7			
83	Disappointment in policies, prom-				
	ises, and actions	3			
84	Failure to carry out promises	13			
•		• •			
85	Insistence on protracted war				
	until reunification achieved	6			
86	Frustrated idealism	13			
87	Disregard by party of human dig-				
	nity and liberty	13			
88	Dislike of communism being impose	ed			
	on Vietnamese people	13			
89	Impoverishment of families by VC				
	exactions of men, food, and labor	2			
90	Loss of chief breadwinner in many	•			
•	families through VC impressment	2			
91	Knowledge by many of the people th				
	VC guerrillas cannot protect them	2			
92	Distrust and dislike of VC civilian				
	cadres for continued exactions by				
	forcible measures	2			

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	Vulnerability	Bibliography No.
93	Dislike of VC methods of control- ling villagerskidnapping for recruitment; tax collections, en- forced labor as porters and battle- field clearers, often under danger- ous conditions	
94	The declining ratio of persuasive- ness to force in VC dealings with villagers	2
95	Evidence that the GVN is establishing legitimacy and viability and similar trend information pointing to increasing GVN strength and acceptance by the people	2
96	Disillusionment of villagers with VC failure to carry out widespread land redistribution and to conform new holdings with actual titles	2
97	VC fears of being abandoned by the people, who are vitally necessary to the long-term success of their insurgency	2

125	Fear of allied arms	11
126	Harassment by GVN	21
127	Bombing during infiltration	21
128	Abandonment of sick, wounded, and dead, plus seeing wounded returning to NVN	21
129	War weariness	1

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	<u>Vulnerability</u> <u>E</u>	libliography No.
130	Lack of food	18
131	Inadequate food	21
132	Lack of vitamins	18
133	Poor health	18
134	Disease during infiltration	1
135	Much disease	21
136	Lack of medical supplies and personnel	18
137	Poor medical care	11
138	Inadequate medical supplies	21
139	Lack of shelter and rest	18
140	Hardships	22
141	Hardships of infiltration	11
142	Hardships of infiltration and life in wilderness	18
143	Family separation	21
144	Separation from family	11
145	Long absence from home and fami	ly 18
146	Contrast between what cadre say and what soldiers experience	11
147	Disillusionment at finding propa- ganda claims at variance with real	lity 18

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	<u>Vulnerability</u>	Bibliography No.			
148	Being misled in Hanoi about extent of communist control in south and about degree of popular support	.1			
149	Fighting and killing fellow Viet- namese	21			
150	Defeats	22			
151	Rising desertion rate in weeks just prior to infiltration	18			
152	Doctrinal disillusionment	22			
153	Anxiety of NVA personnel at being far from home and family with no hope of early return ******				

175	Fear of death	1			
176	Air and artillery strikes with no safe refuge	19			
177	Air and artillery strikes	18			
178	Lack of food	19			
179	Lack of food	1			
180	Lack of medical supplies	19			
181	Lack of medicine	1			
182	Realization that the counterinsur- gency will be much more than a brief struggle	19			

Table 6 (con't)

Code No.	Vulnerability	Bibliography No.
183	Increasing strife between NVA and VC	. 1
184	Fears and anxieties about a pro- tracted war (among military and civilian cadres and the population)	2
185	Reduced expectation of victory	2
186	Frustrations, anxieties, and fears arising from operations of VC/NV security system	A 2
187	Sensitivity of VC/NVA apparatus to Chieu Hoi appeals and successe	2 s
188	Sensitivity to trend information indicating VC/NVA are losing ground, people, control over resources, and control over intelligence and security	2

(C) TABLE 7

VULNERABILITIES: DESCRIPTIVE PARAMETERS OF STUDIES IN BIBLIOGRAPHY (U)

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1 - INTERVIEWS B- BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

CONFIDENTIAL



83

Concern for Family Welfare

- --- Family economic hardships
- --- Decline in family income

Dislike of Means Used Toward Self to Implement Party Goals

- --- Dislike of feeling of being distrusted and under constant
- --- Contrast between what NVA cadre say and what NVA soldiers experience

Dislike of Means Used Toward Others to Implement Party Goals

- --- VC ruthlessness in recruiting
- --- War atrocities

Loss of Confidence in Eventual Success

- --- War weariness
- --- Loss of faith in VC victory

Disillusionment with Faulty Implementation of Goals of Party

- --- Dissatisfaction with superiors
- --- Dissatisfaction with military policy

Intraparty Tensions

- --- Disagreement about military strategy/tactics between Northerners and Southerners
- --- Conflict between puritanical, dogmatic, political-solutionoriented ideology of older VC and technocratic, reformoriented ideology of younger VC

Disillusionment with Goals of Party

- --- Doctrinal disillusionment
- --- Frustrated idealism

- (C) The items in each group were sufficiently homogeneous to allow a descriptive label to be used which summarizes the nature of each group of "vulnerabilities" despite the variations in levels of generalization. For instance, one category contains relatively simple, specific, individually relevant, and individually variable items such as "dislike of being sent on missions" and such sweeping generalizations as "increased (Allied) military pressure."
- (U) Use of this method, type, and level of categorization, representing the highest level of sophistication of which there are examples in the literature, highlights some of the problems that currently exist in defining and exploiting vulnerabilities. The items listed include objective external conditions, evaluative statements about military practices, emotional reactions, physical conditions, logical analyses, etc. Results of the grouping raise the semi-humorous question, "will the real 'vulnerability' please stand up?" More precisely stated, the question is: "What is the most informative and systematic manner for definition and specification of vulnerabilities in a fashion that facilitates recognition, communication to others, and productive exploitation?"
- (U) Organization of Data. The assortment of "vulnerabilities" identified also represents a rather amorphous set of observations made on many different levels of penetration or generalization by individuals with diversified points of view who have used many different frames of reference. A wide range is found in the degree of consequence or significance of specific findings; they range from abstract policy-level statements which attempt to combine generalizations about causes, effects, and resultant "vulnerabilities" all the way to minute fragments of the total problem such as "ragged clothing" or "lack of sleeping mats" or just "hardships".
- (U) To date, the uninformed or partially informed user of vulnerabilities studies appears to have had no basis for distinguishing between "vulnerabilities" which are major causal factors common to all or those which are effects of minor consequence with only restricted application in terms of audience, locality, or situation.
- (U) In summary, perspectives and objectives in studies pertinent to vulnerabilities have varied greatly. There has been no systematic consolidation and organization of the results produced which, for the reader or user, would place the so-called vulnerabilities in proper perspective in terms of the relative degree of consequence of each vulnerability and the specificity or generality with which it is applicable (i.e., specific groups of people or all people, specific geographic locality or all areas, specific conditions or all conditions, specific times or not time-bound, etc.).

- (U) Because of the disjointed nature of the many vulnerabilities to be analyzed, a cause/effect or input/output analysis was made. Table 3 shows the results of this analysis in terms of external actions, conditions, situations, or other such general considerations; the consequences of the "external factors"; the implications that these consequences of external factors hold for individuals and groups; and the physical, behavioral, intellectual, emotional, and attitudinal impact or residual effect upon individuals and groups.
- (C) The matrix of vulnerabilities shown in Table 8 contains eight columns grouped in two separate sections.
- (C) The first separate section contains three columns devoted to matters of general significance which are outside the control of the individual:

"External Considerations/Factors"

(conditions, actions, situations, events, or any other major factor affecting everyone that is beyond the control of the general population; in this case, NVA/VC military and civilian rank and file)

"Consequences" of External Factors

(direct or indirect results of more consequential and more broadly applicable factors. In some cases events/actions with heavy impact but restricted applicability)

"Implications" of Consequences of External Factors

(conscious or unconscious inferences resulting from the individual's perception of the consequences of external factors)

(C) The second separate section contains five columns which represent the various ways in which External Factors eventually affect the individual:

Physical Impact

(changes in physical condition or capacities)

Behavioral

(actions occurring as a direct or indirect result of the individual's perception of external events and consequences)

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	and labor (2)	87. Disregard by party of mean digitity and liberty (13)
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Logical/Intellectual Impact

(thoughts which occur or lines of reasoning consciously developed as a result of the individual's perception of consequences of external events)

Attitudes/Beliefs/Opinions Impact

(positions adopted by the individual, consciously or unconsciously, toward external factors as a result of his perception of their consequences)

Emotional/Psychological Impact

(emotional states or conditions resulting on an unconscious level from the impact on the individual of his perception of consequences of external events)

- (C) The two major sections of the matrix represent the simplest possible model of each individual's relation to and interaction with the external world. The three-column section on the left is the external world; the five-column section is the internal world of the individual. The section on the left represents "what is happening" in three sequential steps: what happened, consequences of what happened, and the way in which the individual sees the results of what happened. The five-column section fractionates the input pathways through which data about the external world travels into the internal world of each individual.
- (U) The model is described as the "simplest possible" because no attempt is made, at this point in the research task, to describe what occurs during the intermediate processing of data on external factors between the time when it impacts the individual and when it is finally stored within the "apperceptive mass", i.e., the memory and understanding the individual has of that particular set of data within the framework of all previously stored data.
- (U) Some comments or cautions are necessary to avoid misinterpretation of the model; since delineation of the line of research and reasoning that supports the validity of these comments would require several treatises to be written, they will have to be made by fiat; following are many commonly held assumptions:

- 1. It would be easy to assume that everyone who looks at the same object, "sees" and registers internally the same evidence or impression. This is not so.
- 2. If a plea or argument is based on infallible mathematical logic in terms comprehensible to the individual, he will necessarily accept it. This is not so.
- 3. If others are exposed to the same evidence that is convincing by the communicator's standards, they will reach the same conclusions as the communicator. This is not so.
- 4. It is a common assumption, made consciously or unconsciously, that an individual can report accurately his reasons for his actions, attitudes, and feelings. This is not so.
- 5. People who are the products of very different cultures are completely different. This is so or not so depending on the level of analysis applied to the issue in question.

This is so in one sense because the essential concept of "culture" and difference in cultures is based on individuals in various cultures having learned:

- -- different ways of reacting to the "same" external factor
- -- different ways of outward expression of the same internal reaction to external stimuli

This is not so for many reasons:

- -- all humans have the same assortment of senses which are the means by which they obtain information (with obvious exceptions, such as individual cases of deafness, etc.)
- -- all humans are thought to have a small assortment of the same basic drives .
- -- all humans are guided in their total behavior and thinking fro the unconscious -- a level below awareness far more than by conscious perception/analy: s/decision
- -- all humans have some assortment of the same limited repertoire of primary "defense mechanisms" or "adjustment mechanisms"

- 6. Vietnamese are the best judge of, and understand better than anyone else, all other Vietnamese. This might or might not be so depending on the interaction of such factors as pertinence and extent of appropriate knowledge, training, and experience; intelligence; personality organization; emotionality/logic bias; and many other factors.
- (U) As has been stated, the assortment of "vulnerabilities" identified from the first three studies represented observations made on many different levels of generalization from very diversified points of view within many different frames of reference. The degree of consequence or significance of specific findings varied greatly. This was neither surprising nor disappointing in what is clearly a newly-emerging field of research as evidenced by the absence of precise and generally accepted working definitions. It was expectable to find that there had been no systematic consolidation and organization of the results of research efforts. However, there is a need for organization and consolidation of the results in order to provide proper perspective for readers and users on the relative consequence of each vulnerability and the specificity or generality of its applicability.
- (U) Because the manner of describing vulnerabilities represented such diversity, including mention of objective external conditions, evaluative statements about military practices, emotional reactions, physical conditions, logical analyses, etc., a test questionwas formulated to crystallize the objectives of further work. The question was: "What is the most informative and systematic manner for definition and specification of vulnerabilities in a fashion that facilitates recognition, communication to others, and productive exploitation?"
- (U) After exhausting the possibilities of more simple forms of analysis, a more sophisticated approach than any noted in the literature -- a modified input/output analysis -- was employed to analyze and organize the data in meaningful fashion. Imposition of this organizing procedure on the data made several facts evident:
- (U) 1. As now described in the literature or general discussion, many "vulnerabilities" deal with various partial aspects of the same condition/event/action/or state of being.
- (U) 2. Many "vulnerabilities" represent descriptions of the same condition/event/action/or state of being but appear to be different because of being pitched at different levels of analysis or generalization.

- (U) 3. All or almost all descriptions of vulnerabilities deal with intermediate factors, i.e., conditions/events/actions/or states of being/or nature of impact on the individual. It is invariably left to the reader or user to draw the needed inferences to arrive at the actual vulnerability.
- (U) 4. In the absence of any mention of the need to draw inferences, and because the described phenomenon is already labeled a "vulnerability", there is no basis for assuming either that the need for further inference is known or that the necessary inferences are indeed made by the psyoperator.
- (C) Integration of the products of the analysis as shown in Table 8 with data obtained in the field surveys against a background of knowledge gained from the literature, previous pertinent research, and related experience, indicated that items which had been treated as vulnerabilities in the literature would be, depending on their nature, more correctly termed "Primary Mediators" (of vulnerability), "Secondary Mediators" (of vulnerability), and "Contributory" or "Facilitating" factors which enhance or decrease the intensity of effect of "primary" or "secondary mediators".
- (C) The "primary vulnerabilities" are derived mainly from the emotional states which, in a stressful situation, are the primary determinants of behavior. "Secondary vulnerabilities" are associated with and are inferred mainly from attitudes, opinions, and beliefs which have less ability to affect behavior. "Contributory" or "facilitating" factors are all other aspects of the human psyche that function to create or enhance, in positive or negative direction, the emotional receptivity or resistance to any input of any type of data.
- (C) Each of the "primary vulnerabilities" is the resultant of a complex of interacting factors; the secondary and contributory factors may change to a small or large extent over time and may change frequently or infrequently, but the "primary vulnerability", representing a summation of the subordinate factors, operates in a different time frame. It comes about more slowly, changes more slowly, and disappears more slowly. However, in the case of truly significant events, psychological/emotional changes of any kind can occur overnight or even immediately.
- (C) In reporting results, for ease and clarity of communication and convenience in discussion, the manner of description of vulnerabilities found in the literature and in general current use for discussion purposes is continued in use here in conjunction with definition of the inferred or true vulnerabilities.

- (C) Two primary vulnerabilities and their related primary mediating factors have been identified, one applicable to all VC and one applicable to all NVA. For each of the two primary vulnerabilities, two secondary vulnerabilities and their related secondary mediating factors are identified.
 - (C) The primary VC vulnerability is:
 - a. Greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about the near-term future.
 - (C) The related primary mediating factor is:

"Generalized deterioration of the will to fight" resulting from a feeling that in the current situation he has little to gain and much to lose. The feeling is caused by his perception of the present situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding.

- (C) Secondary VC vulnerabilities are:
 - a. Increased readiness to give credence to messages which indirectly reflect recognition of his current plight and feelings and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of Party controls and which remove uncertainty about the near future to the greatest extent possible by description of procedures and what is to be expected.
- (C) The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Negative reaction against Party control methods" which are becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application and which affect him, his relatives, and his fellow VC.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indirectly indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change his situation.

(C) The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Feeling of victimization" resulting from interaction of many factors, two of which are the increasing drain created by progressively greater levies upon all VC to fulfill quotas that once may have been realistic when larger numbers of VC existed but which now are oppressive in view of the reduced number of NLF supporters, and the disappearance of hope of victory and any tangible form of reward for service and sacrifice for the "liberation" cause.

- (C) The primary NVA vulnerability is:
 - a. Potential for receptivity to messages which indirectly confirm and complement the sources of
 a generalized disaffection; receptivity is discussed
 in terms of potential because the available evidence
 supports only the notion of a developing trend toward
 erosion of morale and allegiance to the cause rather
 than any active dissatisfaction.
- (C) The related primary mediating factor is:

"Recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and paucity of positive rewards" in a situation that may result in a long-drawn-out half war. The current information available does not suggest active resistance or rejection of the cause.

- (C) The secondary NVA vulnerabilities are:
 - a. Decreased resistance to acceptance of messages which indirectly reflect existence of disparities between NVN indoctrination and RVN reality. There is no evidence as yet that this receptivity in itself is adequate to cause any widespread positive reaction to messages suggesting such final actions as rally, surrender, self-assisted capture, etc.

(C) The related secondary mediating factor is:

"NVA disillusionment" in RVN which may occur on the infrequent occasions when the NVA comes into contact with RVN civilians or receives other visual evidence of disparities between indoctrinationderived notions and what is actually seen.

- b. Increased receptivity to messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify taking an action that will benefit both the NVA soldier and his family.
- (C) The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Family-centered concerns" which stem.from an extremely complicated interrelationship of dependency and obligation. The preservation of his relationship to his family is perhaps the most important single concern in the life of the North (or South) Vietnamese soldier.

It should be noted that this traditionally inculcated attitude may be trending toward reduced importance for the current adolescent generation.

(C) Each of the vulnerabilities is treated in detail in the sections that follow.

VC Vulnerabilities

- (C) There are many differences between the situation of the VC and the NVA soldier; two major differences are the fact that the VC are in familiar territory and have many personal contacts within the local population while the NVA are in an area unfamiliar to them, far from their families and civilian friends, and are unlikely to know anyone in the local civilian population. These aspects of the situation, sometimes referred to as vulnerabilities, are not in themselves vulnerabilities but do affect the nature of VC/NVA vulnerabilities.
- (C) Primary: Deterioration of the Will to Fight. Despite reduction in the intensity of military operations, because of the apparent increase in GVN strength and effectiveness, the prototypical VC soldier perceives

his total situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding. The genesis of this feeling is reflected in the literature in such general terms as "ARVN pressure", "pressure from Allied Forces" with a resultant "fear of Allied arms", and in such specific terms as "fear of being killed", "fear of death", etc.

- (C) The major perceived danger has shifted from fear of death in battle to anxiety over the increased likelihood of capture and imprisonment. Logically, imprisonment would seem less dangerous. However, the same reasons that caused the reduction in military operations also result in there being fewer motivating factors to push the VC soldier in a positive direction. With the shift of the war in GVN's favor, there is no longer a valid basis for enthusiasm for a glorious victory; for visions of personal success, recognition, promotion; for dreams of "liberating brothers", etc. In other words, the positive motivating factors have vanished.
- (C) In the operation of the human mind, changes in perception and adjustment to perceived "reality-situations" can be described as being mediated by a psychological process termed "adaptation level". This mechanism which affects human thought processes can best be described as a sliding scale of values that is continually unconsciously adjusted or recalibrated to provide psychological comfort within an individual; it is not bound by logic and therefore its workings cannot be understood in logical or mathematical terms. Used with considerable freedom of interpretation, the general nature of this process is helpful in understanding the nature of individual vulnerabilities.
- (C) For the VC soldier, functioning of the "adaptation-level" process can cause him to perceive his present situation as one in which he has little to gain and much to lose (capsulized in the literature as "feeling that the VC cause is hopeless"). More specifically, the varied benefits that would have accrued to him through victory do not now exist as motivators; the risk of his own death, or injury, or loss of years of living-time are deglamorized and cannot be justified by any grandiose expectations.
- (C) The primary vulnerability that is created by the generalized deterioration of the will to fight, representing the sum of many large and small factors, is a greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about his near-term future.

- (C) Secondary: Reaction Against Party Control Methods. As the overall situation becomes more difficult for the VC leadership, efforts to improve their position result in more oppressive actions, increased restrictions, and stronger and more punitive methods of control and motivation, all becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application. This is seen in the literature and in the current document-flow in such statements as "resentment at being criticized or punished", "dislike of feeling of being mistrusted and under constant surveillance", "dislike of VC methods of controlling villagers", "opposition to cadre", "arrest or execution of a family member or friend", etc.
- (C) The adaptation-level process causes the VC to view this aspect of the overall VC structure with an ever more jaundiced eye as the once-existing compensatory factor -- faith in victory and associated material and psychological rewards -- deteriorates.
- (C) The secondary vulnerability created by the increase in scope and intensity of Party control methods and the individual VC's negative reaction toward the perceived effects of these actions, is an increased readiness to give credence to messages which reflect recognition of this (to him) unfortunate situation and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of the Party controls. Such a message should also remove uncertainty about the future to the greatest extent possible by specific description of what can be expected. For instance, the basic logic of the Chieu Hoi concept easily encompasses the notion that a VC eventually can be returned to his former village, have returned to him his former holdings and even offices, and perhaps unrealistically, some form of indemnity for his losses.
- (C) Secondary: VC Feeling of Victimization. A sense of personal loss, which ranges in intensity up to a feeling of having been victimized, exists among the VC. This is encapsulated in "vulnerabilities" identified in the literature such as "feeling of being exploited by VC for the benefit of the Party with no real care for the individual and no personal benefit", "dislike and distrust of the VC civilian cadre for continued exactions by forcible methods", "conclusion that personal sacrifices for the Front have been insufficiently rewarded", "feeling of having gained nothing for services to the VC", etc.
- (C) With waning fortunes, the process of obtaining material support from the civilian population becomes more difficult and increased effort and stronger methods must be used. As the forcible levies for supplies,

money, and manpower grow in scope and as the methods for the exactions increase in harshness in order to fulfill quotas, the families and friends of the VC soldiers can seem to be receiving worse treatment than is customarily given to the GVN civilian population by VC soldiers. This is noted in the literature as "sacrifice of the interests and well-being of the people to the interests of the apparatus, i.e., callous indifference in demanding fulfillment of quotas and requirements".

- (C) As the VC acts more oppressively toward its own supporters, particularly while unable to offer any real hope of reward, it is progressively destroying its acceptance and allegiance among both the VC civilian and military populations; this is noted in the literature as "growing alienation of the people".
- (C) The adaptation-level process makes it easy for the VC soldier in this situation to develop or accept a rationale that justifies his acting to change his situation for a less frustrating or more rewarding one.
- (C) A secondary vulnerability created by this condition is increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indication recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change the situation.

NVA Vulnerabilities

- (C) The NVA soldier, even though he is also Vietnamese and engaged in liberating his "brothers", usually is easily distinguished from his southern brothers by his language and manner of speech. While in the South, he is also usually identifiable as a Northerner through his lack of what, for a Southerner, is the most basic and ordinary knowledge of names and locations. As a consequence, unlike the VC who are at home, he cannot merge with and disappear into the local population. These factors are not vulnerabilities but do affect the nature of actual vulnerabilities.
- (C) Primary: Trend Toward "Generalized Disaffection". General disaffection with the "just cause" or "liberation" effort, where it exists, is caused by unfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and lack of any discernible reward for service and sacrifice. The effect of these factors is exacerbated by fear of a long drawn-out unsuccessful half-war in which lack of success over a long period of time has degraded the concept of "dying gloriously for a noble cause" to a "risk of life for no good reason" (this is a different order of concern than fear of death itself).

100

- (C) If a generalized erosion leading to widespread deterioration of morale and the "will to fight" is to occur, it will have to be prompted by evidence that leads to generalized loss of conviction in what is the keystone of the NVA motivational structure and a major factor in NVA propaganda and indoctrination, i.e., belief in eventual victory. Suggestions of a beginning trend toward erosion of this conviction can be seen in the research literature in such terms as "war weariness", "fear of Allied arms", "fears and anxieties about a protracted war", "fighting and killing fellow Vietnamese", "defeats", "rising desertion rates in weeks just prior to infiltration", "doctrinal disillusionment", etc.
- (C) More specifically, the positive motivating factors that create internally-generated initiative and which cause individuals to persevere logically or illogically in the face of obstacles can undergo considerable erosion or can have evaporated without any significant change in behavior occurring because a major sustaining factor will remain in the form of habit—an inertia caused by conditioning and environment—and absence of a powerful external factor/event which would disrupt their accustomed routine.
- (C) The external factor in the case of the NVA would have to be, for example, of the magnitude of a surprise implementation of Vice-President Ky's recent remark about possible resumption of bombing of NVN coupled with announcements of ARVN's intention to carry the war into NVN. Assuming hypothetically that an action of such magnitude were possible, the surprise, consternation, and disruption it would cause are lost if it is publicized prior to occurrence.
- (C) A state of generalized disaffection, although it would constitute a major vulnerability, is not easily exploitable because of the complex interaction of the multitude of minor factors that summate to create the whole pattern described by the term "generalized disaffection".
- (C) It is not possible to tell whether concern about the possibility of a protracted wartime state is reduced or increased by the well-publicized and already partly-implemented plans for U.S. withdrawal.
- (C) The adaptation-level process allows the mental and emotional state of an NVA soldier to arrive at a disaffected state with less difficulty than might be expected since field research data shows rather surprisingly, that neither he nor his family wanted him to come South to fight (see Table 9). This attitude, surprising in view of the apparent thoroughness and effectiveness of indoctrination on so many other issues

101

(U) TABLE 9

MILITARY SERVICE/TRIP TO RVN: ATTITUDES (U)

(U)	Question	(U)	Response (U)	Percent
	In what way did you enter military	2.	Volunteered	14%
	service?	3.	Drafted	82
			(Other)	04
	How did you feel about entering	2.	Wanted to	30%
	military service?	3.	Neutral	24
		4.	Did not want to	46
			(Other)	(0)
,	•.			
	How did your parents feel about	2.	Not sure	12%
	your going to South Vietnam to	3.	Wanted me to go	. 14
•	fight? (Did they want you to go?)	4.	Were neutral	16
		5.	Did not want me	58
			to go	
	When you left NVN to go to SVN	2.	Not sure	02%
	where the actual fighting is going	3.	No	54
	on, did you want to go?	4.	Yes, a little	20
		5.	Yes, very much	24

(U) TABLE 9 (con't)

MILITARY SERVICE/TRIP TO RVN: ATTITUDES (U)

	Not Sure	No	Yes, Little	Yes, very Much
(U) When you left NVN to go to SVN				
where the actual fighting is going	,			
on:				
were you afraid to go?	2%	62%	18%	18%
were you in a hurry to				·
get there?	0	72	18	10
expect support from people	•			
in GVN areas?	4	16	20	. 60
expect to get needed food				
from NLF sympathizers?	4	14	28	54
think trip would be dan-				
gerous?	-	14	18	68
think trip would be hard?	-	06	16	78
worry about safe return to				
NVN?	4	16	24	56

103

and attitudes, is not an adequate cause for him to initiate action to "leave the field." Part of the reason for this appears in field research data that tends not to support the notion that the NVA are uniformly combat-weary and subjected to intense hardship. Many state that they had not been experiencing any hardships and of fifty POW's, only five had been in actual combat more than once; also, only five had been in combat lasting for one hour or more (see Table 10).

- (C) Despite the frequent references to "hardships" in the literature and the frequent occurrence of that term in interviews with prisoners and ralliers, it is extremely important to place the interpretive meaning and implications of this term in proper perspective.
- (C) Most of the NVA soldiers come to NVA military service and to RVN from what is, for any American, an unbelievably impoverished environment; some research data from NVA POW's is:
 - (C) As a civilian, did you earn more or less than your military pay?

Much more	 20%
More	 14
About same	06
Less	 24
Much less	 16
(Other)	 20

(C) While in service in NVN, how many NVN piastres were you paid each month?

5	-	6	NVN\$	 90%
7	_	10	NVN\$	 10

(C) While in RVN, before becoming a prisoner, how many GVN piastres did you receive each month?

0 - 80 GVN\$	82%
100 - 200 GVN\$	06
600 - 1600 GVN\$	06
(Other)	06

(U) It is not possible to accurately compare the value of the NVA dollar (piastre) but the best available estimate indicates the ratio to the GVN dollar to be about 1:20. If that ratio is used, the monthly pay of

(U) TABLE 10

COMBAT EXPERIENCE: NVA POW'S (U)

U)	Question	(U) Response	(U) Percent
	Have you ever been in combat?	No	74%
		Yes	26
	How often in combat?	Never	74%
		One time	16
		Three times	06
		Four times	02
		Seven times	02
	What was the longest period of	Never	74%
	time you were in any single	10 - 30 minut	es 16
	battle?	4 - 5 hours	06
		20 - 24 hours	04

the NVN soldier is about 30 cents in U.S. money based on me free rate of exchange. Perspective on the NVA soldier's standard of living can be gained if one considers that receipt of one can of condensed milk per month is a significant benefit or privilege awarded to a cadre.

- (U) It must be kept in mind that what the foreign observer may view as a series of incredible hardships on the trail and in the jungle or swamp may very well be the high point in the life of someone (NVN) who would otherwise have been bound for the remainder of his life within one or two square miles, interacting always with the same two or three hundred people, and concerned only with the same limited range of topics peculiar to his particular hamlet or village. Instead of such a life, his income is very likely to be considerably increased despite what seems to be extraordinarily low compensation for military service even for an impoverished, under-developed country. He has more and possibly better clothing than ever before; he is fed possibly as well as he ever has been; and as a soldier he has an unaccustomed high status in NVN civilian eyes. He is also traveling and -- for someone with his limited purview -- seeing the world, seeing many interesting and exciting new things, places, events; may be impressed or even exalted by his first access to authority symbolized by possession of a weapon which renders him able to overpower others. Finally, many of the "hardships" referred to in interview records, upon further elaboration turn out to be danger from bombing and other military operations; the exposure to these hazards is not frequent.
- (U) In summary, the very great differences in the life style and mental content of the NVA population and the NVA soldier from that of the average American causes it to be almost impossible to maintain "conceptual equivalency" across language lines when describing experiences and conditions in evaluative terms.
- (C) Secondary: NVA Disillusionment in RVN. Among the NVA, a feeling exists that is similar in nature to the VC feeling of having been victimized, but is much less intense. The origin of the feeling to the extent that it may exist lies mainly in the disparity between the objective evidence forced upon them by their experience in the South and the expectations and beliefs created by propaganda and indoctrination in the North. This feeling is mentioned in the literature in such items as "disillusionment at finding propaganda claims at variance with reality", "doctrinal disillusionment", "friction between old-line VC and new NVA in the Delta", "increasing strife between the NVA and VC", "being misled about the extent of Communist control in the South and about degree of popular support", "villagers hostile and uncooperative to requests to supply NVA with food", etc.

- (C) After a lengthy and exhausting trip to RVN, the NVA soldier appears to have little contact with the civilian population and spends little time in hamlets or cities; therefore, impressions formed in the North remain unaffected unless there is contact with the local population on food-gathering trips. The resistance that apparently is frequently encountered acts to raise questions about the validity of claims regarding the support of the RVN population. This is seen in the literature as "villagers uncooperative and hostile to requests to supply NVA food."
- (C) Table 11 contains a sample of the questions and responses from 50 NVA POW's which illustrates some of the disparities or changes in perception of significant features treated in indoctrination and propaganda while still in NVA and later personally experienced in RVN.
- (C) The cumulative effect of gradually increasing amounts of personal experiential evidence that points up the disparities between indoctrination-derived concepts and actuality provides stimuli that can, by the adaptation-level process, cause the NVA soldier to feel that he has been misled or manipulated. This feeling does not yet appear to exist with sufficient intensity or pervasiveness to constitute a major vulnerability in the sense of producing ralliers or surrenderers if exploited. In adaptation-level terms, this is because an off-setting factor -- belief in eventual victory -- still holds firm in the NVA mind.
- (C) The vulnerability resulting from recognition of disparities between propaganda or indoctrination and personal experience in RVN does not appear to have significant value at the present time as an avenue through which action can be stimulated. It can best be exploited by incorporating assumptions of recognition of disparities in messages relating to family-centered concerns; the negative feelings aroused by recognition of the disparities would counterbalance to some extent the indoctrination and training-inculcated factors which are negative to the possibility of rally, surrender, or desertion.
- (C) Secondary: NVA Family-Centered Concerns. The literature contains many references to concern about or attachment to the family, some stated quite succinctly such as "homesickness" while others are more informative such as "anxiety of NVA personnel at being far from home and family with no hope of an early return". Many references deal with the individual's own reactions such as "long absence from home and family", "family separation", "separation from family", etc.

U) TABLE 11

NVN INDOCTRINATION VS RVN EXPOSURE: COMPARISON (U)

(U)	Question	(U)	(U)	Indoctri- nation in NVN	(U)After Time in SVN
	How was the military	2.	GVN much stronger	0%	22%
	strength of GVN and its	3.	GVN stronger	. 8	. 12
	allies compared to the	4.	About equal	10	10
	military strength of	5.	NVN stronger	44	34
	NVN and its allies?	6.	NVN much stronger	10	06
			(Other)	(28)	(16)
				•	14
	How was the military	2.	GVN much stronger	0	14
	strength of GVN alone	3.	GVN stronger	. 4	12
	compared to NVN	4.	About equal	4	06
	alone?	5.	NVN stronger	38	38
,	· .	6.	NVN much stronger	20	12
•			(Other)	(34)	(18)
			•		
	According to what was	2.	GVN certainly	0) 12)
i	said, who would win	3.	GVN probably	0)
	the war?	4.	In doubt	. 4 .	
		5.	NVN probably	2) 56)
	•	6.	NVN certainly	70	,) ,
			(Other)	(24)	(32)
	•		108	•.	

TABLE 11 (con't)

NVN INDOCTRINATION VS RVN EXPOSURE: COMPARISON (U)

	(U) Response	Money/ (U Supplies/ Manpower	Supplies: No Manpower
Can NVN win the war if	3. No, definitely	18%	08%
US continues to support	4. Probably not	04	10
GVN with:	5. Stalemate	08	0
	6. Yes, probably	28	12
	7. Yes, certainly	18	46
	(Other)	(24)	(24)

- (U) It is extremely important to recognize, and keep in the forefront of one's thinking, that the concept of "relationship to the family" for Vietnamese is just as difficult to understand as is any other aspect of Vietnamese life and culture; this is apparently often overlooked because almost everyone is part of a family and this fact is so much taken for granted that it is easily understandable if it is assumed that all family relationships and feelings are much the same.
- (U) The basic unit of the Vietnamese culture is the extended family (grandparents, parents, children plus ancestors) and the prototypical Vietnamese personality is egocentric to the ultimate degree. This means that because of the nature of his total physical, social, and financial environment, the typical Vietnamese comes to regard himself as the center of his own universe in which his primary concern is an amalgam of himself and his family. In contrast, the American basic family unit is composed of parents and children and is acquiring a heavy loading of childless couples. Also, while it might be oversimplification to describe a prototypical American personality (other than in terms of "ideal" or tradition), the American can be characterized as other-oriented or outwardly-oriented rather than as egocentric. Psychologically, because of the nature of his total environment, the American, with no diminution of his relationship to his family, can at times be more concerned with the welfare and needs of others than with his own.
- (U) The significance of the differences between Vietnamese and Americans in family relationships lies in the fact that the individual Vietnamese must look to his family for all things since there are few other sources of aid. Also, the early training of Vietnamese -- particularly rural Vietnamese -- inculcates a tremendous sense of obligation to the family. There are no rest homes for the aged in Vietnam.
- (U) In contrast, Americans have a wide variety of sources to draw upon before turning to the family and depending on their background, might look to their family for aid only as a last resort.
- (U) In summary, the "family" factor for Vietnamese is not based purely in emotions or attitudes. It is a deeply-ingrained cultural characteristic but it also has a heavy loading of financial or personal welfare elements. This cultural phenomenon is, in effect, an institutionalized social, financial, and personal security system.

- (C) The degree of vulnerability created in the NVA soldier by a complex of family-centered concerns is also counterbalanced to some extent by his egocentricity. Stated in somewhat oversimplified fashion:
 - --- he would not accept a given risk if both he and his family could lose
 - --- he would not accept the same risk if he or his family could lose
 - --- he might not accept the same risk if he could gain but his family would lose
 - --- he might not accept the same risk if he could lose but his family would gain
 - --- he might accept the same risk if he could gain but his family would not be affected either way
 - --- he might accept the same risk if he would not be affected either way but his family would gain
 - --- he would accept the same risk if both he and his family would gain
- (C) The adaptation-level process, if the right psyop approach could cause the weight of the effect of family ties and egocentricity to be combined rather than acting to some extent as counterbalances, would be very likely to enable an NVA soldier to devise logical grounds for any action such as rallying or surrendering or deserting that he was persuaded would benefit both himself and his family at an acceptable risk level.
- (C) The NVA soldier, to the extent that he is vulnerable, is most likely to have some interest in (although not necessarily be stimulated to action by) messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify his taking an action which he can interpret as being of benefit to both himself and his family.

Conclusions

- (U) Major conclusions are:
- (U) 1. For all psyop policy-level managers and for operators in the field, a more precise and consistent approach to data collection, data analysis, and definition of vulnerabilities is a basic requirement for valid understanding, conceptualization, and productive exploitation of vulnerabilities. A formal definition of "vulnerability" and the manner in which it is described for users must be established as an initial step in systematization of theory, thinking, and practice regarding vulnerabilities.
- (U) 2. Conclusion 2 is responsive to the need for precise definition of vulnerabilities described in Conclusion 1. The manner and level of generalization with which vulnerabilities should be described for all purposes has been tentatively identified and can be described as follows:
 - --- Vulnerability may be primary (which implies generality of applicability) or secondary (which refers to a subfactor included within and facilitating the primary vulnerability). Other conditions/events/actions or states of being are contributory or facilitating.
 - --- Diagnosis of a vulnerability must be preceded by identification of the mediating factors (actions/situations/events, etc.).
 - --- The relationship of the mediating factor and resultant primary or secondary vulnerability to other major characteristics and current situations of the enemy individual or group must be considered before decision on diagnosis of the existence of a vulnerability.
 - --- The primary or secondary vulnerability must be expressed in terms of the impact of the mediating factor upon the resistance or receptivity of enemy individuals or groups to a specified psyop approach.
 - --- The objective expected to be achieved by exploitation of the vulnerability should be expressed in terms of impact on resistance to or acceptance of a psyop approach and/or the specific behavior the exploitation is designed to evoke.

112

- A procedure has been devised for classifying and positioning data about an external event/situation/action/or state of being by use of the External Factor/Consequence/Implication/Impact on Individual sequence shown in the Vulnerabilities Classification Matrix in Table 8. Use of this means of classification in combination with formatting of the description of the inferred vulnerability according to the manner of definition described in Conclusion 2, provides a consistent and systematic means of describing and defining vulnerabilities and of communicating this information to others in a form sufficiently specific for use. There is no implication that the process is easy; but the method and the proper focus of attention for psyop communications is identified and usable. The accuracy of an initial assumption of existence of a condition/situation/ event/or state of being that leads to diagnosis of a vulnerability is, of course, a function of the quality and quantity of available pertinent valid data interacting with the extent of pertinent knowledge and degree of skill possessed by the diagnostician.
- (U) 4. It is recognized that the current practice of quick-reaction exploitation in the field would be seriously hampered by attempting to follow these steps listed in sequence and it is not intended to prevent quick-reaction exploitation where appropriate. However, it does appear to be possible to restrict quick-reaction operations to functioning within the limits of primary vulnerabilities already identified with the option of adding certain carefully-specified features to already-selected and approved themes or procedures and to restrict the execution of such operations to specified sets of conditions under which they can be productive.
- (C) 5. Two primary vulnerabilities and their related primary mediating factors have been identified, one applicable to all VC and one applicable to all NVA. For each of the two primary vulnerabilities, two secondary vulnerabilities and their related secondary mediating factors are identified.

The primary VC vulnerability is:

a. Greatly increased receptivity to messages which describe a safe means to leave a highly unsatisfactory situation, which decrease his apprehension about the way in which he will be received and treated, and which decrease his uncertainty about the near-term future.

The related primary mediating factor is:

"Generalized deterioration of the will to fight" resulting from a feeling that in the current situation he has little to gain and much to lose. The feeling is caused by his perception of the present situation as becoming progressively more dangerous, frustrating, and unrewarding.

Secondary VC vulnerabilities are:

a. Increased readiness to give credence to messages which indirectly reflect recognition of his current plight and feelings and which suggest believably safe ways to remove himself and others from the scope of Party controls and which remove uncertainty about the near future to the greatest extent possible by description of procedures and what is to be expected.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Negative reaction against Party control methods" which are becoming progressively more frequent and intense in application and which affect him, his relatives, and his fellow VC.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which establish credibility by indirectly indicating recognition of those aspects of the VC situation that engender a sense of loss and frustration and which provide a rationale for acting to change his situation.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

"Feeling of victimization" resulting from interaction of many factors, chief of which are the increasing drain created by progressively greater levies upon all VC to fulfill quotas that once may have been realistic for larger numbers but which now are oppressive in view of the reduced number of NLF supporters, and the disappearance of hope of victory and any tangible form of reward for service and sacrifice for the "liberation" cause.

The primary NVA vulnerability is:

a. Potential for receptivity to messages which indirectly confirm and complement the sources of a generalized disaffection; receptivity is discussed in terms of potential because the available evidence supports only the notion of a developing trend toward erosion of morale and allegiance to the cause rather than any active dissatisfaction.

The related primary mediating factor is:

Recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and paucity of positive rewards in a situation that may result in a long-drawn-out half-war. The modest amount of current information available does not suggest active resistance or rejection of the "liberation" cause.

Secondary NVA vulnerabilities are:

a. Decreased resistance to acceptance of messages which indirectly reflect existence of disparities between NVN indoctrination and RVN reality. There is no evidence as yet that this receptivity in itself is adequate to cause any widespread positive reaction to messages suggesting such drastic and final actions as rally, surrender, self-assisted capture, etc.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

NVA disillusionment in RVN which may occur on the infrequent occasions when the NVA comes into contact with RVN civilians or receives other visual evidence of disparities between indoctrination-derived notions and what is actually seen.

b. Increased receptivity to messages which develop lines of reasoning that justify taking an action that will benefit both the NVA soldier and his family.

The related secondary mediating factor is:

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Family-centered concerns which stem from an extremely complicated interrelationship of obligation and dependency. The preservation of his relationship to his family is perhaps the single most important concern in the life of the North (or South) Vietnamese soldier.

It should be noted that this traditionally inculcated attitude may be trending downward in importance for the adolescent generation.

- (U) 6. Data obtained from the field research supports the existence of the kinds and degrees of vulnerabilities listed in Conclusion 5.
- (C) 7. The concept of targeting and tailoring can be applied profitably to vulnerabilities as they are defined here since by definition, appeals would represent "the most appropriate messages aimed at the biggest potential" if the intelligence data used as a base is valid.

Field research data provides the direction that must be taken to overcome the multiple obstacles represented by indoctrination-inculcated attitudes and justified or unjustified fears. The added factor is pressure.

Approximately a third of the NVA report that it would not cause harm to them or to their family if they were captured in combat or in various forms of hopeless situations. Such a situation, then, is a great help in enabling the psyop message to do its part.

If pressure is provided by military operations to create a situation in which it is acceptable and honorable to become a prisoner, thereby nullifying fears inculcated by Party indoctrination and controls, and an earlier stream of psyop messages have conveyed credible information about safe procedures and methods for coming into GVN hands, then the timely introjection during combat or any other similar pressure-situation of appeals which normally relate to secondary vulnerabilties may be successful.

(C) 8. At the present time, field research data indicates that evocation of desired behavioral responses such as surrender, rally, desertion, and self-induced capture are most likely to be promoted by an integrated

combination of military operational pressure and psyop messages -- if they occur at all. Doctrine says essentially that consideration of psyop should occur at all levels and in all operations; whether this occurs in the way that is intended in actual practice is undetermined. A study to assess the extent to which psyop is incorporated in tactical planning is needed to provide perspective on the realistic possibility of increasing such integrated planning and on the extent to which it can be increased.

In comment on this point, rally, surrender, and other such appeals directed to NVA in the South are attempting to induce or trigger an action of a kind that may have more important, sweeping, and radical consequences for the individual soldier than any other possible action; the danger involved is an added negative factor. In true perspective, this is a great deal to hope for from one or several brief messages on leaflets or radios. When one factors in the additional consideration that the NVA is in strange territory, and operates with full awareness that his family -- perhaps his most important concern -- is to some extent a hostage, it is clear that even the most artfully devised and compellingly persuasive message or flood of messages must overcome some very solid obstacles.

117

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PAG TASK 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ENEMY SOLDIER

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PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE ENEMY SOLDIER

Summary and Introduction

- (U) JUSPAO requested research into the psychological characteristics of the enemy soldier.
- (U) This survey was intended to increase the effectiveness of psychological operations directed to NVA and VC enemy audiences and continued use of procedures established under Task 2, Vulnerabilities.
- (U) Based upon an intensive effort then under way, a research program in two phases was planned in response to the formal task statement presented in April. In Phase 1 equal samples of NVA prisoners and Hoi Chanh would be surveyed in each of the four military regions and data from each sample tabulated, summarized and reported. In Phase 2 the samples were to be combined into the four categories and profiles prepared for each, i.e., a profile of the NVA prisoner, of the NVA rallier, of the VC prisoner, and of the VC rallier. These would then be compared: the NVA prisoner and the NVA rallier, the VC prisoner and the VC rallier, the NVA prisoner with the VC prisoner, the NVA rallier and the VC rallier, permitting a final assessment of the enemy soldier for the report.
- (U) The task was halted abruptly in May to divert all HSR effort to another top-priority psyop community research need. As a result of the diversion of time to other tasks, the scope of Task 3 was reduced to include only treatment of data already collected in Phase 1 which totaled 400 interviews within three of the groups, or seven studies.
- (U) Findings from each study were reported together with a profile of the individual samples in an attempt to provide as much information as possible.

Problem

(U) JUSPAO requested that HSR conduct a study of the psychological characteristics of the NVA and the VC soldier. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 3, Priority 1 - Psychological Factors of the NVA/VC soldier.

In order to increase the effectiveness of psychological operations directed to NVA and VC enemy audiences, conduct a program of research to continue use of HSR survey instruments developed in PAG Tasks 1 and 2. Perform extensive field work to tap Hoi Chanh (HC) and Prisoners of War (PW's); investigate the possibility of gaining access to PW's as soon after coming into Allied hands as possible. From this research, prepare basic profiles on four groups of available enemy population -- NVA PW's, NVA HC, VC PW's, and VC HC -- and highlight important differences among these groups. Analyze comparisons of these profiles and the total obtained data base, emphasizing the following issues:

1. NVA/VC resistance to getting out of the war by any voluntary means.

- a. Weakening of resistance to voluntary selfremoval by the theme that seeking an alternative to certain death can be considered involuntary.
- b. Other approaches that might weaken resistance to self-removal from the war.
- 2. Presence of any common factors at the time of surrender which may give clues to psychological exploitation.

- 3. Factors which motivate NVA and VC soldiers' will to fight.
- 4. Themes and actions which may depress morale to an extent that may impair the will to fight.

Prepare summary reports to convey significant information when it is revealed in the continuing series of surveys.

Plan the research with the view of its continuation in the future.

Background

(U) This task continued use of the procedures established under Program II, Task 2 - Vulnerabilities. Already-developed data collection instruments and procedures, modified as necessary, were used to focus on means to remove NVA and VC from the war voluntarily.

HSR Research Approach

(U) The research plan for JUSPAO's top priority research need as expressed on 12 April was conservatively designed to obtain adequate information required to respond to the task statement, based upon an intensive effort then under way. The effort was to consist of a series of studies in two phases: Phase I was to involve conduct of surveys to obtain 200 samples each of prisoners of war and Hoi Chanh from the North Vietnamese Army and from the Viet Cong, for a total of 800 interviews; Phase 2 was to involve assessment of the findings on each group and analysis of combined groups with comparisons and contrasts among the various categories. (See Chart 5 for original task flow diagram.) As modified by the suspension of Task 3 on 9 May due to the urgent need for assessment of the effect of the Allied invasion of Cambodian sanctuaries, and subsequently the curtailment of Task 3 research effort to the level of already-completed data, the task consisted of a modified Phase 1 only. This included only the seven studies (400 interviews) for which survey data had been obtained prior to mid-May. Survey of VC ralliers was eliminated. Phase 2 which provided for detailed analysis and comparisons of groups and combinations of groups, was also eliminated completely.

- (U) Phase 1, the field research phase, included three studies:
 - Study 1. Investigations of NVA prisoners countrywide:
 - A. 50 from MR1
 - B. 50 from MR2
 - C. 50 from MR3
 - D. 50 from MR4
 - Study 2. Two investigations of VC prisoners, from the extreme northern areas and extreme southern areas of RVN:
 - A. 50 from MR1
 - B. 50 from MR4
 - Study 3. One investigation of NVA ralliers in the National Center in Saigon:
 - A. 100 from National Chieu Hoi Center (received countrywide)

Research Plan

- (U) Questionnaires and procedures had been designed for each of the four categories to be assessed: NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's, VC Hoi Chanh. Because of priority shifts, the VC Hoi Chanh instrument was not used as only three categories were assessed. With the major time-consuming tasks of instrument-development/test/preparation accomplished, the detailed research plan described steps used for each group surveyed from that point:
 - Select specific groups of no less than 50 within the three populations to be assessed: NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, and VC PW's. Plan for 50 protocols from the NVA PW population from each of the four Corps areas, and 50 percent of that total from the NVA Hoi Chanh population. Also, obtain two sets of 50 protocols from VC PW's.
 - 2. Train interviewer teams in use of questionnaires designed for specific categories of enemy forces.

- 3. With the assistance of JUSPAO and MACJ3-11, prepare and submit access authorization through US/ GVN channels to insure admission to PW camps and to Chieu Hoi Centers.
- 4. Have versions of questionnaires required for specific samples produced in sufficient quantity.
- 5. Receive authorizations for access to samples.
- After authorizations have reached the facilities to be sampled, visit the camp officials to arrange times, entry, schedules, and interviewer accommodations.
- 7. Through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11 and ARPA, arrange travel schedules and accommodations for survey team in the field.
- 8. Conduct questionnaire surveys of the selected samples.
- 9. Tabulate pre-selected response data.
- 10. Translate narrative responses; regroup and categorize.
- 11. Summarize pre-selected response data.
- 12. Summarize narrative responses.
- 13. Organize/analyze results of surveys.
- 14. Interpret results of surveys.

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- 15. Issue summary reports for immediate use in the field.
- (U) These fifteen sub-tasks were required for each of the seven groups investigated.
- (U) Staffing. This effort assumed availability of contracted Vietnamese personnel as required, trained in survey research, interviewing and translation. From resumption of effort after completion of the Cambodian effect task, this task required three HSR Research Scientists.

Procedure

- (U) Random samples, each sample containing 50 low-ranking prisoners, were drawn from PW camps in each military region. Both NVA and VC prisoners were drawn from Da Nang in MR1 and Phu Quoc in MR4; NVA were also drawn from Pleiku in MR2 and Bien Hoa in MR3. PW names were drawn from camp records either the night before or on the morning of each day of interview. Although Phu Quoc is a collection center for PW's from all the military regions, the large number of prisoners concentrated there made it easy to select a random sample of PW's captured in MR4, both VC and NVA, for the two samples from that region.
- (U) Interviewing was done by a trained staff of Vietnamese interviewers under the supervision of a Vietnamese Research Supervisor and an HSR Research Scientist.
- (U) Individual interviews with each PW, averaging three hours and fifteen minutes in length, were conducted in facilities furnished in the camps' enclosures.
- (U) A lengthy questionnaire that had been developed specifically for each of the groups (i.e., NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's) and several supplementary data-collection instruments were used.

Development of Data-Collection Instruments/Procedures

- (U) Results of participation in surveys using questionnaires obtained from other sources or questionnaires designed in large part by other participants showed clearly that new and radically different questionnaires and procedures would have to be developed for at least four specific groups; i.e., NVA PW's, NVA Hoi Chanh, VC PW's, and VC Hoi Chanh.
- (U) In mid-September 1969, HSR research personnel participated in a quick-response questionnaire survey of 60 NVA Hoi Chanh using an already available questionnaire. Early in October, HSR personnel played a major part in executing a survey that proposed to sample 40-50 NVA PW's to obtain useful data while pre-testing a questionnaire developed jointly by representatives of several groups within the psyop community including HSR. Work was terminated after the questionnaire had been administered to 24 NVA PW's when it became clear that the questionnaires in use were not appropriate or productive for the task.

- (U) Four new questionnaires were designed to cover all significant aspects of NVA and VC PW's and ralliers.
- (U) The questionnaire is made up of independent sections, each of which can be used alone or in any combination of sections depending on the focus of interest. The questions combine the use of pre-selected answer choices where appropriate for speed, accuracy, and consistency, with provision for narrative response or elaboration of all questions where desirable and appropriate. In this fashion, the questionnaire makes use of the advantages inherent in both the open-end and closed type of questions.
- (U) The questions are pre-coded to enable the data to be key-punched directly from the questionnaire even without knowledge of the Vietnamese language. The questions are so numbered that all four forms are fully compatible (with the exception of a small number of specific questions which do not hamper processing) and the data can thus be processed on cards or tape with the same program and report format even though they treat four different types of subjects. Those questions which permit elaboration of a pre-coded response will show, in machine-produced reports, whether a narrative answer exists for any specific question for a particular subject but will not show the content of the narrative answer itself. The narrative portion of the answer must be extracted later in narrative form from the original questionnaire by a Vietnamese translator; the "present" or "absent" indicator in the machine-produced report will eliminate the necessity to search all questionnaires to find out whether or not a narrative response was given.

- (U) In the course of development and translation of the questionnaires into Vietnamese, it was established that there is a considerable disparity between the Vietnamese and English languages in the range of distinctions or nuances that are possible for many keywords. This issue is extremely important because the nature of the research objectives makes it imperative that these fine distinctions be made; it is clearly possible that some apparent ambiguities or contradictions in the literature may have resulted from this problem.
- (U) As a partial solution to this problem, i.e., the problem of maintaining "conceptual equivalence" in working between different languages, an essentially behavioral card-sort technique was developed, field-tested, and used to supplement questionnaire data. It is important to recognize that, under the time and operational pressures which exist in a war, no full solution to this problem (which is both a technical and an operating problem) may be realistically possible.

(U) Rather than using a single word such as "surrender" which has or may have unfortunate connotations, and because the Vietnamese language cannot easily handle the distinction between "surrender", "allowing capture", and "being captured" (indeed, they require some operational elaboration to make a distinction in English), several situations have been described in consistent fashion on cards. The individual reads (or has read to him) the description, sorts the cards in four successive choices by placing the card on a labeled section of a large chart in response to the following four questions given in sequence.

		•	
1.	Do your leaders consider this action in this situation acceptable?	Acceptable	Not Acceptable
2.	Do your leaders believe this action in this situation to be honorable or dishonorable?	Honorable	Not Honorable
3.	Would your families be af- fected or not affected if you took this action in this situa- tion?	Family not	-
4.	Would you do this in this situation?	Would	Would Not

- (U) The questionnaires have gone through a process of successive modifications following field use; the current versions represent the product of a series of analyses of the instrument.
- (U) The questionnaire contains about 450 questions; about three-quarters of the questions may require quantitative or qualitative elaboration or both depending on the nature of the initial answer. Therefore, administration usually involves about 750 questions plus discussion.
- (U) The questionnaire was designed, to the extent possible, to follow the time sequence of major phases of the individual soldier's life history because that is the most efficient mode of organization for data collection. Also treated, after entrance into military service, are the individual's judgments about the other men in his unit and the situation in which he is operating.

Grouping of Questionnaire Sections

(U) The logical organization of the 36 sections of the questionnaire for analysis of responses used in this report requires grouping which differs from the time sequence on which organization of the questionnaire is based. Grouping is slightly different for NVA and VC samples unless specifically indicated; otherwise, remarks which follow refer to both NVA and VC questionnaires. The way in which sections can be regrouped most conveniently for analysis of the data is described here under eight major headings; grouping is not rigid.

Pre-Military - Service History (Sections 1, 2, 3, 4)

(U) Major influences working in his infancy, childhood, and adolescence are of special concern because experiences during these years fix the base content of his body of knowledge and shape the way in which he will perceive the world and whatever happens to him in the future.

Indoctrination/Propaganda (Sections 6, 19, 20)

- (U) Sections 6, 19, and 20 are concerned with the effort devoted to thought control and conditioning represented by the program of propaganda and political indoctrination to which he is exposed while in military service.
- (U) Major elements of interest are content and the emphases found in the formal political indoctrination program; the way in which the individual is manipulated through the Front's ability to give or withhold basic necessities for his family; and the machinery for control and surveillance represented by group discussion, several forms of group criticism and self-criticism, and 3-man cells.

Trip to RVN (Sections 8, 9, 10, 11)

(U) Sections 8, 9, 10, and 11 treat the NVA soldier's journey to RVN in detail. For someone who previously has led a relatively impoverished and restricted life, each soldier's long, grueling trip to RVN to join the fighting must be an extremely significant, new, and formative experience.

Despite its rigors, because it is such a new and different experience, it cannot be assumed to have only a negative impact. It may increase his sense of self-importance or may open new vistas. It may act to create or strengthen feelings of camaraderie and heightened morale generated from increased reciprocal esteem among comrades in his unit because of having shared and successfully endured a long period of successively greater dangers and hardships.

(U) Sections 8 and 10 treat the VC soldier's attitude toward joining the Front and his contacts with and aid to NVA units traveling to their destination in South Vietnam.

Controls/Exposure in RVN (Sections 13, 14, 15, 18)

(U) Sections 13, 14, 15, and 18 are designed to obtain details about the opportunities for various kinds of contacts and experience in RVN which confirm or negate indoctrination-derived notions.

Exposure to Allied Psyop (Sections 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)

(U) Familiarity with GVN psyop messages and general communications efforts is analyzed in Sections 25 through 29 to gain perspective on exposure to various media and the extent and nature of impact upon the enemy soldier.

Stress in RVN (Sections 12A, 12, 32, 17)

(U) In Sections 12A, 12, 32, and 17, stress-producing elements of the soldier's experience in the South are looked at, such as disparities between propaganda and actual experience, food and diet, sickness and medical care, and combat exposure.

Contemplation of Defection (Sections 22, 22A, 23, 24, 31)

(U) Sections 22, 22A, 23, 24, and 31 treat the kind and extent of the individual's thoughts which might result from stress such as consideration of various methods of defection, and the role of GVN psyop in his thoughts and decisions is examined.

Motivators/Obstacles to Defection (Sections 5, 7, 21, 30, 33)

(U) Factors which may act as positive motivators and therefore counterbalance negative experiences such as compensation, promotions, current benefits, future rewards, and expectations of victory are covered in Sections 5, 7, 21, 30, 33. Finally, because the indoctrination-inculcated expectation of "very bad treatment" is judged to be -- based on previous research -- a major deterrent to all types of defections, and because there are some reasons to believe that the "grapevine" reaches easily into PW camps, reactions to treatment at various stages of the steps by which he reaches the PW camp are analyzed.

Results

- (U) Results were presented as a profile in narrative form with supporting raw data shown adjacent to narrative statements. The profile is a device to describe an "average" or "typical" NVA or VC soldier since the average is the "best guess" about what is characteristic of him. As any given percentage moves closer to 0% or 100%, less "guess" is involved and more certainty is assumed. The numbers in parentheses appearing in the narrative indicate the question and answer upon which statements in the narrative are based. Where statements are based on more than one set of responses only the most pertinent question number is cited. Material in the text, not directly drawn from the percentage distributions shown, is usually from quantitative or narrative elaboration of initial answers.
- (U) In the process of creating verbal summarizations of percentage distributions -- an action necessitated by the narrative treatment designed to interrelate the answers to a sequence of questions -- several devices were used. Generally, if the distribution of answers is essentially balanced (for instance, 46% No, 52% Yes) the verbal equivalent is usually "...he might or might not..." Where the distribution is less in balance (for instance, 34% No, 61% Yes) the verbal equivalent is usually "... it is likely..." Where the imbalance is greater (for instance, 17% No, 79% Yes) the usual verbal equivalent is "...probably..." Larger percentages may be equated to "...very probably..." and percentages above 90%, depending on the nature of the distribution among other answer choices of the remaining 10%, may be unqualified statements (for instance, 6% No answer, 94% No); the verbal equivalent might be "... he never..." or "... he believes..."

- (U) Narrative statements also may be phrased in terms of probability such as "...there is 1 chance in 4..." if the low-percentage issue is thought to have some special significance.
- (U) In the main body of results that follows, percentages are used to show the way in which responses are distributed among pre-selected answers.
- (U) Some questions require answers in terms of numbers rather than words. For such questions, three other statistics may be added to the percentage distribution; the median, range, and inter-quartile range of the numerical responses.

"Median" - when the numerical responses are ranked low to high, the median is the numerical response below and above which there are an equal number of responses, i.e., the middle response. The median is used, rather than an average, to eliminate distortions that may be introduced by unusually high or low responses.

"Range" - when the numerical responses are ranked low to high, the range represents the limits of a series, i.e., the lowest and highest numerical response obtained.

"Inter-Quartile Range" - for "Inter-Quartile Range": when the obtained quantified responses are ranked low to high and divided into four equal quarters or groups, the spread of numbers covered by the two middle quarters is the Inter-Quartile Range, i.e., the middle half of any set of responses. The Inter-Quartile Range is given where the range alone may be misleading because of unusually high or low answers.

- (U) These three statistics may be computed in several ways; the manner of computation can be inferred logically from the nature of the question. For instance, if 80% of the sample report that their father is alive, the median age is obviously computed on those whose fathers are living.
- (U) Profiles for each of the seven samples follow; in generalizing from samples to the general VC or NVA populations, it must be kept in mind that there is good evidence for the existence of considerable differences between VC and NVA personnel who come to be ralliers or prisoners, between VC ralliers and VC PW's and between NVA ralliers and NVA PW's.

136

Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR1

- (U) The NVA soldier captured in MR1 shows the following typical characteristics:
- 1. The typical low-ranking NVA soldier, captured in MR1 in 1970, was a volunteer whose parents wanted him to go South to join the fighting. He has had a very restricted and controlled early life. No parents, but other family members may be war casualties.
- 2. Cradle-to-grave news control and thought-conditioning creates individuals who unquestioningly accept NVN leaders' version of events. This belief in NVN's version of "reality" -- grossly distorted from a Westerner's point of view -- is the basis for NVA "morale". Surveillance and control mechanisms -- group discussions, criticism sessions, 3-man cells -- are enjoyed or liked rather than resented.
- 3. The three-month trip to RVN, for those in MRI, was not nearly as difficult and stressful as it may seem when seen in a Westerner's perspective.
- 4. There is very little contact with people or villagers in GVN-controlled areas.
- 5. Psyop resources devoted to newspapers, posters, and novelty items show little return if aimed at NVA soldiers; this is true also for television, radio, and ground loudspeakers.
- (U) It is probable that airborne loudspeaker broadcasts were heard occasionally by the MR1 NVA PW but they were heard clearly on less than half of those occasions; this suggests that the full potential of the impact is reduced to an unknown extent by operating and/or mechanical problems. It is very significant that almost all have seen leaflets but less than one-third have read them and little credence is given to them.
- 6. There is some receptivity -- although a small one representing about 15-20% of the total -- for defection appeals but the fact that the individuals who represent the market are all prisoners who say they were captured in combat indicates something additional is needed to evoke action rather than just arouse curiosity or interest.
- 7. Experiences in RVN tend to confirm rather than negate expectations created by Party propaganda: food was seldom a problem, sickness was frequent but seldom fatal, and exposure to hostilities seems small. Stress does not seem great enough to evoke such a drastic action as defection except in those already predisposed.

8. There appear to be very few positive motivators for NVA. Their conviction of superior strength and complete confidence in ultimate victory is the key to their morale; both notions are a product of the NVA's total news control and pervasive mind-conditioning indoctrination programs.

Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR2

- (U) The NVA soldier captured in MR2 shows the following typical characteristics:
- 1. The typical NVA soldier captured in MR2 in 1970 is a draftee who is a little older on the average than his counterparts in other areas and has led a very restricted and controlled early life. Neither he nor his family wanted him to enter military service, and his 1-in-5 chance of a relative being a war casualty is the highest throughout the country for NVA soldiers.
- 2. The amount of NVN effort devoted to cradle-to-grave news control and thought-conditioning may have a mild backlash in the existing circumstances. There are about 2 chances in 5 that he has a negative attitude toward the various control and surveillance mechanisms. He is much more ready than those in other regions to say that there was some resentment in his unit about such practices.
- 3. He was a somewhat unwilling combatant since he did not want to go to RVN and was in no hurry to get there after he started to South Vietnam. On the 3-month trip, illness was frequent in his unit; about 5% could not continue and it is a 1-in-4 chance that about 4 men died from sickness.
- 4. Opportunities to see those aspects of GVN areas which might confirm or disprove his indoctrination-based expectations were few and brief. He had very little contact with people or villages in both Front-controlled and GVN-controlled areas. There was a modest amount of exposure to South Vietnamese NLF personnel and most of his time was spent in forests.
- 5. Many payor resources apparently can be used more profitably in other ways or require rethinking. It is extremely informative about the degree of control accomplished by the Party or the degree of credibility given to its policies since, although almost all had seen leaflets,

it was about a 50-50 chance that they had not read leaflets; if read, a majority of the messages were given little credence. Almost all other media -- GVN newspapers, posters, and novelty items -- were seldom if ever read; television and ground loudspeaker messages were not heard; radio programs were seldom heard. Among those who heard the sounds of the airborne loudspeakers, the words were heard clearly less than half of the time. It is likely that some part of some of the themes or content of some of the messages was understandable; only some portion of them was believable.

- 6. A small percentage of the NVA have allowed their thoughts to encompass the possibility of defection in some form; nevertheless, almost all are now prisoners who claim they were captured in combat or as a result of severe wounds. Some factor to be added on the side of defection is needed to tip the balance; integration of psyop with tactical planning and operations should be routine rather than sporadic.
- 7. Experiences in SVN form a neutral balance with indoctrination-derived notions. Food does not seem to be a problem. Sickness was a problem of some proportions with malaria being prevalent; for example, it is probable that he lost about thirty days through sickness too severe to allow him to carry out any of his normal duties. It may be significant that if hospitalization was needed, there were perhaps 3 chances in 5 of getting it. Exposure to hostilities seems comparatively slight.
- 8. There are no discernible tangible and positive motivating factors in the life of the lower-ranking NVA soldier in RVN. Benefits or rewards appear minimal even in his perspective; for example, his monthly pay in RVN was 60 GVN piastres -- about enough to buy one package of cigarettes. Apparently, no current or future benefits or rewards were held out to him. He does expect a pension and a job if disabled and aid to his family if he is killed but these are negative nullifiers of concerns rather than positive motivators; i.e., he must be hurt severely or lose his life for these benefits to be applicable.
- (U) On balance there has been general minor disappointment about his experiences in South Vietnam and his indoctrination-derived notions are a little frayed around the edges; for example, he recognizes that, on balance, NLF support among the general public is less than he had been led to expect. This is a very significant factor in view of the fact that public support is a key factor in the logical structure of the NVA indoctrination program.
- (U) The usual complete confidence in eventual victory is not found. On balance, he still thinks NLF is the eventual victor, but conviction is lacking.

Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR3

- (U) The NVA soldier captured in MR3 shows the following typical characteristics:
- 1. The typical low-ranking NVA soldier captured in MR3 early in 1970 was a draftee; both he and his family had mixed emotions about his entrance into military service and his going south to join the fighting. He led a very restricted and controlled early life. There is a 1-in-25 chance that his father may be considered a war casualty, but no other close relatives are war casualties.
- 2. Indoctrination during training in NVN and in the field in RVN appears to have been less thorough and less frequent than for comparable samples in other regions.
- 3. The trip to the South appears to have been more rigorous for this group than for similar groups in other areas of the country. The five-month trip to RVN, in a 500-man unit where few men had weapons, was marked by considerable sickness; about 10% of the men were unable to continue and some died from sickness.
- 4. There has been little contact with civilians in RVN in both NLF and GVN-controlled areas. There has been frequent contact with VC soldiers partly but not solely because there were both VC and NVA soldiers in his unit; contact with VCI is very infrequent. Since most of his time has been spent in forests he has had little direct exposure to situations, other than military operations, that might confirm or conflict with his indoctrination-derived notions about RVN.
- 5. The typical NVA soldier in MR3 has been reached by more psyop media than NVA in any other MR. Leaflets are seen by about 95%, and read by about 70%; about one-third give some degree of credence to the content of some of the messages. MR3 NVA PW's are the only ones to have read GVN newspapers before becoming prisoners; 20% read newspapers but believed little of what was read; about 5% read posters of slogans on novelty items.
- (U) No ground loudspeaker messages reached them and they saw no television programs. About 40% heard radio broadcasts but preferred music to the news which they did not believe. Almost all heard airborne loudspeaker messages occasionally but often could not hear clearly or understand them. Less than half of what was heard was judged to be believable.

- 6. NVA PW's in MR3 were much more likely to have considered some form of defection than were NVA in any other MR. Twenty-four percent had considered surrendering, 18% had thought of rallying, and 30% had considered other alternative methods -- usually desertion. Excluding overlaps in the percentages, almost 40% of the sample had considered at least one of these actions. The fact that 88% expected death or torture when captured is surely associated with their failure to reach a positive decision when they were considering defection.
- 7. Sickness was pervasive; the average NVA soldier was incapacitated for an average of 20 days during his time in RVN. A large proportion -- although still a minority -- were dissatisfied with medical care and medicines received. Food was seldom a serious problem. Frequent contact with VC soldiers who may have a realistic view of general conditions in RVN, coupled with less intense and pervasive indoctrination, may be related to his perception of negative differences between what he was told in NVN and what he experienced himself in RVN.
- 8. No tangible rewards are found for the typical NVA soldier in MR3. He has not been promised any current rewards. There is a 1-in-3 chance he has been told of future rewards and benefits; these hinge on victory and are largely intangible such as "better priorities" and "esteem". If tangible, they are still essentially symbolic such as medals and citations. The indoctrination he has received about how soldiers are treated by GVN is certainly a strong deterrent to defection. He no longer is completely convinced that NLF will win under any circumstances but those who do not choose NLF as the eventual victor are uncertain about who will win rather than judging that RVN will win.

Profile of the NVA Soldier in MR4

- (U) The NVA soldier captured in MR4 shows the following typical characteristics:
- 1. The typical NVA soldier taken prisoner in MR4 in 1970 at 21 years of age is the youngest among samples from the four Military Regions. He grew up in a restricted and tightly-controlled rural environment. There is about 1 chance in 20 that his father or a sister is considered a war casualty.

- 2. Cradle-to-grave news control and thought conditioning creates individuals who unquestioningly accept NVN leaders' version of events. This belief in NVN's version of "reality" -- grossly distorted from a Westerner's point of view -- is the basis for NVA "morale". Surveillance and control mechanisms such as group discussions, criticism sessions, and 3-man cells are enjoyed or liked rather than resented.
- 3. Although a draftee rather than a volunteer, his comparatively intensive indoctrination while in NVN apparently created an enthusiastic soldier for he was eager to start South to join the fighting. During the five-month trip, there was always sufficient food for his 600-man unit, half of which carried weapons. Sickness was frequent; slightly over 2% dropped out because of illness and several men may have died.
- 4. Exposure to the villages and civilians of RVN was small although there were occasional opportunities to talk to VC soldiers. He tends to be uncertain or ambivalent about how well the VC and NVA get along together.
- 5. Psyop efforts seem either to involve inappropriate media, or be subject to purely mechanical problems, or be thwarted by NVA discipline. GVN newspapers, posters, and novelty items are not read by any NVA. No ground loudspeaker broadcasts and no television programs were heard or seen. The very infrequently heard radio news or messages were disbelieved in entirety.
- (U) Leaflets were <u>seen</u> by more than 70% but <u>read</u> by less than 15%; more than half of this 15% believed none of what was read. Airborne loudspeaker broadcasts were heard by about 40%, usually were not heard clearly, were seldom understandable, and were judged not credible by almost all who heard them.
- 6. The NVN PW in MR4 is the most intransigent of all. He claims to have given no thought to surrender; none to rallying, and never has considered any alternative methods of leaving the NVA ranks. He will not even speculate about what might be the most advantageous mode of defection for "another NVA soldier".
- 7. During his time in RVN he might have been ill seriously enough to lose about 20 days in which he did not carry out his normal duties; however, despite the frequency of illness in his unit, it was seldom fatal.
- (U) His experience in RVN provided only strong confirmation of his indoctrination-derived expectations; for instance, it is an even chance that he finds NLF military operations even more successful than he has expected. His exposure to hostile actions about equals those in MR3 and is considerably more than those in MR1 and MR2.

8. No tangible rewards for military service are detectable. His conviction of eventual victory is the strongest and the least uncertain found in all four Military Regions.

Profile of the VC Soldier in MR1

- (U) The VC soldier captured in MR1 shows the following typical characteristics:
- 1. The typical VC soldier taken prisoner in MR1 in 1970 very probably had at least one war casualty in his immediate family. It is a 42% chance that his father is a war casualty; 24% his mother; 18% a sister; and 32% chance that a brother is a war casualty.
- 2. The median time of 20 hours devoted to political indoctrination after joining the Front was preceded by lengthy discussions before he actually became a volunteer. Subsequent indoctrination in the field was conducted almost entirely by other VC personnel. Group discussion and various forms of criticism sessions were frequent and were enjoyed as was participation in a 3-man cell.
- 3. The typical VC soldier captured in MR1 was an eager volunteer whose desire to join the Front was supported by his parents. He was proud to join and was in a hurry to get to the fighting.
- 4. After having joined the Front, there was little contact with civilians in GVN-controlled areas but there was a considerable amount of contact with NVA soldiers; relations between the NVA and VC were judged to range from normal to very good.
- 5. Exposure to psyop varies greatly by media. All VC PW's had seen GVN leaflets frequently but only one-third had read any; only some of what was read was believed some of the time. Eight percent had read GVN newspapers, 6% had read posters, and none had seen novelty items bearing slogans or messages.
- (U) All in the VC PW sample had heard the sound of airborne loudspeakers occasionally but ability to hear the words clearly varied considerably in frequency. The same was true for understandability of the message theme or content; none were able to understand the theme all or most of the time. A fifth of the total sample believed some portion of the messages some of the time.

- 6. The typical VC prisoner taken in MRI described homself as a dedicated soldier; he claimed to have given virtually no consideration to any form of defection.
- 7. Frequent illness and exposure to air strikes, artillery, heavy bombing, and combat dangers should have combined to create considerable stress but personal experience appears to have reinforced rather than undermined adherence to indoctrination-derived belief in NLF superiority and eventual victory.
- 8. Motivation was emotionally or idealistically based for no obvious material rewards for participation in the Front were described. VC soldiers did not share the NVA belief that a pension and a job will be available for the disabled and that financial aid will be given to the families of men who are killed. Complete conviction of ultimate victory played a major role in sustaining motivation.

Profile of the VC Soldier in MR4

- (U) The VC soldier captured in MR4 shows the following typical characteristics:
- 1. The typical VC soldier, captured in MR4 in 1970, was aged 22, had 3 years of schooling, and was from a farmer family in a small rural village; he is a Buddhist and an ancestor worshipper. There is about a 1-in-3 chance that a close relative is a war casualty.
- 2. The formative early years were not controlled by membership in a succession of junior Party-controlled organizations; the result is an individual with more freedom than the typical NVA soldier to make his own interpretation of what he sees and hears.
- (U) After joining the Front, he received about 40 hours of political indoctrination. Group discussions and various forms of criticism were frequent while in the field; a majority of those who participated liked these sessions and liked being in a 3-man cell as well.
- 3. There were many indications of enthusiasm and high expectations more than three years ago at the time of joining the Front; dangers and hardships were discounted and help was confidently expected from civilians in both NLF and GVN controlled areas.

- 4. The fact that the VC soldier spends time in NLF-controlled villages and may have some contact with civilians in GVN areas who are perhaps VCI while the NVA soldier is unlikely to have such contacts, makes the VC soldier a credible source of information for any NVA soldiers who may be in his unit; the VC soldier is probably the source of much of the data that forms the NVA soldier's impression of RVN.
- 5. Success of attempts to reach the type of VC soldier who becomes a prisoner through various means of communications varies considerably. Leaflets were seen frequently by about three-quarters of the PW sample and were read by about one-fifth of the total. Ten percent gave some degree of credence to the leaflet messages.
- (U) The sound of airborne loudspeaker messages reached two-thirds of the PW's occasionally. In the total sample only about one-quarter heard the words clearly on some occasions but among those who did hear the sound of the loudspeakers, about half heard clearly on some occasions but not on others. Less than one-fifth of the PW's gave any degree of credence to the messages' content.
- (U) Posters, novelty items, and magazines did not reach the VC, nor did ground loudspeaker messages or television programs. All had seen radio sets; 12% had <u>listened</u> to the radio, and 8% had heard rally or surrender appeals on the radio.
- 6. Consideration has been given to rallying or surrendering, and to some alternatives as well. In speculating about what would be the "best way for a VC soldier to leave the ranks" almost half could select a method -- mostly rallying -- and most indicate that they might themselves have rallied if the right opportunity had occurred at the right time.
- 7. Frequent exposure to hostile action, occasional instances of inadequate medical care for sicknesses, and the possibility that he may -- although infrequently -- find himself without food for so long that his energy is impaired appear to underlie the VC soldier's tendency to make judgments favorable to RVN when comparing personal experiences with NLF indoctrination and propaganda.
- 8. Few sources of positive motivation appear to exist for the VC PW in MR4; there may be some extra emphasis on control through families since there is a comparatively high belief that families of defectors may be adversely affected. What may have once been confidence in eventual victory now appears more like uncertainty about who will win.

Profile of the NVA Rallier Received in the Republic of Vietnam

- (U) The rallier is an atypical NVA soldier. In the course of the war up to early 1970, more than 7,000 NVA prisoners had been taken. This is roughly 10% of the NVA troops that have been in the field. Some 700 NVA soldiers had rallied; this is roughly 1% of the NVA troops that have been in the field. The NVA rallier is a disaffected individual, not a convert who has made a positive change of allegiance.
- 1. The typical NVA rallier (who overall is an atypical NVA soldier) received within RVN in early 1970 was a draftee; neither he nor his family had wanted him to enter military service. He is twice as likely to be married compared to NVA PW's and is 5 or 6 years older than the average NVA PW. It is less than a 10% chance that there is a war casualty in his family.
- (U) The typical NVA rallier had received about fifty hours of political indoctrination in a period of about six months while in NVN after entering military service.
- 2. He has a distinctly more negative attitude toward the communist surveillance and control mechanisms. In addition, more ralliers than prisoners claim not to have been affected by or exposed to various forms of controls which is itself suggestive of a general adaptive avoidance.
- 3. The duration of his trip to RVN averaged about four months. Food was not a problem but illness was frequent and apparently served as an excuse for some men to return to NVN. Deaths from illness were infrequent but most of the men in his group were somewhat devitalized when they arrived at their destination; few men arrived in normal good health.
- 4. The NVA rallier has had at least as much exposure to RVN civilians in NLF-controlled areas as any NVA PW and considerably more than most. He does not appear to have any more contact with VC or VCI personnel than the typical NVA PW. A large majority of his time was spent in forested areas.
- 5. Almost all NVA ralliers had seen and read GVN leaflets frequently and found them easy to understand. A majority of the messages were rally appeals. Most contained some form of instructions that the rallier judged made the act of rallying seem somewhat more safe.

- (U) A large majority had been exposed to airborne loudspeaker broadcasts; although he had the usual difficulty in hearing them, more than half of the sample found some of the messages to be believable. Almost half had listened to GVN radio broadcasts but only 10% remembered any radio psyop appeals.
- 6. Compared to NVA PW's, the NVA rallier is much more likely to have considered various forms of defection prior to his rallying. He favored rallying as the best means to leave the NVA ranks mainly because he believed the promise of "good treatment". Apparently, the promise of "good treatment" and "warm welcome" are important adjuncts to rally appeals; more specific details about the treatment may be even more persuasive.
- 7. The NVA rallier had a difficult time in RVN. Typically there was much illness and many deaths from illness in his unit. If he needed medical care he is likely to have felt that he received inadequate treatment. He is also likely to have experienced a severe shortage of food on one or more occasions. There was considerable exposure to air strikes, artillery, and heavy bombing; some losses in his unit were probably associated with each of these actions in addition to losses suffered in combat. Perhaps because of all these factors he is disillusioned about the NLF position on many of the issues treated in indoctrination programs. In particular, he feels that the NLF military operations are much less successful than he had been led to believe.
- 8. Many negative and no positive motivating factors can be identified for the NVA rallier. He did not want to enter military service originally and now has no interest in a military career. He is not aware of any current or future rewards that he can expect to receive and, on balance, feels that his being in military service has had an adverse effect on his family's financial situation. He began military service dissatisfied with his salary and allowances and remained dissatisfied; the fact that his monthly pay while in RVN was between 50 and 80 GVN piastres a month represents a concrete reason for feeling that he is not properly compensated. If he ever had the conviction -- shared by most NVA soldiers -- that NLF would win the war, he has now lost that conviction.

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
TASK 3: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THF NVA/VC SOLDIER
PHASE 1: SURVEY OF 800 NVA/VC POW'S AND HOI CHANH
MAN-MONTH ALLOCATION CHART

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TASK 3: PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF THE NVA/VC SOLDIFR PHASE 2: ASSESSMENT OF THE ENFWY SOLDIFR
MAN-MONTH ALLOCATION CHART
CHART 4

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TASK 3: WORKFLOW CHART



PAG TASK 4

FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN

PAG TASK 4

FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN

Summary and Introduction

- (U) JUSPAO requested research into factors affecting support for GVN.
- (U) The survey was intended to supply information needed to improve the effectiveness of JUSPAO products directly related to political aspects of the war, which are targeted to South Vietnamese audiences.
- (U) A five-phase study was designed to (1) construct the data base needed for design and development of means to assess relevant factors; (2) prepare instruments and conduct research to identify attitudes relevant to GVN support; (3) prepare instruments and conduct survey of communications media impact patterns; (4) determine perspective on appropriate role of information and methods for communications; (5) consolidate and analyze results for report.
- (U) This research task was held in abeyance while more urgent research needs were filled. It was not undertaken later.
- (U) The plan to research a problem that is even larger in 1971 than it was in 1970 is reported here.

Problem

(U) JUSPAO requested that HSR conduct a study of communication needs of a people developing their government while defending against military invasion. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 4, Priority 2: In order to improve the effectiveness of JUSPAO products, directly related to political aspects of the war, which are targeted to South Vietnamese audiences, analyze the factors which affect the GVN's gaining support of the countryside, emphasizing the following issues:

- a. Research, primarily through field study, the attitudes of rural people relevant to support for the GVN.
- b. Determine which media are best able to reach the people.
- c. Place in perspective the role of information in gaining support for the GVN.
- d. Determine whether GVN is using the right means of communication, if information has a significant role in gaining support for the GVN.

Background

(U) The people in RVN are variably exposed to different sources of communications depending on geographic location, economic status, literacy, and other such factors. A not inconsiderable factor which affects the potential effectiveness of communications is existence of built-in culturally-based attitudes which affect the credibility of news and information received in different ways. The overall problem is compounded by the impact of enemy-introduced distortions of news and propaganda.

154

- (U) To be effective, an information-dissemination program package must first reach most or all of the individuals who compose the many diverse groups within GVN. Next, the messages conveyed in many different treatments through many different media should achieve the same effect for all -- that is, promotion of individual and group acceptance and identification with GVN aims.
 - (U) The problems faced by the communicators are truly staggering.
- (U) JUSPAO has undertaken many programs and activities since its inception in Vietnam during a period of time when the demand for its services and products was always in excess of resources; the success of these efforts is evidenced by the fact that many of the resultant publications or activities are still in operation. During the time when operational necessities automatically had first priority, secondary activities naturally gave way. Therefore, it is entirely understandable that systematized efforts could not be made in the past to evaluate the utility of each program or activity.
- (U) Now, as purely military activities plateau or decline and as GVN is called on to assume more responsibility in all areas, the civilianoriented pacification and development activities assume progressively greater importance. Pacification and development will not be brought about solely by force. It must be facilitated by a carefully considered blend of actions and examples forcefully brought to the attention of the general population through effectively persuasive information-dissemination programs to motivate support for GVN; in this task, JUSPAO has a major responsibility. The issues treated in news and information media, the manner in which the issues are treated, and especially the impact of messages to the general population must come under careful and close scrutiny. Note that the concern should not be limited only to those who are presently civilians. Those who are now in military and paramilitary services will also be "civilians" in the not-too-distant future: these individuals are a significant group among the general population (with a heavy loading of individuals of rural origin).

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(U) Fortunately, it is now possible to devote some time and effort to activities designed to increase the success of future information support programs with derivative beneficial effects upon attitudes toward the GVN P&D Plan and toward GVN as a whole. This effort will be devoted to a systematic means of evaluating the prevailing general attitudes toward support for GVN, the various needs for information, and the best means of getting the right information to the right people at the right time in the right way to engender support.

- (U) This study should be undertaken in close collaboration, or desirably in full participation, with GVN agencies such as the Ministry of Information (MOI), General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), the Social and Behavioral Sciences Section of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Combat Development Test Center (ARVN CDTC), and others. Their assistance is not vitally necessary but the training and experience gained by the Vietnamese participants would represent a sizeable bonus without any increase in costs.
- (U) Results of a successfully executed study will have direct application to MAG and USIS activities far beyond the scope of Vietnam.

HSR Research Approach

- (U) An attempt to identify factors which operate to determine the attitudes of the general population toward the Government of Vietnam may represent a task of the same magnitude as JUSPAO's own primary task of trying to communicate meaningfully and similarly to all Vietnamese. As a minimum, major considerations that must be covered include identification of what "GVN" means to all major groups; identification and measurement of the attitudes of significant groups toward the image, aims, and actions of GVN; search for the sources, kinds, and strengths of factors which impact attitudes positively or negatively; identification of patterns of use of information-dissemination media; identification of kinds, volume, and content of news-dissemination activities; and subsequent identification of the most credible and effective themes, treatment, media, human resources, and timing for information dissemination purposes.
- (U) In the several earlier versions of the presently proposed task statements, Task 4 was built around GVN Pacification and Development Plan, its objectives, and JUSPAO and GVN information support programs. Several weeks of discussion and search have not discovered alternative means for defining GVN aims and objectives in a way that can be specified and tested in the field. Since no useful alternative is realistically available at this time, the P&D Plan necessarily will be an important source of "GVN aims".
- (U) This research plan, which represents a conservatively conceptualized minimum but adequate response to the task statement, is comprised of five sub-tasks. The combined results of these sub-tasks will respond to the general and specific issues contained in the PAG task statement.

Sub-task 4.1 - Preparation of Data Base

- (U) Survey materials relevant to identification of GVN aims; implementing announcements, plans, and programs; and the information support activities of JUSPAO, MOI, and other news-dissemination agents to construct the data base are needed for design and development of data-collection instruments and procedures appropriate for identification and analysis of the factors which affect GVN's gaining support in the countryside. Three different types of data about three different types of activities will be acquired by the following activities:
 - 1. Construct agreed-upon definitions of what constitutes "support for GVN".
 - Identify GVN actions, and information released to the public about these actions, that could have impacted the general population and could have affected attitudes.
 - Identify the related information programs and information support activities of JUSPAO, the GVN Ministry of Information (MOI), and other newsdissemination agents.

Sub-task 4.2 - Identify Attitudes Relevant to Support for GVN

(U) Design and develop questionnaires and other data-collection instruments and procedures needed to determine the attitudes of rural people that are relevant to gaining support for GVN and identify the major factors that influence the nature and intensity of attitudes toward the GVN; execute field surveys using questionnaires and other data-collection instruments and procedures.

Sub-task 4.3 - Survey Communications Media Impact Patterns

(U) Design and develop questionnaires and other data-collection instruments and procedures needed to assess which media are best able to reach the people. Conduct field surveys using questionnaires and other appropriate data-collection instruments and procedures.

Sub-task 4.4 - Determine Perspective on Appropriate Role of Information and Methods for Communications

(U) Analyze the data obtained in Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 and collect other information as necessary to develop perspective on the role of information in gaining support for the GVN and determine whether appropriate means of communication are being used.

Sub-task 4.5 - Prepare Consolidated Report

- (U) Consolidate the data and analyze the results of Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4; prepare an overall summary report.
- (U) Detailed research plans and flow-charts are attached for all subtasks.

Research Plan

(U) Sub-task 4.1: Prepare Data Base

- 1. Arrange through JUSPAO liaison, access to US and GVN officials, agencies, facilities, and documents as needed.
- Review all documents available through JUSPAO which bear upon the GVN aims and objectives with special emphasis on review of the Pacification and Development Plan (P&D Plan); identify assumptions, objectives, priorities, and relevance to various geographical areas of the country.
- 3. Review the steps taken to date on the part of GVN to implement their objectives and the P&D Plan, and the process by which implementation is achieved; the difference in planned implementation and the actual implementation; the sources supporting various types of implementation and those opposing.
- 4. Determine the distinctive geographical areas of the country in terms of pertinence for various objectives and in terms of distinctive population groups distinguished on the basis of interests, language, ideology, etc.

158

- 5. On the basis of Steps 2, 3 and 4 relate objectives and implementing actions of the P&D Plan to geographical areas.
- 6. Assess popular support needed and desirable for each objective by area.
- 7. Interview US and GVN officials and survey agencies, facilities, and documents needed to construct a data base and create perspective on the major information support programs that are operational in support of the GVN P&D Plan.
- 8. Survey all GVN and JUSPAO information programs, activities, resources, and capabilities.
- Judge the past and present role of information support in relation to achievement of GVN P&D aims; retain in project files as pre-study assessment for update at end of study.
- 10. Arrange through JUSPAO to receive for review all pertinent documents relevant to GVN aims and to each P&D objective on a current basis.
- 11. Arrange through JUSPAO to receive for review all reports of pertinent GVN meetings/decisions relating to GVN aims and to P&D objectives on a current basis.
- 12. Determine the various sets of information needed to survey rural peoples' attitudes toward GVN aims and the P&D objectives.
- 13. Specify (restate) aims and objectives of the GVN, emphasizing the GVN P&D Plan:
 - a. At a level of concept, detail, and language that has personal applicability and meaning for individuals in a rural population.
 - b. In a manner which enable questions to be formulated which treat the pertinent dimensions of rural populations attitudes and which may evoke an answer whether or not an individual is aware that the objectives exist.

(U) Sub-task 4.2: Identify Attitudes Relevant to Support for GVN

- 1. Design and develop sampling plans and procedures.
- Design and develop needed questionnaires and other research and data-collection instruments and procedures for attitude surveys.
- 3. Through JUSPAO, make initial contact and arrangements with the MACV Data Management Agency to insure conformance to any local special technical requirements for key-punching and machine-processing of obtained data.
- 4. Working with bilingual specialists, both US and Vietnamese, analyze each part of the developing questionnaires in an attempt to assure conceptual equivalence and intra-instrument consistency.
- 5. Select an interview team and instruct the team in administration of data-collection instruments and survey procedures.
- 6. Administer questionnaires to small test populations to pre-test instruments and procedures.
- 7. Tabulate pre-selected responses of test populations and summarize by question.
- 8. Translate free-responses of test populations, and regroup responses by questions (as distinguished from grouping byindividuals); analyze to establish categories; categorize responses and summarize.
- 9. Analyze results from test populations in terms of instrument design.
- 10. Modify questionnaires and procedures as appropriate on basis of analysis of results of test administration.
- 11. Have bilingual experts, both US and Vietnamese, check each part of each revised questionnaire for conceptual equivalence and intra-instrument consistency.

160

- 12. Have final master copies of the questionnaires and other materials typed in English and in Vietnamese.
- 13. Prepare appropriate versions of data-collection instruments for each geographical area which requires distinctive treatment.
- 14. Reinstruct interview teams on administration of questionnaires and survey procedures.
- 15. Have questionnaires and other materials printed.
- 16. Select desired populations from rural areas for which instruments are appropriate.
- 17. Obtain through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11, any necessary permits or clearances (US, GVN, local area, etc.) for access to survey populations, transportation, housing, and subsistence support for interview teams.
- 18. Schedule survey teams with supervisory personnel to rural areas selected.
- 19. Arrange through JUSPAO or MACJ3-11 for machine data processing of results.
- 20. Conduct surveys and studies.
- 21. Tabulate and summarize pre-selected response recults.
- 22. Translate narrative answers to free-response questions.
- 23. Regroup free-response answers by question; analyze to establish categories; categorize responses and summarize.
- 24. Analyze results.
- 25. Interpret results.

- 26. Issue summary reports, where findings warrant, relative to:
 - a. Profiles of rural Vietnamese attitudes toward support of GVN and P&D Plan objectives.
 - Factors that cause existence of or changes in attitudes related to support of GVN.
 - c. Identification of attitudes which may be affected by possession or lack of information.
 - d. Identification where possible, of any significant ways in which P&D programs are suited to psychological exploitation through publicizing themes or content that may have positive application to GVN aims.

(U) Sub-task 4.3: Survey Communications Media Impact Pattern

- 1. Design and develop sampling plans and procedures to survey means of communication and appropriate use of various media.
- Design and develop needed questionnaires and other research and data-collection instruments and procedures.
- 3. Through JUSPAO, make initial contact and arrangements with the MACV Data Management Agency to insure conformance to any local special technical requirements for key-punching and machine-processing of obtained data.
- 4. Working with bilingual specialists, both US and Vietnamese, analyze each part of the developing questionnaires to assure conceptual equivalence and intrainstrument consistency.

- 5. Select an interview team and instruct the team in administration of data-collection instruments and survey procedures.
- 6. Administer questionnaires to small test populations to pre-test instruments and procedures.
- 7. Tabulate pre-selected responses of test populations and summarize by question.
- 8. Translate free-responses of test populations, and regroup response by question (as distinguished from grouping by individuals); categories; categories answers and summarize.
- 9. Analyze results from test populations in terms of instrument design.
- 10. Modify questionnaires and procedures as appropriate on basis of analysis of results of test administration.
- 11. Have bilingual experts, both US and Vietnamese, check each part of each revised questionnaire for conceptual equivalence and intra-instrument consistency.
- 12. Have final master copies of the questionnaires and other materials typed in English and in Vietnamese.
- 13. Prepare appropriate versions of data-collection instruments for each geographical area which requires distinctive treatment.
- 14. Reinstruct interview teams on administration of questionnaires and survey procedures.
- 15. Have questionnaires and other materials printed.
- 16. Select desired populations from rural areas for which instruments are appropriate.

- 17. Obtain through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11 any necessary permits or clearances (US, GVN, local area, etc.) for access to survey populations, transportation, housing, and subsistence support for interview teams.
- 18. Schedule survey teams with supervisory personnel to rural areas selected.
- 19. Arrange through JUSPAO or MACJ3-11 for machine data processing of results.
- 20. Conduct surveys and studies.
- 21. Tabulate and summarize pre-selected response results.
- 22. Translate narrative answers to free-response questions.
- 23. Regroup free-response answers by question; analyze to establish categories; categorize answers and summarize.
- 24. Analyze results.
- 25. Interpret results.
- 26. Issue summary reports, where findings warrant, relative to:
 - a. Identification of attitudes directly affected by possession or lack of information.
 - b. Development of proper perspective on the role that is realistically possible and appropriate for information support programs and activities.
 - c. Use of the right means of communication and communications media in terms of probable audience, appropriate content, and comparative effectiveness.
 - d. Identification, where possible, of any significant ways in which P&D programs are suited to psychological exploitation through publicizing themes or content that may have positive application to GVN aims.

(U) Sub-task 4.4: Determine Perspective on Appropriate Role of Information and Methods for Communication

- 1. Consolidate and organize the data obtained in Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.
- 2. Analyze the consolidated data to identify existence of needs for additional data.
- 3. Analyze the consolidated data for various communications methods and media from the standpoint of audience size and acceptance in relation to publication frequency and volume, content, credibility of content, and tone or style in the case of hard-copy media.
- 4. Prepare a brief summary report treating such issues as:
 - a. Identification of attitudes affected by possession or lack of information.
 - b. Identification, where possible, of any significant ways in which support for P&D objectives can be aided through information support activities.

(U) Sub-task 4.5: Prepare Consolidated Report

- 1. Organize the data from Sub-tasks 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.
- 2. Analyze the consolidated data and prepare a summary report of Task 4.0.


Staffing. The effort required for Task 4.0 assumes availability of contracted Vietnamese personnel trained in survey research procedures, interviewing, and translation. It will require two HSR Research Scientists for a total of thirty man-months spread over sixteen calendar months with intermittent participation of HSR Senior Research Scientists.

Table 7 shows the overall schedule for Task 4.0.

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	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr May		Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct
4.1 Prepare Data Base			989 403 803			;								. ,				,
4.2 Attitude Surveys		. =				9901804190419041904		00 100	. 11			3	•					
4.3 Survey Media Impact																	ì	
4.4 Role of Information			- 1					=										
4.5 Consolidate Report											60			60101				·
								TAS	TASK 4.0									


FACTORS AFFECTING SUPPORT FOR GVN
MAN-MONTH ALLOCATION CHART
CHART 6

166




SUBTASK 4.2: WORKFLOW CHART


CHART 8



SUBTASK 4.3: WORKFLOW CHART

CHART 9






SUBTASK 4.4: WORKFLOW CHART

CHART 10

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SUBTASK 4.5: WORKFLOW CHART

PAG TASK 5

(U) JUSPAO PUBLICATIONS EVALUATION (U)

PAG TASK NO. 5

(U) JUSPAO PUBLICATIONS EVALUATION (U)

Summary and Discussion

- (U) JUSPAO requested a survey of audiences and attitudes toward four JUSPAO Vietnamese language publications distributed free of charge in South Vietnam. These four: <u>Huong Que</u>, a monthly magazine; <u>Viet-Nam Ngay Nay</u>, a weekly newspaper; <u>Long Me</u>, a magazine published bi-monthly; and <u>The-Gioi Tu-Do</u>, a monthly magazine.
- (U) This survey was intended to supply urgently needed data for executive decisions about the future policy, course, and continuance of these publications.
- (U) A three-phase study was undertaken to (1) collect and consolidate existing information; (2) develop instruments for and collect needed additional information; (3) organize, analyze and report findings. JUSPAO arranged with various outside resources to collect the data within ongoing survey efforts.
 - (U) Findings are summarized for each of the four studies below.

Summary of Huong Que Study

1. (U) The definition of "audiences" in underdeveloped countries is complicated by varying literacy rates; therefore, two different definitions of audiences have been considered here (see section titled 'Discussion" for descriptions of the bases for computation).

Huong Que is read by 43% of "all rural villagers".

Huong Que is <u>read</u> by 86% of "all rural villagers able to read in some degree".

2. (U) Best available estimates placed the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. After appropriate projections and adjustments it was calculated that a conservative estimate of "all available and accessible rural villagers" was 10,000,000 people. A generous estimate of "all rural villagers who are potential readers" was set at 12,800,000.

Based on 10,000,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers is 4,300,000.

Based on 12,800,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers is 5,500,000.

- 3. (U) The typical reader is a male farmer, married, aged 42-43, with two years of schooling.
- 4. (U) The content of Huong Oue is understandable in whole or part for almost all of its readers. Articles concerning agriculture or animal husbandry receive the most widespread interest.
- 5. (5) The content of Huong Que articles is rated extremely high for "use-fulness" which, in this context, can be interpreted to mean "applicable in some practical way."

Summary of Viet-Nam Ngay Nay (VNNN) Study

1. (U) The definition of "audiences" in underdeveloped countries is complicated by varying literacy rates; therefore, two different definitions of audiences have been considered here (see section titled "Discussion" for description of the bases for computation).

VNNN is read by 11% of "all rural villagers."

VNNN is read by 22% of "all rural villagers able to read in some degree."

2. (U) Best available estimates placed the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. After appropriate projections and adjustments it was calculated that a conservative estimate of "all available and accessible rural villagers" was 10,000,000 people. A generous estimate of "all rural villagers who are potential readers" was set at 12,800,000.

Based on 10,000,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers would be 1,200,000.

Based on 12,800,000 rural villagers, the absolute number of readers would be 1,400,000.

176

- 3. (U) A typical reader of VNNN is age 36-37, male, and married. In relation to occupation, a typical reader is not identifiable; 34% are farmers or unskilled laborers; 21% are semi-skilled craftsmen; and another 32% are merchants, technicians/"professionals", or military; 13% are distributed thinly among other classifications. For the total group, the average level of education is approximately four years of schooling; it should be noted that this "average" figure does not adequately describe any of the three groups although it is correct for the composite group of VNNN readers.
- 4. (U) The content of VNNN is understandable in whole or part for a convincing majority of its readers. Articles on agrarian topics clearly receive the most popular interest.
- 5. (U) The content of VNNN articles is rated extremely high for "usefulness" which, in this context, can be interpreted to mean "informative" to VNNN readers.

Summary of Long Me Study

1. (U) The definition of "audiences" in underdeveloped countries is complicated by varying literacy rates; therefore, two different definitions of audiences have been considered here (see section titled "Discussion" for descriptions of the bases for computation) as well as separate renderings of rural and urban survey results.

Long Me is read by 19% of "all adults" in rural areas.

Long Me is read by 04% of "all adults" in urban areas.

Long Me is <u>read</u> by 38% of "<u>all adults able to read in some degree</u>" in rural areas.

Long Me is <u>read</u> by 08% of "all adults able to read in some degree" in urban areas.

2. (U) Best available estimates place the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. With this population figure as a base, adjusting for appropriate considerations such as war-related factors and age, a "general adult" population in 1970 has been derived. The figure which may be considered realistically descriptive of a potential nation-wide urban and rural audience approximates 12,000,000. Therefore, 12,000,000 "general adults" is a reasonable working figure to describe the population that may be reached by Long Me.

Based on 12,000,000 adults (10,000,000 rural and 2,000,000 urban), the absolute number of readers is approximately 2,000,000 people.

- 3. (U) A typical reader of Long Me is over 30, male, married, a farmer or laborer with four to five years of schooling.
- 4. (U) The content of Long Me is understandable in whole or part for a majority of its readers. Articles on various aspects of the Chieu Hoi program set against a rural or agrarian background receive the most widespread interest.
- 5. (U) The content of Long Me articles is rated overall as high for "use-fulness" which, in this context, can be interpreted to mean "informative and/or interesting."

Summary of The-Gioi Tu-Do Study.

1. (U) The intended audience for The-Gioi Tu-Do is defined as "...all elements of literate upper levels of the Vietnamese population; government officials; university faculty and students; military officers and cadre; professionals, business people, and shopkeepers; labor leaders, religious leaders, et al."

The actual reading audience, defined in terms of the distribution of copies of the magazine and the characteristics of its total readership, is more correctly described as the "better-educated general adult population"; this more broadly conceived audience is inclusive of the intended audience.

The-Gioi Tu-Do is read by 29% of the national "general adult" population.

The-Gioi Tu-Do is read by 53% of the national "general adult population able to read with some degree of comprehension".

2. (U) Best available estimates place the 1966 population of RVN at about 16,000,000. With this population figure as a base, adjusted for all appropriate considerations, a nationwide "general adult" population in 1970 has been derived. The figure which may be considered realistically descriptive of a potential urban and rural audience approximates 12,000,000. Therefore, 12,000,000 "general adults" is a reasonable working figure to describe the population that may be reached by The-Gioi Tu-Do.

178

Based on 12,000,000 adults (10,000,000 rural and 2,000,000 urban), the absolute number of readers is 3,480,000 people.

- 3. (U) The typical reader is a male businessman or skilled worker, married, age 36, with about five years of schooling. Approximately 14% of the urban readers report "some college" attendance.
- 4. (U) The content of The-Gioi Tu-Do is understandable for the most part to its readers. Articles on agrarian subjects and commercial development receive the most widespread interest.
- 5. (U) The content of The-Gioi Tu-Do articles is rated relatively high for "usefulness" considering the diversity of the audience; "usefulness", in this context, can be interpreted to mean furnishing information of interest to the The-Gioi Tu-Do reader.

Comment

- (U) The reader is urged to regard the figures and statistics offered here with appropriate caution and prudence.
- (U) The data is internally consistent, the logical analysis is conservative and simplistic (i.e., no inappropriately sophisticated statistical operations have been performed -- the mathematics are appropriate for the quality of the data), and interpretation is straightforward and has been kept to a minimum. The reader therefore can be confident that the statistics quoted provide a more factual basis for judgment than purely subjective estimates.
- (U) Nevertheless, cross-cultural research statistics must be treated with caution even under peacetime conditions. In wartime, when many otherwise non-existent factors are operating, even more caution is advisable.

Problem

(U) JUSPAO requested that HSR conduct a survey of audiences and audience attitudes toward four JUSPAO publications. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 5, Priority 3: In order to improve effectiveness of JUSPAO products directly related to political aspects of the war targeted to South Vietnamese audiences, conduct the following research studies:

Survey the audience and attitudes toward four JUSPAO publications: Huong Que, Viet-Nam Ngay Nay, Long Me, and The-Gioi Tu-Do.

Background

- (U) Some of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) communications media had been in operation for as long as six years. Available history indicated that, while there may have been intermittent efforts to survey audiences and attitudes towards the various communications instruments, the current project represented the first systematic attempt to provide such information on these publications.
- (U) The survey was intended to supply urgently needed data for executive decisions about the future policy, course, and continuance of these publications.

HSR Research Approach

(U) The research plan for JUSPAO's third priority research need was designed to supplement and process data already collected on the basis of informal assistance and verbally agreed-upon task plans to generate quick-response summary reports.

180

(U) The entire research study was designed in three phases. Phase 1 covered collection and consolidation of existing information. Phase 2 covered development of instruments for and collection of needed additional information. Phase 3 covered organization, analysis, and report of findings. Early phases were covered in consultation afforded JUSPAO in 1969. PAG task scheduling began with Phase 2, beginning in February 1970. Based upon prior effort conducted in response to verbal request, this involved assessment of findings and analysis of results in terms of management information needs. See Chart 13 for original task-flow diagram.

Research Plan

- 1. (U) Interview key people involved in production and distribution of Huong Que, Long Me, Ngay Nay, and The-Gioi Tu-Do to determine how each product is developed, the schedule followed, the people involved in production, objectives for each product, preparation of material for each, the source of concepts, copy, pictures, contributors, and procedures from production to delivery to the target audience.
- 2. (U) Examine representative samples of each product as provided by the key people interviewed.
- 3. (U) Search for and review results of available previous studies conducted on the products of interest. Where possible, state who conducted the study, whether it was systematic or casual, whether responses followed some pattern or were judgments, statements of opinion, observed facts, informed analyses. Record opinions, questions, judgments from any report which bears on the research question or product effectiveness.
- 4. (U) From the information gathered in Steps 1, 2, 3, organize information on each product into a systematic description with uniformity of format, for easy reference. Include some historical background, state the purpose the product was originated to fill, what objectives were stated originally, the current product objectives stated, the policies followed, intended audience, and volume of each publication.
- 5. (U) Identify the geographic areas served.
- 6. (U) Obtain through Field Development Division (FDD) of JUSPAO a detailed plan of distribution for each geographic area and reports of actual distribution within each geographic area.

- 7. (U) Based on information about product objectives and intended audiences, design questionnaires to survey readership.
- 8. (U) Translate the questionnaires and back-translate.
- 9. (U) Have bilingual specialists examine the questionnaires for conceptual equivalence and internal consistency.
- 10. (U) Have questionnaires printed.
- 11. (U) Select sampling areas and arrange for conduct of survey and any necessary clearances with US, GVN, and local agencies involved.
- 12. (U) Arrange for machine processing of survey results.
- 13. (U) Execute the questionnaire surveys.
- 14. (U) Tabulate results of closed-end questions.
- 15. (U) Translate answers to free-response questions.
- 16. (U) Summarize results of closed-end questions.
- 17. (U) Analyze translation of answers to free-response questions to establish categories for grouping; summarize.
- 18. (U) Analyze results.
- 19. (U) Prepare brief summary report of results.
 - (U) Chart 12 shows the schedule for this task.
- (U) Staffing. Six man-months of effort of HSR Research Scientists was required. Intermittent participation of HSR Senior Research Scientists was also a requirement.

Procedure

- (U) In compiling developmental histories of the publications, all available documents and materials were reviewed. Individuals concerned with policy, management, production, and distribution were interviewed. Key officials were consulted within JUSPAO and the RVN Ministry of Information (MOI). Concerned American and Vietnamese officials at corps, province, and district levels were contacted during field trips. All available previous surveys concerned with each of the publications were also reviewed and summarized.
- (U) Four surveys which included a total of 2,718 subjects form the data base for reports on four JUSPAO publications. Two surveys of 624 and 803 rural villagers designed by HSR were conducted as part of the country-wide Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) monthly surveys. A third nation-wide survey covering 691 rural villagers was designed by HSR and executed by the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) Local Survey Detachment (LSD) teams. For the fourth survey, questions developed by HSR were appended to a survey of 600 urban residents in the Saigon-Cholon area, conducted by the Center for Vietnamese Studies (CVS) under contract to JUSPAO.
- (U) The arrangements made by JUSPAO to enable conduct of the survey for evaluation of JUSPAO publications involved use of different resources, each external to JUSPAO, each using different survey procedures and methods for data collection. Since none of these resources were under the direct control of JUSPAO, and since their execution of HSR-designed surveys for JUSPAO was a courtesy extended at no cost to JUSPAO, it was necessary to work within the limitations created by the need to conform to their already-existing survey formats and sampling procedures. In short, the time, manpower, resources and wartime constraints within which the overall evaluation of several JUSPAO publications had to be conducted, did not permit the kind of lengthy research and analysis that would have been necessary to develop counts of the specific sub-classes of the intended audiences and to design and execute additional surveys. The necessary solution was to survey a larger audience that would conta,. within itself a useful representation of the specific sub-classes of the total population for which the publications were intended.
- (U) The patterns of results of the four surveys are generally consistent and mutually supportive. Results of the LSD country-wide survey of rural villagers were emphasized in the individual reports. These results are reported in the next section for each of the four publications.

here with appropriate caution and prudence. The data is internally consistent, the logical analysis is conservative and simplistic (i.e., no inappropriately sophisticated statistical operations have been performed—the mathematics are appropriate for the quality of the data), and interpretation is straightforward and has been kept to a minimum. The reader therefore can be confident that the statistics quoted provide a more factual basis for judgment than purely subjective estimates. Nevertheless, cross-cultural research statistics must be treated with caution even under peacetime conditions. In wartime, when many otherwise non-existent factors are operating, even more caution is advisable.

Special Considerations

- (U) The issue of literacy is crucial in developing statistics for readership surveys. It is discussed here in regard to literacy in the Republic of Vietnam as a whole and in terms of the HSR survey in particular.
- (U) <u>Literacy in RVN</u>. Development of reasonably accurate statistics on the size of audiences and readership, particularly in an under-developed country, requires careful examination and evaluation of the interrelation-ship of such factors as literacy, specificity of definition of audiences, readership in terms of absolute numbers, and percentage of readership which will vary with the definition of an audience.
- (U) Statistics on literacy in RVN, as in all under-developed countries, cannot be accepted at face value and must be examined carefully. The percentage of literacy which characterizes the rural population in RVN cannot be established with any satisfactory degree of precision. Estimates of RVN literacy available from the research literature and the research community do not always include a distinction between rural dwellers who tend to possess less schooling and urban residents who are characterized by a considerably higher level of education; this results in inflated estimates of rural literacy. Some US-supported studies have provided estimates of literacy for the rural population ranging from as low as 10% to as high as 60%. These estimates, however, are by-products of studies conducted for other purposes; consequently, their validity is questionable since they are based on varied types of samples, methodology, and sources such as self-reports ("Yes" or "No" to "Can you read?"), indirect inferences by observers, or practical tests such as reading and completing a printed questionnaire without assistance. Estimates of literacy obtained from Vietnamese sources are uniformly higher, ranging up to 80%; the basis for these estimates is unclear.

- (U) Another factor affecting the validity of estimates is the existence of considerable field research evidence that the percentage of illiteracy is progressively larger at each successively higher age level, particularly for rural men after age 40 and especially for rural women.
- (U) A major distorting factor is that ability to recognize a number of basic Vietnamese words can be interpreted mistakenly as "ability to read." This type of "ability to read" in no way implies "ability to read and comprehend" printed material which uses words not included within the small group of words that can be recognized. The importance of this factor can be understood when it is recognized that the structure of the Vietnamese language is such that many words have radically different meanings dependent upon context or contiguity to other words, and when combined with other words. Therefore, ability to recognize a word in print does not necessarily imply understanding of the word's meaning in the context of the sentence in which it is used. Failure to recognize one or two words can prevent comprehension of the meaning of an entire sentence.
- (U) In summary, based on all available outside data, a generous estimate of literacy among rural villagers is 50%.
- (U) <u>Literacy Reported in the HSR Survey</u>. Thirty-eight percent of the total sample reported being able to "read well"; an additional 52% reported being able to read a little. If "read a little" is interpreted to mean "read with comprehension of a theme", the total of the two figures -- 90% -- is obviously invalid since it compares very favorably with the literacy rate found in the most advanced nations.
- (U) If it is assumed that one-half of the 52% able to "read a little" do read with some degree of comprehension, the resultant figure would indicate a literacy rate of 64% (38% "read well" plus one-half or 26% of those who "read a little"). Comparison of the externally-derived estimate of 50% literacy in the rural population and the survey-obtained figure of 64% suggests that the survey-derived figure is somewhat inflated or that the survey sample may be somewhat biased. A check of the personal history data identified two minor sources of bias which normally should act to cancel each other. The sample has a higher proportion of people at higher age levels than does the general population but the distribution of subjects among levels of education shows a larger proportion at higher levels than is true for the general population. Since it has been pointed out that it is usual for the average level of schooling to decline at successively higher age levels, it would be expected that the age bias would counteract the education bias. The fact that the literacy rate remains unduly high although

the two sources of bias should balance out suggests that distortion may occur in the self-reports; analysis by level of education shows that 66 individuals or almost 10% claim 7-12 years of schooling. When this is checked against the occupational distribution of the sample, the 10% figure is not improbable but is unlikely for a rural population.

(U) In summary, the pattern of personal history responses strongly suggests that a predictable exaggeration in self-reports concerning literacy has occurred. For this reason, the more conservative externally-derived figure of 50% rural literacy will be used rather than the survey-derived figure of 64% when computing audience sizes.

Results

(U) Results are reported individually for each of the four studies.

HUONG QUE READERSHIP SURVEY

(U) The major objective of the study was development of perspective on rural villagers' awareness of and attitudes toward Huong Que. This section describes the developmental history and results of a readership survey of Huong Que (Rural Spirit), a Vietnamese-language magazine published monthly by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and distributed free of charge to the general rural population of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

History

(U) Publication of Huong Que was begun in 1962. Modeled on agricultural magazines published in the Republics of Korea and China, it is one of the oldest JUSPAO publications and has the widest circulation of any periodical in Vietnam.

Intended Audience

(U) The intended audience of Huong Que is the entire rural population of South Vietnam, especially farmers and provincial leaders (including those in contested areas), which comprises about four-fifths of the people of the country.

Production/Distribution

(U) Huong Que contains thirty-six 8-1/2 x 11 inch pages. The average lead time is nine or ten weeks from completion of "paste-up" to the receipt of printed copy. Initial monthly printing of 50,000 copies was begun in 1962, increased to 200,000 in November 1963, and was raised to 565,000 in April 1968, where it has remained. Printing is done in Manila. The magazines are shipped by military vessels to Saigon where they are packaged at JUSPAO Warehouse #1 for subsequent distribution.

Policy/Content

(U) The magazine is intended to serve two main objectives: stimulation of social and economic development, and promotion of a feeling of unity or nationhood.

- (U) Since the rural population is primarily engaged in farming, fishing, or small farm-related industries, the content of the magazine emphasizes practical articles related to agriculture and fishing, using a basic vocabulary and an uncomplicated style of presentation. In this way information on improved techniques and methods is simply and graphically conveyed in order to encourage increased production and economic growth.
- (U) Articles describing or explaining government programs and actions that have a widespread effect are intended to promote a sense of nationhood. Many rural people ordinarily have little opportunity to be informed about happenings outside their own villages. Through the magazine, the villager can recognize that the GVN activities which affect him and his village also affect other people in other villages whether near or far. This recognition of shared experience or responsibility is intended to lead to a sense of national identification or unity.
- (U) Editorial policy dictates that there be eight articles in each issue. Occasionally, this includes a letter from the editor and a short story (fiction) as well as articles focusing on agriculture, health, and education. The issue developed for April 1970, for example, contained pieces on hamlet self-help production programs, district-level farm loans by agricultural banks, venereal diseases, cabbage as a new Delta crop, the market for eels, the "tac ran" river boat, an editorial, letters from readers, and an illustrated poem.
- (U) Articles on pacification and aspects of land reform or village selfdevelopment programs also appear frequently. Material for publication is obtained regularly from the Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture, which publishes a magazine of its own on a smaller scale than Huong Que.

Staffing

(U) Huong Que's Vietnamese editor, a JUSPAO employee, writes at least half of the articles for each issue. He draws upon six or seven Vietnamese free-lance writers to fill out the remaining articles required for any given edition.

Previous Studies

(U) A "Nationwide Hamlet Survey" was conducted in 1967 by the Survey Research Branch of the JUSPAO Planning Office. A sample totaling 1300

subjects was interviewed in 125 hamlets throughout 15 provinces: 35% of the people either read or had Huong Que read to them, 9% received the magazine regularly (once a month or almost every month), and 26% received it irregularly. About 24% were able to keep their copy, i.e., did not pass it on to someone else. Most readers (27%) obtained the magazine from a military unit or a government service. The remainder (6%) borrowed it from someone else or got it from a family member who brought a copy home from the office. Those aspects liked best by Huong Que readers were "nice" clear pictures (15%) and the attractive cover and good quality of the paper (7%). Articles on agriculture were preferred most by the readers (25%), while others preferred articles on animal husbandry (18%). Some 11% said they liked nothing in Huong Que.

- (U) An informal study of comparative preferences was made by the United States Information Service (USIS) in November 1963. Sixty-four Civil Guard and 74 Self-Defense Corps Squad leaders attending a two-month leadership training course at Phu Cat, Binh Dinh Province, were interviewed to determine their preference for either Huong Que or The-Gioi Tu-Do and the reasons for their preference. It was found that 85% preferred Huong Que because of its farming-oriented articles, "how-to-do-it" instructions, and the simplicity of the language used. The results are not informative about readership since they describe preferences based on comparison of quite different types of magazines. The sample was composed entirely of farmers with a low level of education who are the exact audience for whom Huong Que is intended. The-Gioi Tu-Do, on the other hand, is designed for the better educated adult population characterized by more sophisticated interests. Because of the bias inherent in the sample, the findings were in the predictable direction but were not informative.
- (U) The Center for Vietnamese Studies (CVS) surveyed a sample of 600 Saigon-Cholon residents in March 1970 with an HSR questionnaire appended. Despite the fact that this group reflected an urban audience, as opposed to the intended rural agrarian audience of Huong Que, 22% of the total number interviewed knew about the magazine.

Survey

(U) Statistical results of the survey are shown in terms of audience registration, percentage of readership, readership characteristics, and reader preferences.

Audience Registration

(U) Of the sample of 680 rural villagers, 394 individuals (58%) reported being aware of the existence of Huong Que. Of these 394 individuals:

32% knew about Huong Que through hamlet level VIS

18% knew about Huong Que through village level VIS

10% knew about Huong Que through district level VIS

04% knew about Huong Que through province level VIS

26% knew about Huong Que through "friends or neighbors"

10% knew about Huong Que through other sources

(U) "Awareness" of Huong Que is not equivalent to "reading" Huong Que.

Readership

(U) Of the sample, 295 individuals (43%) reported having <u>read</u> Hucng Que. Of these 295 individuals:

29% receive Huong Que once a month

38% receive Huong Que every two months

33% receive Huong Que every six months

54% "read well" (self report)

43% "read a little"

03% cannot read

40% "understand most"

47% "understand half"

13% "understand almost none"

72% "articles are useful mostly"

27% "articles are useful sometimes"

01% "articles are generally not useful"

Readership Characteristics

64% are farmers or laborers

69% are male

80% are married

68% are between ages 30 and 60

11% had 0 - 1 year of school

46% had 1 - 4 years of school

24% had 4 - 7 years of school

16% had 7 - 12 years of school

03% (no answer)

190

Preferences

(U) Readers of Huong Que express a high degree of interest in articles on crop farming (23%), animal husbandry (23%), and rice growing (20%), ranking them on the basis of their "usefulness" (interpreted as practicality of applicability). In addition to the preference for agrarian topics, villagers next favor general non-farm-related material or non-farm material such as short stories, poems, pictures, and public health articles.

Discussion of Survey Results

(U) The survey statistics are extrapolated to the general rural population of RVN.

Definition of Audience

- (U) The designated audience for Huong Que is the general rural population or "all rural villagers."
- (U) If literacy is taken into consideration, a realistically defined audience would be "all rural villagers able to read with some degree of comprehension."

Percentage of Readership

- (U) Forty-three percent of the survey sample reported having read Huong Que. Therefore, for an audience defined as "all rural villagers" the readership percentage is 43%.
- (U) For an audience defined as "all rural villagers able to read with some degree of comprehension" the readership percentage is 86% (43% who read Huong Que divided by 50% who read with any degree of comprehension).

Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers

(U) The June 1968 Annual Statistical Bulletin of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reports the total population of RVN in 1966 was slightly over 16,000,000. With customary adjustments for annual population growth, the 1970 population was estimated to be slightly more than 18,000,000. This figure agrees well with a JUSPAO-obtained

figure calculated from the Hamlet Evaluation System for 1969 which when adjusted provides a 1970 figure of just over 18,000,000. Using the base figure of approximately 18,000,000, an upper limit of 12,800,000 was calculated for a population composed of "all rural villagers who are potential readers". With all unusual wartime factors taken into consideration, based on information available from concerned RVN ministries for such factors as death rates and refugee influx, a conservative adjusted minimum working figure of 10,000,000 "available and accessible rural villagers" was calculated; computations were made using both figures.

Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers

(U) Using the conservative figure of 10,000,000 for the number of rural villagers, with a 43% readership the reading audience for Huong Que includes some 4,300,000 rural villagers. Assuming the existence of 12,800,000 rural villagers and 43% readership, the reading audience for Huong Que would comprise about 5,500,000 rural villagers.

Frequency of Reading

- (U) A roughly equal distribution is found for those who receive and read Huong Que each month, once every two months, and once every six months. The typical reader, therefore, reads about two out of every five issues.
- (U) If the conservative figure of 10,000,000 is used as a base, and an average of two out of every five issues, or 4.8 issues of the magazine each year are read by 43% of the audience, the two figures in combination indicate that 20,640,000 "readings" take place (4,300,000 people read Huong Que 4.8 times). If the base figure of 12,800,000 is used, the corresponding figure is 26,400,000 "readings".
- (U) With an annual printing volume of 6,780,000 copies $(565,000 \times 12)$ and an annual rate of 20,640,000 "readings", it can be calculated that each individual copy of Huong Que may be read by an average of 3.0 rural villagers (20,640,000 "readings" divided by 6,780,000 copies). If the figure of 26,400,000 readings is used, the corresponding statistic would be 3.9.
- (U) A frequently-encountered estimate or rule of thumb is that each copy of such publications in RVN passes through about five sets of hands or is read by about five people. The survey-derived rate of 3.0 or 3.9 appears, therefore, to agree well with subjective estimates.

VIET-NAM NGAY NAY READERSHIP SURVEY

(U) This section describes the developmental history and results of a readership survey of Viet-Nam Ngay Nay (Viet-Nam Today), a Vietnamese-language newspaper, published weekly by JUSPAO with participation by the RVN MOI, and distributed free of charge to the general rural population.

History

(U) The Vietnamese language news-sheet, Viet-Nam Ngay Nay (VNNN), appeared in the wake of the 1968 Tet offensive to fill the void created by suspension or reduction of printing and distribution of many commercial publications. VNNN, originally an air-dropped publication bearing the name of Tu-Do (dubbed the "mini-Tu-Do" in U.S. quarters because of its abbreviated newspaper format), is presently a hand-circulated news-sheet that received its current name in July 1969.

Intended Audience

(U) Oriented to the rural population in government-controlled and contested areas, VNNN is geared toward carrying news and information on local and national GVN activities. Farmers, laborers, and fishermen and their families make up the bulk of this audience in sections of the country not regularly or adequately served by the commercial press.

Production/Distribution

- (U) VNNN is a one-page weekly newspaper, 10-1/2 inches by 16 inches, printed on both sides. Type-setting and page composition is done at the Government of Vietnam's (GVN) printing plant. Six hundred and twenty thousand copies are printed each week; half of each issue is printed at the JUSPAO II printing facility and the remaining half (formerly produced by the 4th Psyop Group) is now printed by MOI.
- (U) Lead time for acceptance of copy is one week. VNNN is distributed by JUSPAO down to province level where the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) takes over delivery.

Policy/Content

- (U) JUSPAO and MOI share responsibility for editing VNNN. The content of each issue is approved by a JUSPAO-MOI panel.
- (U) The designated theme of this one-page newspaper is Pacification and Development (P&D) "Special Programs". Drawing on the GVN P&D Council for material, much attention is allocated to publicizing the activities and accomplishments of pacification efforts in order to insure that the rural population is aware of GVN progress. A further aim is to develop a sense of national cohesiveness among people who have previously had limited opportunity to be informed about events outside of their own immediate area and hence, little cause to identify with them.
- (U) Any given edition of VNNN contains articles and photographs that reflect its expressed policy of playing up completed or current activities as opposed to stressing concepts or future plans. A recent issue (appearing in June), developed during the height of US/GVN pushes into Cambodia, carried a lead article on RVN's support of Cambodia's anti-Communist struggle plus coverage of US/ARVN operations and the opening of the RVN embassy in Phnom Penh. Photos were featured of a senior Viet Cong (VC) rallier yielded by the Cambodian incursion and of Vietnamese refugees evacuated from Cambodia and now being settled and cared for within RVN. Other articles in this issue treated school construction, a Korean-Vietnamese economic/technical agreement, vocational training, land reform, agricultural development bank loans, and the effectiveness of a recent Chieu Hoi Campaign.

Staffing

- (U) During 1968 the editor of VNNN was a JUSPAO employee. From January 1969, JUSPAO and MOI each supplied a co-editor; MOI also provided one or two other staff members assigned on a part-time basis who work within JUSPAO. This participation on the part of MOI represented the initial step toward the eventual turn-over of full responsibility for VNNN to GVN, programmed for December of 1970.
- (U) Several steps are slated to occur in the gradual assumption of control of VNNN by MOI; these include, in sequence:
 - 1. Sole control of selection and preparation of copy.
 - 2. Full control over policy, format and production.
 - 3. Full responsibility for printing and distribution.

Previous Studies

(U) No previous rural surveys for VNNN could be located. An HSR questionnaire on selected JUSPAO publications was appended to a public opinion survey taken by the Center for Vietnamese Studies (CVS) in March 1970. It revealed that 3% of the sample of 600 Saigon-Cholon residents read VNNN. In light of the rural orientation and distribution of VNNN, however, the low level of awareness of its existence on the part of a metropolitan population is not undeserved nor unexpected. It is probable that VNNN's urban readers may include many of the displaced rural population now living in the city.

Survey

(U) Statistical results of the survey are shown in terms of audience registration, percentage of readership, readership characteristics, and reader preferences.

Audience Registration

- (U) Of the sample of 680 rural villagers, 170 individuals (25%) reported being aware of the existence of VNNN. Of these 170 individuals:
 - 44% knew about VNNN through hamlet level VIS
 - 15% knew about VNNN through village level VIS
 - 09% knew about VNNN through district level VIS
 - 04% knew about VNNN through province level VIS
 - 18% knew about VNNN through "friends or neighbors"
 - 10% knew about VNNN through other sources
 - (U) "Awareness" of VNNN is not equivalent to "reading VNNN".

Readership

(U) Of the sample 75 individuals (11%) reported having <u>read</u> VNNN. Of these 75 individuals:

02% receive VNNN once a week
19% receive VNNN twice a month
45% receive VNNN once a month
18% receive VNNN every two months
16% receive VNNN every six months

66% "read wcll" (self-report)
34% "read a little"
00% cannot read

40% "understand most"
48% "understand half"

12% "understand almost none"

49% "articles are useful mostly"
50% "articles are useful sometimes"
01% "articles are generally not useful"

Readership Characteristics

65% are male
72% are married
62% are between ages 30 and 60

34% are farmers or unskilled laborers
21% are semi-skilled or skilled craftsmen
32% are merchants, technicians/"professionals", or military
13% miscellaneous

08% had 0 - 1 year of school 34% had 1 - 4 years of school 24% had 4 - 7 years of school 33% had 7 - 12 years of school 01% (no answer)

Preferences

- (U) VNNN readers expressed a markedly high interest in articles on agrarian subjects with more than 20% preferring articles on crop farming and another 20% favoring articles on animal husbandry.
- (U) Second choice among interesting articles or topics was general news stories that cover a broad range of local affairs.

196

Discussion of Survey Results

(U) In this section, the survey statistics are extrapolated to the general rural population of RVN.

Definition of Audience

- (U) The designated audience for VNNN is the general rural population or "all rural villagers".
- (U) If literacy is taken into consideration, a realistically defined audience would be "all rural villagers able to read with some degree of comprehension".

Percentage of Readership

- (U) Eleven percent of the survey sample reported having read VNNN. Therefore, for an audience defined as "all rural villagers" the readership percentage is 11%.
- (U) For an audience defined as "all rural villagers able to read with some degree of comprehension" the readership percentage is 22% (11% who read VNNN divided by 50% who read with any degree of comprehension).

Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers

(U) The June 1968 Annual Statistical Bulletin of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reports the total population of RVN in 1966 was slightly over 16,000,000. With customary adjustments for annual population growth, the 1970 population was estimated to be slightly more than 18,000,000. This figure agrees well with a JUSPAO-obtained figure calculated from the Hamlet Evaluation System for 1969 which when adjusted provides a 1970 figure of just over 18,000,000. Using the base figure of approximately 18,000,000, an upper limit of 12,800,000 was calculated for a population composed of "all rural villagers who are potential readers". With all unusual wartime factors taken into consideration, based on information available from concerned RVN ministries for such factors as death rates and refugee influx, a conservative adjusted minimum working figure of 10,000,000 "available and accessible rural villagers" was calculated; computations were made using both figures.

Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers

(U) Using the conservative figure of 10,000,000 for the number of rural villagers, with an 11% readership the reading audience for VNNN includes some 1,100,000 rural villagers. Assuming the existence of 12,800,300 rural villagers and 11% readership, the reading audience for VNNN comprises about 1,400,000 rural villagers.

Frequency of Reading

- (U) The typical reader reads about one out of every four issues.
- (U) If the conservative figure of 10,000,000 is used as a base, and an average of one out of every four issues, or thirteen issues of the news-sheet each year, is read by 11% of the audience, the two figures in combination indicate that 14,300,000 "readings" take place (1,100,000 individuals read VNNN 13 times). If the base figure of 12,800,000 is used, the number of "readings" would be 18,300,000.
- (U) With an annual printing volume of 32,200,000 copies (620,000 x 52) and an annual rate of 14,300,000 "readings", it can be estimated that each individual copy of VNNN may be read by an average of .45 rural villagers (14,300,000 "readings" divided by 32,200,000 copies); stated another way, almost one of every two copies is read by one person. If the figure of 18,300,000 readings is used, the corresponding statistic would be .57; stated another way, approximately three out of every five copies are read by one person.
- (U) A frequently-encountered estimate or rule of thumb for magazines is that each copy of such publications in RVN passes through about five sets of hands or is read by about five people. A corresponding figure for newspapers could not be located.

Analysis: Comparison of Viet-Nam Ngay Nay and the Commercial Press

(U) Publication of VNNN was begun early in 1968 after the Tet offensive had caused the curtailment or shutdown of many newspapers. To some extent VNNN was, and was intended to be, an interim substitute for commercial newspapers.

(U) As part of background information useful in providing perspective on VNNN's reception by its intended audience, some general information about the commercial press and other government-sponsored newspapers is presented here in terms of content and style, numbers of publications, circulation, and comparison with VNNN.

The Vietnamese Commercial Press

- (U) The Vietnamese vernacular press is basically a Saigon press. For the most part, its interests and concerns are parochial or urban in scope with some exceptions as in the case of regional matters such as Southeast Asian affairs or major world events. News carried on the non-urban side of Vietnamese life and activities is sparse to non-existent. Vietnamese newspapers do not have bureaus and few employ stringers working for them outside of metropolitan Saigon. News of government programs pertinent to the provinces, such as the local impact of land reform, for example, reaches the readers of the Saigon press in the form of GVN press releases. As a rule, the press releases are printed with little change and give little evidence of any attempt at dynamic news reporting or analysis.
- (U) In addition to Saigon and Southeast Asian oriented news stories and news-related features and articles, large portions of many news-papers are given over to short stories, serialized fiction, horoscopes, and other regularly featured non-news items that have extensive appeal and enjoy great popularity among readers of the vernacular press.
- (U) The editorial and operating policies of the Saigon press run the full gamut from pro-government to anti-government and anti-U.S. policy in tone. It is difficult to tell whether the range and intensity of the latter stance -- avowed opposition to GVN and American policy -- is more likely to be increased or decreased by government confiscation of objectionable editions of dissident newspapers.
- (U) In general, then, the Vietnamese newspapers reflect Saigon interests, are almost exclusively parochial and urban in content; represent varying degrees of political sentiment ranging from anti-government to pro-government stands; and rely upon sizeable quantities of non-factual, non-news material to attract and guarantee their readership.

Province Newspapers - Government Publications

(U) Readers who seek news on local affairs (i.e., the intra-province level) in certain regions can turn to the province newspapers which are budgeted and published by provincial governments in support of their own objectives. Twelve provinces currently produce their own semi-monthly newspapers or news-sheets; this number is substantially lower than it has been in the past due to recent cutbacks in funds. In most of those provinces producing their own newspapers the ratio per issue of the number of province newspapers compared with the number of VNNN is as high as four to one in favor of the local paper.

Number of Commercial Newspapers

- (U) In recent years the commercial press has undergone a marked across-the-board rise in number of publications and size of circulation which surpasses even the previous peak during 1963-1964. This rise can be attributed, at least in part, to political ramifications of shifts in government policies that now result in loosening of government constraints as national stability increases. Previously, the effect of shifts in government policy seemed almost to have the effect of placing stop-and-go controls on the press. Despite fluctuations in the number of newspapers published from year to year, the demand and potential for circulation of newspapers has grown steadily.
- (U) Although a total of fifty daily newspapers are now being published in Saigon (34 Vietnamese-language, 12 Chinese, 3 English, and 1 French) there are applications pending for permission to print twenty-six additional daily papers.
- (U) The number of non-daily newspapers has increased significantly since early 1960's although the daily newspapers still dominate the Vietnamese press in a journalistic sense.
- (U) Among the things which have led to the popularity of non-dailies is the fact that continuing censorship under war-time conditions imposes practical limitations that in some cases are more conducive to the publication of non-daily newspapers rather than to dailies; this is especially true for weeklies. Greater lead time in the preparation of copy allows more thorough scrutiny of the content and analysis of implications which might cause curtailment of production or stoppage by the government.

200

From a cost-effectiveness standpoint, it is obvious that only a fraction of the resources and logistical demands needed to get out a daily are required for publication of a newspaper that appears only once or twice a week. The importance of this point, because of the strained economic atmosphere in which all Vietnamese commercial undertakings operate, is made evident by the increase in the number of non-daily papers.


- (U) However, it must be noted that, from a competitive standpoint, the non-daily compared to the daily newspapers suffers from a lack of timeliness or lag in reporting news events. There is no available way to develop a figure indicating the extent of this disadvantage but it is sure to be sizeable.
- (U) The number of daily and non-daily newspapers published each year, from the start of 1963 to the end of 1968, is shown in Figure 1. The drop in number of publications that occurred at Tet is not obvious in Figure 1 because the organization of the original source data is such that only one point can be plotted on the graph for each year.

Commercial Press Circulation

(U) The licensing and regulatory practices imposed on newspapers by the government results in creation of records which provide reasonably accurate data on the numbers of various types of commercial publications appearing in Vietnam but circulation figures are very difficult to locate. Publishers often claim circulation rates that are so inflated as to be clearly well beyond their production capabilities. Until commercial press readership surveys are conducted, controlled as well as is possible under wartime conditions, it will continue to be necessary to accept the claimed circulation rates while applying a substantial discount for optimism. There are also cultural variations that may or may not be known; for instance, RVN's equivalent for the discarded newspaper which travels between tables all day long in an American cafeteria may be found at many of the Saigon mobile restaurants. A news-stand dealer may rent the same fifteen-piastre newspaper to half-a-dozen readers for a few piastres and then turn in that same copy at the end of the day to the publisher or distributor as unsold. Such practices known and unknown, in combination with the problems involved in making estimates for contested areas, create a situation in which circulation and readership for the commercial press is almost impossible to gauge with acceptable precision. However, figures for the circulation of daily and non-daily newspapers during the period beginning 1963 to the

FIGURE 1

NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS (1963-1968)



Daily Newspapers Non-daily Newspapers Total Newspapers Other Periodicals

ers — —

*Non-daily newspaper data incomplete for 1967.


202

end of 1968 are shown in Figure 2; these figures are obtained from the Viet-Nam Statistical Yearbook published by the National Institute of Statistics. The dip in circulation that occurred at Tet is not obvious in Figure 2 because the organization of the original source data is such that only one point can be plotted on the graph for each year.

VNNN Compared to the Commercial Press/Province Newspapers

- (U) The troubled situation which gave rise to the creation of VNNN has since greatly subsided and today VNNN in many respects can be considered to be in competition with the commercial press. This is true not only because publishers gradually resumed their activities as security increased in the urban areas, but also because the upward trend in number of newspapers published and amount of circulation that marked the period between 1965 and 1968 has been renewed.
- (U) Some aspects of VNNN policy create differences between VNNN and other commercial and government-affiliated newspapers, whether weekly or daily, which may act to the disadvantage of VNNN. In limiting itself to reporting on GVN programs or events of inter-province or national significance, VNNN automatically excludes information on a whole range of topics that may be attractive to any reader whose interests range beyond GVN's self-reports on public happenings within Vietnam or happenings on the immediate Southeast Asian scene. Another practice that places VNNN at some competitive disadvantage is avoidance of nonnews and fictional items such as horoscopes and serialized stories although the commercial press appears to find these devices useful to gain and hold readership. Also, VNNN, like all other weekly news publications, suffers from a lack of timeliness or lag in reporting current news events.
- (U) Very probably two of its chief advantages are that it is distributed without charge and its contents may be regarded as authoritative because of government sponsorship, although the official character of VNNN precludes any accompanying dissenting comment or analysis which appeals to many newspaper readers.
- (U) VNNN, in the twelve provinces where province newspapers are still produced, may have less utility or effect on the rural villager although it is unlikely that the literate hamlet dweller is ever too busy to read a one-page newspaper.

FIGURE 2
NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION 1963-1968



Daily Newspapers Non-daily Newspapers Total Newspapers

Non-daily newspaper data incomplete for 1967.

204

(U) In brief summary, despite its growth and current ease of reaching country-wide distribution, the failure of the urban press to attend to coverage of local news -- particularly rural localized news -- supports the belief that some need for such a publication as VNNN continues to exist.

205

LONG ME READERSHIP SURVEY

(U) This section describes results of a readership survey and the developmental history of Long Me (Mother's Heart), a Vietnamese-language magazine published bi-monthly by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and distributed free of charge to the general adult population of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

History

(U) This section of the report describes the developmental history of Long Me, a bi-monthly Vietnamese-language magazine devoted to the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. Publication was begun shortly after the Tet offensive of March 1968.

Intended Audience

(U) The magazine is directed toward the general adult population of Vietnam with special additional emphasis on the civil and military leaders of GVN, the Armed Forces, and the population of contested areas.

Production/Distribution

- (U) Long Me contains sixty-four 5" x 8-1/4" pages. There are six editions each year; 100,000 copies of each issue were printed until May 1969 when volume was increased to 200,000 where it stands today. Freeze date for acceptance of copy is nine weeks prior to printing which is done in Manila; the magazines are sent by sea to Saigon where they are packaged at JUSPAO Warehouse #1 for delivery throughout RVN.
- (U) At the "rice-roots" level this magazine is ideally suited for hand distribution by RD teams and Armed Propaganda Teams (APT's) to the families with known VC affiliation or to families residing in contested areas.

Policy/Content

(U) Long me is designed to publicize and promote acceptance and support for the Chieu Hoi program among civilians and military personnel

throughout the Republic. It is a dual venture of the Government of Vietnam's Ministry of Chieu Hoi and the JUSPAO Field Development Division (FDD) which mutually determine the contents of each issue.

- (U) As Long Me's title (Mother's Heart) implies, familial ties as well as nationalistic spirit are paramount avenues for all types of Chieu Hoi exploitation. Much emphasis, therefore, is placed on inducing those who have relatives in the ranks of the Viet Cong to urge those relatives to rally to GVN. The magazine also functions as a semi-official organ for Chieu Hoi cadre.
- (U) The magazine employs varied forms of presentation including feature articles, poems, personal experiences, or short stories. A frequently-used theme and plot describes the VC who have become disenchanted, perhaps due to recognition of the deceits practiced by VC leaders or because of family concerns or pressures, and rally to the GVN side.
- (U) A typical issue developed in March 1970 contained seventeen pieces and included nine articles, three speeches or interviews with government officials on the Chieu Hoi program, two short stories, a first-person account by a former NVA, a poem and a song. In terms of the content of this particular issue, it is significant to note that six selections (five feature articles and the first person essay) dealt with North Vietnamese affairs. Specifically, they treated working conditions and wages, religious and intellectual freedom, and forced migration in the North and the prosperity of North Vietnamese refugees in the South. These articles, while not intended to reach a Northern audience, could contribute to the prestige and sophistication of subsequent appeals to the NVA by the officials who read Long Me.
- (U) A preference on the part of village readers of Long Me is indicated by the consistent interest reported for those contributions whose themes center on or utilize a rural-agrarian setting. Feature articles, stories and poems reflecting aspects of farm life are particularly favored by the majority of Long Me readers.

Staffing

(U) Ralliers (Hoi Chanh) working on a full-time basis write most of the material for each issue, using information available to them at the Chieu Hoi Ministry. Many articles are solicited by a roving editor who visits Chieu Hoi centers and villages. A Vietnamese panel, at the Ministry of Chieu Hoi, evaluates the potential effectiveness and appropriateness of each article.

Previous Studies

(U) There are no known previous surveys of Long Me.

Survey

(U) Statistical results are shown in terms of percentage of readership, audience registration, readership characteristics, and reader preferences.

Readership

(U) Of the rural sample, 125 individuals (19%) reported having <u>read</u> Long Me or having it read to them. Of these 125 individuals:

62% receive Long Me every two months

38% receive Long Me every six months

58% "read well" (self-report)

41% "read a little"

01% cannot read

48% "understand most"

34% "understand half"

18% "understand almost none"

51% "articles are useful mostly"

37% "articles are useful sometimes"

12% "articles are generally not useful"

(U) Of the urban sample, 21 individuals (4%) reported having read Long Me or having it read to them. Of these 21 individuals:

25% have Long Me regularly available 75% find Long Me useful

Audience Registration

(U) Within the rural sample of 680 individuals, among those aware of the existence of Long Me:

27% knew about Long Me through hamlet level VIS

24% knew about Long Me through village level VIS

09% knew about Long Me through district level VIS

07% knew about Long Me through province level VIS

25% knew about Long Me through "friends or neighbors"

08% knew about Long Me through other sources

208

Readership Characteristics

(U) Of the rural readers of Long Me:

63% are farmers or laborers 72% are male 82% are married 69% are between ages 30 and 60

09% had 0 - 1 year of school 41% had 1 - 4 years of school 26% had 4 - 7 years of school 21% had 7 - 12 years of school 03% (no answer)

(U) Urban readers of Long Me were within a sample of businessmen, workers, military, civil servants or office workers, 25% of whom reported 10-12 years of school.

Preference

(U) More than 50% of Long Me readers in rural areas expressed a preference for content related to agrarian life. Articles, stories, poems, etc., suggestive of the countryside and farming hold greatest appeal.

Discussion of Survey Results

(U) In this section, the survey statistics are extrapolated to the general adult population of RVN.

Definition of Audience

- (U) The designated audience for Long Me is the general adult population.
- (U) If literacy is taken into consideration, a realistically defined audience would be "adults able to read with some degree of comprehension."

Percentage of Readership

(U) Nineteen percent of the rural survey sample reported having read Long Me. Therefore, for a rural audience defined as "general adult" the readership percentage is 19%.

209

- (U) Four percent of the urban survey sample reported having read Long Me. Therefore, for an urban audience defined as "general adult" the readership percentage is 4%.
- (U) For an audience defined as "adults able to read with some degree of comprehension" the readership percentage is 38% in rural areas and 8% in urban areas. (Long Me readership divided by 50% who read with any degree of comprehension.)

Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers

(U) Estimates of the population of RVN in 1966 issued by the Office of Joint Economic Affairs (USAID) and the National Institute of Statistics placed the figure at some 16,000,000 individuals. Using that base line figure and employing appropriate adjustments for usual vital statistical factors and for unusual wartime factors, a conservative estimate of the potential "nationwide general adult population" in 1970 was calculated to be approximately 12,000,000 "available and accessible adults."

Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers

(U) By simple generalization from the rural and urban survey results, assuming the existence of 10,000,000 adults and 19% readership in rural areas and of 2,000,000 and 4% readership in urban areas, the reading audience for Long Me comprises about 2,000,000 adults; this represents about 17% nationwide.

Frequency of Reading

- (U) The typical reader reads about two out of every three issues. An average of two out of every three issues, or four issues of the magazine each year, is read by 17% of the nationwide general adult population. The two figures in combination indicate that 8,000,000 "readings" take place (2,000,000 individuals read Long Me 4 times) in one year.
- (U) With an annual printing volume of 1,200,000 copies (200,000 x 6) and an annual rate of 8,000,000 "readings", it can be estimated that each individual copy of Long Me may be read by an average of 6-7 adults (8,000,000 "readings" divided by 1,200,000 copies); stated another way, on the average every copy is read six or seven times.

(U) A frequently-encountered estimate or rule of thumb for magazines is that each copy of such publications in RVN passes through about five sets of hands or is read by about five people. The survey-derived rate of six to seven readers per copy may represent an indication that the magazine is especially useful or interesting to its readers.

211

THE-GIOI TU-DO READERSHIP SURVEY

(U) This section describes the developmental history and results of a readership survey of The-Gioi Tu-Do (Free World), a Vietnamese-language magazine distributed monthly by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) free of charge to the general adult population of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

History

(U) The Vietnamese-language magazine, The-Gioi Tu-Do, is published monthly by JUSPAO and distributed free of charge within RVN. It is an adaptation of the internationally distributed magazine, Horizons, which is now in its 19th year of publication by the U.S. Information Service. Since Horizons' first appearance, a Vietnamese language version has been distributed.

Intended Audience

(U) The-Gioi Tu-Do is designed to appeal to the better-educated portion of the South Vietnamese population such as government officials, university faculty members and students, professional men, and business, labor, and religious leaders.

Production/Distribution

(U) The-Gioi Tu-Do is composed of forty-eight 8" x 10-1/2" pages. Copy can be accepted as late as 9 to 10 weeks before printing. One hundred fifty-five thousand (155,000) copies are printed in Manila each month, sent by military ship to Saigon, and packaged at JUSPAO Warehouse #1 for distribution throughout RVN.

Policy/Content

(U) The magazine is designed with two main objectives in mind: enhance the image of the government among the people of South Vietnam and develop or increase a feeling of identification of RVN with other free Asian nations. Both of these goals are encompassed in the publication's explicit official theme of nation building.

- (U) By policy, twenty to twenty-five percent of the content of the international English language version -- Horizons -- is deleted and replaced by four or five articles developed locally for Vietnam. The Field Development Division of JUSPAO controls the selection and content of the substituted articles which are produced by both The-Gioi Tu-Do staff members and outside contributors.
- (U) The locally generated articles treat various aspects of Vietnamese life and public affairs. A recent edition typifies the general content of an issue of The-Gioi Tu-Do. It contained in addition to pieces on Japan, Korea, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Burma, and the Philippines, contributions on the new American role in Asia, computer teaching, and moon exploration. The three articles on Vietnam (out of a total of fourteen) in this particular edition centered on student art exhibits at the VAA, the Vietnamese policewoman, and the motion picture industry in RVN.
- (U) Looking to the future, sponsorship and final control of content will remain with the United States Information Service (as is universally true for other local adaptations of Horizons) when responsibility for other current JUSPAO publications is transferred to GVN. The substituted articles will continue to be created by the present Vietnamese staff. Circulation may be reduced by half and responsibility for distribution in RVN assumed by Cultural Affairs personnel.

Staffing

(U) While Horizons is edited in Manila, a local editor and clerical staff support the Vietnamese edition. Articles are often fielded to a group of a half-dozen freelance writers or solicited from the Vietnamese Feature Service, but many originate from the desk of the Vietnamese editor of The-Gioi Tu-Do.

Previous Studies

(U) In May 1966 the Center for Vietnamese Studies (CVS) conducted a survey of a randomly selected sample of 504 college students in Saigon. One of the purposes of the study was to determine where students get their information. It was found that 50% of the students read The-Gioi Tu-Do "sometimes", 20% read it "regularly" (every issue or almost every issue), and 30% "don't read it". Forty-four percent rated it "somewhat reliable", 19% "very reliable", 4% "not reliable", 3% did not know, and 30% did not read the magazine.

(U) Another survey, carried out by the Center for Vietnamese Studies, of 466 students who had studied in the United States (either at the high school or college level) found that 35% read The-Gioi Tu-Do "regularly", 50% read it "sometimes", and 15% do not read it.

Survey

(U) Statistical results of the survey a.e shown in terms of audience registration, readership, readership characteristics and reader preferences.

Audience Registration

- (U) Approximately 40% of the general adult sample reported being aware of the existence of The-Gioi Tu-Do. When divided into rural and urban inhabitants, the percentage of "awareness" of The-Gioi Tu-Do for rural areas is 42% and 33% for urban dwellers. This particular statistic for urban dwellers may be somewhat understated because of limitations in survey procedures.
- (U) "Awareness" of The-Gioi Tu-Do is not equivalent to "reading" The-Gioi Tu-Do.

Readership

- (U) Approximately 29% of the general adult sample reported having read The-Gioi Tu-Do (or having had The-Gioi Tu-Do read to them) on at least one occasion. The readership percentage for rural areas is 28% and 33% for urban areas.
- (U) The-Gioi Tu-Do was reported to be regularly available by approximately 19% of the total sample. Operationally, this should be interpreted to imply some means of regular access to each month's issue; it does not mean personal receipt and retention of a copy of each issue each month.
- (U) Among rural readers of The-Gioi Tu-Do more than 80% reported understanding at least half of what they read. Ninety percent of the rural readers judged some articles to be "useful" which, in this context, is interpreted to mean "informative". Twenty-four percent of the urban readers found the content of The-Gioi Tu-Do to be interesting, and 20% judged it to be useful or "informative".

Readership Characteristics

(U) For the general adult sample, 65% of the readers of The-Gioi Tu-Do are male, 74% are married, and 65% are thirty-one years of age or older. The rural-urban division is as follows:

Factor		Rural	Urban
Male		66%	61%
Married		76%	62%
31 or over	•	67%	57%

(U) The average level of education reported by The-Gioi Tu-Do readers in the general adult sample represents about five years of schooling. The rural-urban division is as follows:

Years of Schooling	Rural	Urban
0 - 5	70%	25%
6 - up	30%	75%*

*14% report "some college"

- (U) Within the general adult sample, agricultural occupations (22%) and skilled occupations or crafts (16%) have the largest representation. Among urban readers 25% are in government or private employment while the categories of student, military, and commerce/industry/trade each account for between 10% and 12% of readership. Among rural readers, 27% are in agriculture, 20% in various skilled occupations (crafts), 14% are in commerce or trade, and 10% are in the technical/"professional" category.
- (U) It is considered especially significant that 14% of the urban readers report at least "some college" for level of education.

Preference

(U) Overall, articles related to agrarian subjects and commercial development were judged to be of most interest.

Discussion of Survey Results

(U) In this section the survey statistics are extrapolated to the general adult population of RVN.

Definition of Audience

- (U) The intended audience for The-Gioi Tu-Do is defined as "all elements of literate upper levels of the Vietnamese population: Government officials; university faculty and students; military officers and cadres; professionals; business people and shopkeepers; labor leaders, religious leaders, et al".
- (U) When JUSPAO sources were not able to provide statistics or perspective on estimates of the size of the intended audience, an effort was made to obtain estimates of the size of each sub-category. In the course of this effort it became clear that the impression of precision which may be inferred from the seemingly comprehensive enumeration of categories or sub-groups that compose the intended audience is extremely misleading for three major reasons. The one-or-two-word names of sub-categories such as "business people" within the total intended audience are gross but are not further delineated although there are many levels, types, and varieties of "businesses" and "business people". Reference works are not available to provide recent counts of sub-categories and results of attempts to obtain verbal estimates of occupationally-defined groups from informed sources were found to vary greatly. Lastly, the extent of overlap among categories allows a single individual to be included in many sub-categories; for instance, a "professional" might be a government official, and a member of a university faculty, and an administrative official in the provinces, and an owner or employee of a business, and a member of the "literate upper level". There is no methodical and systematic procedure available to identify and eliminate such duplications of representation.
- (U) After exhausting the sources available as bases for estimates and using subjective logic or estimates to adjust for duplications, the resulting figure for the better-educated adult population who meet the additional restrictive qualifications relating mainly to occupation and who constitute the intended audience was estimated to be between 250,000 and 350,000 depending on the degree of conservatism used in dealing with the various estimates to be pooled.
- (U) The arrangements and agreements made by JUSPAO to make it possible to conduct the surveys for evaluation of JUSPAO publications involved use of different resources -- each external to JUSPAO -- each using different

survey procedures and methods for data collection. Since none of these resources were under the direct control of JUSPAO, and since their execution of HSR-designed surveys for JUSPAO was a courtesy extended at no cost to JUSPAO, it was necessary to work within the limitations created by the need to conform to their already-existing survey formats and sampling procedures.

(U) In summary, the time, manpower, resources, and wartime constraints within which the overall evaluation of several JUSPAO publications had to be conducted, did not permit the kind of lengthy research and analysis that would have been necessary to develop counts of the specific subclasses of the intended audience and to design and execute an additional survey. The necessary solution was to survey a larger audience that would contain within itself a useful representation of the specific sub-classes of the total population for which The-Gioi Tu-Do is intended.

Percentage of Readership

- (U) Twenty-nine percent of the total sample reported having read The-Gioi Tu-Do. Therefore, for an audience defined as "general adult" the readership percentage is 29%.
- (U) For an audience defined as "adults able to read with some degree of comprehension" the readership percentage is 53%. (The-Gioi Tu-Do readership divided by 55% who read with some degree of comprehension.)

Size of Audience in Absolute Numbers

(U) Estimates of the population of RVN in 1967 issued by the Office of Joint Economic Affairs (USAID) and the National Institute of Statistics placed the figure at some 16,000,000 individuals. Using that baseline figure and applying all appropriate adjustments, 12,000,000 is a reasonable working figure for a national audience defined as the "general adult population".

Size of Readership in Absolute Numbers

(U) By simple generalization from the rural and urban survey results, assuming the existence of 12,000,000 adults and 29% readership, the reading audience for The-Gioi Tu-Do comprises 3,480,000.

Frequency of Reading

- (U) The typical reader on the average reads slightly more than two out of every five issues.
- (U) During the year some 1,860,000 copies of The-Gioi Tu-Do are distributed (155,000 monthly x 12). An average of about five out of twelve issues, or five issues of the magazine each year, is read by 3,480,000 adults. These two figures in combination indicate that 17,400,000 "readings" take place (3,480,000 individuals read The-Gioi Tu-Do five times).
- (U) With an annual printing volume of 1,860,000 copies and an annual rate of 17,400,000 "readings". it can be estimated that each individual copies of The-Gioi Tu-Do may be read on the average by about nine persons (17,400,000 "readings" divided by 1,860,000 copies).
- (U) A frequently-encountered estimate or rule of thumb for magazines is that each copy of such publications in RVN passes through about five so of hands or is read by about five people. The survey-derived rate of 9.3 may suggest that The-Gioi Tu-Do has greater pulling power within a broader population base than other JUSPAO publications.

Conclusions

- (U) For convenience of the executive reader, the conclusions for all four surveys are presented here rather than at the end of each separate report.
- (U) Huong Que. Because of the highly positive attitudes reported to-ward the content of Huong Que and the extent of audience penetration, the magazine must be judged to be highly successful in gaining interest and acceptance among the Vietnamese rural population. Treatment of the question of the degree to which the magazine achieves its two main objectives -- stimulation of social and economic development, and promotion of a feeling of unity or nationhood -- was not possible within the limitations of this research effort. It is obvious by inference, however, that if the sense of the articles truly relates to the stated objectives and if the articles are effectively composed, the impact on the accepting and interested audience must be positive. There is no evidence in the survey results that is negative for this inference.
- (U) Viet-Nam Ngay Nay. Viet-Nam Ngay Nay has achieved a respectable readership in view of the number of other publications that have some degree of overlap with VNNN in news coverage and audience and in spite of its self-imposed restrictions on type and variety of content. It was not within the scope of this task to consider cost-effectiveness; however, with that reservation understood, it should be noted that even if the statistics quoted here are taken on a 50% plus-or-minus basis, the figures say that this is a means for GVN to get out the news that it wants the rural population to have. If "carrying news and information on local and national GVN activities to the general rural population" is an adequate description of the intended function and audience for this news-sheet, then VNNN does appear to be serving the purpose for which it was created.
- (U) Long Me. Long Me has gained a degree of acceptance among the rural population that contrasts with that in the urban population. Long Me readers report highly positive attitudes toward the magazine but the small number of urban readers, together with the low factor of availability (only 25% reported it "regularly available") may suggest special urban distribution requirements if a larger urban readership is desired.
- (U) In view of the comparatively low printing volume (1,200,000 copies yearly), the infrequent distribution which is not helpful in creating and maintaining a hold on a "habituated" audience (once every two months), the relatively specialized content, the somewhat different sub-groups

within the total intended audience, and the several somewhat different although complementary objectives, Long Me appears to have achieved a useful level of acceptance and readership. The magazine does achieve its four main objectives -- support of the civil bureaucracy and armed forces for the Chieu Hoi program, national popular support of the program, motivation of families to proselytize VC relatives, and function as a house organ for the Chieu Hoi cadre in that it does reach its audience. Whether it has the desired impact on its readers can be determined directly only by a detailed and comprehensive effectiveness study which was not within the scope of this research effort.

(U) The-Gioi Tu-Do. Based on analysis of the samples' educational and occupational distribution, The-Gioi Tu-Do appears to have reached a gratifying percentage of its intended audience. Additionally, it appears to be of interest to a much more broadly-conceived audience. The liberal use of pictures in color and the diversity of topics treated contribute much to the magazine's appeal. Evaluation of the extent to which the magazine achieves its two main objectives -- enhancement of the GVN image within RVN and development of a feeling of identification of RVN with other free Asian nations -- was not within the scope of this research effort.

JUL JUN MAY APR MAR Σ FEB JAN Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 1

TASK 5 PUBLICATION EVALUATION MAN-MONTH ALLOCATION CHART

CHART 12

221


Summarize Free-Response Data (17)

Translate Free-Response Data (15)

UNCLASSIFIED

TASK 5: WORKFLOW CHART

CHART 13



PAG TASK 6

FILM EVALUATION PROCESS

PAG TASK 6

FILM EVALUATION PROCESS

Summary and Introduction

- (U) JUSPAO requested development of film evaluation procedures.
- (U) These procedures were desired in an effort to improve the effectiveness of JUSPAO products targeted to South Vietnamese audiences.
- (U) A four-phase study was designed to provide tested instruments and procedures for continuing use by US and GVN agencies. These would (1) specify information required of the evaluation process; (2) develop evaluation instruments and procedures; (3) test and assess the instruments; (4) document procedures and instructions for their use.
- (U) The PAG asked that this task be held in abeyance while more urgent research needs were filled. It was not undertaken later.
 - (U) The plan to develop the procedures is reported here.

Problem

(U) JUSPAO requested that HSR develop a procedure for evaluation of JUSPAO films in the field. The PAG Task Statement:

Task 6, Priority 4: In order to improve effectiveness of JUSPAO products directly related to political aspects of the war, which are targeted to South Vietnamese audiences, conduct the following research studies:

Develop a means to field-test the extent to which a given film meets the objectives for which it was designed.

Develop a means of exploring audience comprehension of and reaction to specific films.

Background

- (U) A general plan for the procedure was needed for discussion among relevant JUSPAO offices by 15 April. One or two sample evaluation reports, on films selected by JUSPAO, were desired by 1 July. However, tentative task statements were received 26 March, approved for action in final form 13 April, and submitted to HSR for evaluation and preparation of task research plans on 15 April.
- (U) Informal assistance and consultation on evaluation of radio and TV programs was provided over a 6-7 week period to the Evaluation Section of the Office of Policy, Plans and Research (OPPR). Evaluation of the kind desired is impossible without precise delineation of the intended message or objectives of the communications product being evaluated. The need for firm detailed statements of objectives for each item to be evaluated was emphasized strongly all during the 6-7 week period. During that time no objectives were obtained by the Evaluation Section. Later follow-up indicated that they still had not

been made explicit. If the same situation exists for films, there is little possibility of using the desired evaluation procedure in any valid way, although an evaluation procedure could be developed if sufficient time and manpower can be allowed.

(U) A film evaluation procedure usable with JUSPAO films, and later with GVN films, was desired with the stipulation that it be of a nature that would allow a properly trained JUSPAO employee or contractor to use it for a regular series of film evaluations in the future.

HSR Research Approach

- (U) The research plan for JUSPAO's fourth priority research need was designed to provide tested instruments and procedures for continuing use by US and GVN agencies. It consists of four phases. In the first phase, a requirements analysis will permit specification of the information required of the evaluation process, based upon JUSPAO management's objectives in use of film evaluation procedures. In the second phase, evaluation instruments and procedures for their use will be developed. In the third phase, these instruments will be tested and assessed. The fourth phase covers preparation of the report furnishing the procedures developed and instructions for their use.
- (U) A flow diagram showing relationship of phases and research steps within phases is attached.

Research Plan

(U) Steps in the research plan flow through all four studies.

Study 1

- 1. Obtain from JUSPAO a list of management personnel responsible for:
 - a. Initiating requests for film evaluations.
 - b. Using results of film evaluations.
 - c. Decision on selection of filmscripts.
 - d. Decision on production of films.
 - e. Definition of and decision on the objectives intended to be served by specific films.
 - f. Scheduling the showing of films and selecting locations for showing
 - g. Distribution of films for use by others.

- 2. Interview all available individuals listed as result of Step 1.
- 3. Based on information gained in Steps 1 and 2, judge the extent to which (a) objectives can be defined and (b) accomplishment of objectives can be measured.
- 4. Obtain from individuals interviewed in Step 2, listed objectives of a representative sample of film products which are to serve for study purposes.
- 5. If results of Steps 3 and 4 are positive, establish management information requirements based on management's objectives in use of a film evaluation procedure.
- 6. Review information requirements with individuals listed in 1-a and 1-b.

Study 2

- 7. Monitor showing of films from Step 4, at different locations to different types of audiences for different objectives to obtain perspective on audience size, behavior, availability, etc.
- 8. Determine requirements for clearances, permits, coordination with local officials, etc.
- Arrange for designation of appropriate JUSPAO individual to make all arrangements identified as necessary in Step 8.
- 10. Design and develop data-collection instruments and procedures that meet requirements established in Step 5.
- 11. Prepare instructions for use of the data-collection instruments and procedures.
- 12. Translate data-collection materials and instructions on use of materials and procedures.
- 13. Back-translate and revise as necessary.

14. Prepare final masters and have data-collection materials printed at JUSPAO II.

Study 3

- 15. Through central responsible individual designated in Step 9, select one or more appropriate showings or arrange for special showings designed for test purposes.
- 16. Use data-collection instruments and procedures to collect data at showings arranged in Step 15.
- 17. Tabulate and summarize data from close-end questions.
- 18. Translate narrative free-response answers and group responses by question.
- 19. Tabulate, analyze to establish categories for grouping, and summarize answers to narrative free-response questions.
- 20. Prepare specific film evaluation report, following procedure developed.
- 21. Analyze results of total study.
- 22. Prepare brief report of the total study.

Study 4

- 23. Prepare a manual for film evaluation procedures including questionnaire administration, sampling considerations, data summarization, and analysis and reporting procedures.
- Consult with/train JUSPAO and MOI US or GVN personnel on use of film evaluation procedures.
- 25. Evaluate/spot-check performance of non-HSR users.
- (U) Chart 14 shows the schedule for this task, with effort beginning in May.


229

- (U) Staffing. An unusual number of the necessary activities depend entirely upon the timely availability and productive cooperation of many other individuals who have pressing responsibilities of their own and upon timely occurrence of, or ability to exert some control over, events such as showings of specific films. Also, few of the required steps can be done concurrently since they are sequentially dependent on each preceding step. The time frame for execution of this task is considerably in excess of that implied in the proposed task statement.
- (U) This task requires one HSR Research Scientist for eight manmonths spread over twelve calendar months. Intermittent participation by an HSR Senior Research Scientist will be required.

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	MAY	. JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	A PR	MAY
Study 1 Requirements Analysis									·				
Study 2 Procedure Development				911011									
Study 3 Procedure Test & Evaluation		·		·		=							
Study 4 Procedure Documentation	·	·			·	·				·			

MAN-MUNTH ALLOCATION CHART TASK 6 FILM EVALUATION PROCESS

TASK 8: WORKFLOW CHART
CHART 15



CONFIDENTIAL

PAG TASK 7

EFFECT OF CAMBODIAN INCURSION ON THE ENEMY SOLDIER

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PAG TASK 7

EFFECT OF CAMBODIAN INCURSION ON THE ENEMY SOLDIER

Summary and Introduction

- (U) HSR was requested in May 1970 to interrupt all ongoing research effort to devote full resources to assess the effect of military operations directed against VC/NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia.
- (U) Research activities under this task included interviews, as soon after capture as possible, of NVA PW's taken in Cambodia and NVA and VC PW's taken in RVN after the Cambodian operation began.
- (U) HSR recommended that VC and NVA ralliers also be surveyed as this is where the impact might be most identifiable. The PAG did not, however, request that this be done. The group did request resurvey of PW's who had been interviewed earlier to compare pre-Cambodian and post-Cambodian attitudes. Just as this sub-task was to be undertaken, HSR was told that June-July phase-down operations for the field research team which had been held in abeyance should go into effect, discontinuing the task with data collection phases of the first two sub-tasks.
- (U) In August the contract field period was extended to allow processing and reporting of already-collected data. At that time, HSR undertook the reinterview task under Program I, Effectiveness Studies, and issued field reports on the results.
- (U) In general it was found that the Allied incursion into Cambodia had a striking effect; during the first several weeks, the NLF in that country was completely demoralized.

- (U) Some of the advantageous effect of Cambodian operations was lost when it became apparent that announced limitations on US operations would be honored. Prisoners questioned later in the six-week period showed a greater tendency than those questioned earlier to believe communist forces would devise new strategy to compensate for the Allied attacks in Cambodia, based in part on regrouping farther back inside Cambodia.
- (U) It had almost the same demoralizing effect upon VC troops located in RVN but a much less marked effect upon NVA troops located in RVN. The heavy impact upon VC troops is thought to have occurred for a combination of reasons, foremost being that while the news of the Cambodian entry reached them, communications from higher levels to VC troops in RVN were severely disrupted temporarily with the consequent inability of Party indoctrination/propaganda machinery to transmit a set of "explanations" and "justifications" to provide the troops with a shared consistent understanding of events. While the same disruption of communications existed for the NVA soldier in RVN, lesser impact was believed to be due to longer-term indoctrination and personal experience.
- (U) News of the RVN/US entry into Cambodia had a define impact upon the attitudes and opinions of VC soldiers who were prisoners of war in RVN at the time the Allied Cambodian operations began. News of the incursion had not reached a great majority of the NVA PW's resampled in MR1 and MR4 more than three months later. After hearing of the Cambodian entry for the first time during their post-Cambodian interview, the NVA PW's behavior during the interview demonstrated that news of the event although the truth of the report was questioned did have an impact.
- (U) The reports for each of the studies explicate these general statements further. Reports for studies on NVA captured in Cambodia and on NVA and VC captured in RVN follow. Reports for reinterviews of VC and NVA prisoners, which were initially designed as Task 7 Study 3, are included in Volume I in the section devoted to case studies of effectiveness of psyop.

(U) Objectives of studies on the effect of the Cambodian incursion were to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations on NVA soldiers in Cambodia and on NVA and VC soldiers in RVN at the time the Cambodian operations began.

Problem

(U) Both JUSPAO and MACV requested that HSR evaluate the impact of the Allied invasion of sanctuaries in Cambodia on the NVA/VC soldier. The Pag Task Statement was as follows:

Task 7, Pre-emptive Priority: Pursue the question of the effect on the enemy of cleaning out the Cambodian sanctuaries by the following research activity:

- 1. Interview NVA POW's taken in Cambodia to determine the effect, if any, of cleaning out the Cambodian sanctuaries. Particular research questions: Is it demoralizing? Are expectations of victory, or the future course of the war, changed as a result?
- 2. Interview NVA POW's and VC POW's taken within South Vietnam outside the border areas since the Cambodian action started to determine effect upon them.

 Particular questions in (1) above apply.
- 3. Recheck previously interviewed NVA/VC, especially those in I CTZ and IV CTZ considered hard-core, to see if attitude changed in any way as a result of action on the sanctuaries.
- (U) Furnish as much information as possible on these factors between 10 May and 31 August, providing a full report in the weeks that follow.

Background

- (U) Urgent research needs expressed by the psyop community on 9 May resulting from the ongoing military situation added specific new work requirements. The priority of these requirements superseded any included in the task statements delivered to HSR on 15 April for which HSR delivered detailed task research plans on 30 April. At the PAG meeting on 9 May, called for the purpose of specifying schedules and efforts under HSR Task Research Plans 3, 4, 5, and 6, the new top-priority task statement for Task 7 was approved and HSR was requested to direct all research effort to Task 7 from 10 May onward.
- (U) HSR agreed to accept Task 7 as described and a tentative plan for obtaining the new urgently-required information was drawn. Effort began immediately. On 14 May HSR had two teams of interviewers in the field at the Cambodian border, and a third team was preparing for a new location.

HSR Research Approach

- (U) As agreed at the PAG meeting, the initial approach would be exploratory. The task required first the identification of new types of arrangements and relationships that would be needed, and next that the necessary steps be taken to set up these arrangements and relationships. An immediate, intensive effort was initiated for the period 10 May through 31 May to establish whether the sample population could be reached and to gain perspective in this situation almost unique in the present war on means of access to the PW's, rate of acquisition of data, and other factors which would affect research conduct and results. Firm plans and schedules were then prepared.
- (U) Questionnaires and procedures designed for the various categories of prisoners and ralliers to be assessed were already available. This, together with the trained survey team, represented a major timesaving factor. Additional specially-tailored questionnaires were also developed.

- (U) Three studies were designed to obtain information specified in the task statement:
 - Study 1. Survey 100 NVA PW's taken in Cambodia; interview them as soon as possible after coming into Allied hands.
 - Study 2. Survey adequate samples of NVA PW's and VC PW's in at least two different Corps areas, taken within the Republic of Vietnam since the Cambodian operations began; it is recommended that ralliers be surveyed also since they are considered most likely to reflect the impact of the Cambodian operations.
 - Study 3. Resurvey already-interviewed NVA and VC PW's, especially in I Corps and IV Corps, to compare pre-Cambodian and post-Cambodian attitudes.
- (U) Because the Allied collection centers for prisoners were variously located, it was necessary to form three Vietnamese interviewing teams. The three teams, each working with an HSR Research Scientist as supervisor, were scheduled for field work for approximately eighty percent of the time for three months. Other HSR staff and Vietnamese support personnel were scheduled to coordinate receipt of data from the field and processing of the data in Saigon.
- (U) Brief notes were to be communicated as soon as significant items of interest were identified; summary reports were to be prepared at the conclusion of each separate study.

Research Plan

- (U) 1. With assistance of MACJ3-11 and JUSPAO, explore means to obtain necessary agreements for access to newly-taken prisoners before they reach PW camp.
 - 2. Visit field facilities and personnel to make arrangements for early access to prisoners taken in Cambodia.

- Develop new questionnaires tailored to the Cambodian operation and appropriate for the different study samples.
- 4. Modify existing questionnaires for use with different samples in the study situation.
- 5. Train interviewer teams in use of questionnaires designed for specific categories of enemy forces.
- 6. With the assistance of JUSPAO and MACJ3-11, prepare and submit requests for access authorizations through US/GVN channels to insure admission to forward positions, PW camps, and to Chieu Hoi Centers.
- 7. Have versions of questionnaires required for specific samples produced in sufficient quantity.
- 8. Obtain access authorizations for access to samples.
- 9. Access authorizations to PW's are sensitive documents and are distributed by a carefully controlled procedure. After authorizations have reached the facilities to be sampled, visit the camp officials to arrange times, entry, scnedules, and interviewer accommodations.
- 10. Through JUSPAO and MACJ3-11 and ARPA, arrange travel schedules and accommodations for survey team in the field.
- 11. Conduct questionnaire surveys of the selected samples.
- 12. Tabulate pre-selected response data.
- 13. Translate narrative responses; regroup and categorize.
- 14. Summarize pre-selected response data.
- .15. Summarize narrative responses.

- 16. Organize/analyze results of surveys.
- 17. Interpret results of surveys.
- 18. Issue summary reports of results for immediate use in the field.
- (U) These eighteen sub-tasks must be accomplished for each individual survey conducted.
- (U) Staffing. This effort assumed availability of contracted Vietnamese personnel as required, trained in survey research, interviewing, and translation.
- (U) Comment. Field reports were issued for the psyop community on each of the three categories of studies requested under this task and discussed in the preceding pages. Results of two of these, the NVA Soldier Captured in Cambodia, and the NVA and VC Captured in RVN, are presented here. Third category studies, reinterview of NVA and VC PW's appear in Volume I.
- (U) At the request of the PAG in May, all HSR research resources were rechannelled immediately when a new and much higher priority requirement arose to investigate the effect of Allied Cambodian operations on the enemy. All other tasks were suspended but kept viable for resumption in an extension of the contract period desired by the sponsoring agencies. Phase-down operations, which would have to occur in the June-July period if the contract were not extended were also held in abeyance. After data collection phases of Studies 1 and 2 under Task 7 had been completed and results of a brief preliminary analysis of the data had been presented to the sponsors, HSR was told that June-July phase-down operations for the field research team should go into effect, discontinuing Task 7 after completion only of the data collection phases of the first two sub-tasks. This stopped execution of Study 3, the reinterview surveys.
- (U) In August, the field report of the contract was extended to allow processing and reporting of already-collected data. At that time, HSR undertook the reinterview task under Program I, Effectiveness Studies, and issued field reports on the results; these reports are included in Volume I in the section devoted to case studies of psyop effectiveness.
- (U) Results of the studies on the NVA taken in Cambodia and the NVA and the VC captured in RVN follow.

(C) NVA PW'S TAKEN IN CAMBODIA: MAY-JUNE 1970 (U)

(U) This report is based upon interviews of 100 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) prisoners taken in Cambodia; where interpretive comments are made, it is against a background of additional results available from several lines of continuing recarch into the background and attitudes of NVA/VC soldiers.

Objectives

(U) This report is intended to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations on the NVA soldier.

Background

(U) One hundred interviews with recently-taken NVA prisoners averaged about 3 hours and 15 minutes in length. All were interviewed within 1 - 25 days of their date of capture.

Results

- (C) 1. The NVA, before leaving NVN, did not know that NVA/VC troops were in Cambodia (98%).
- (C) 2. Apparently, about 60% of the Cambodian-taken sample had never been inside RVN.
- (C) 3. 50% had no advance warning of Cambodian entry.

33% learned of Cambodian entry through cadre announcement.

10% learned of Cambodian entry by unofficial rumor.

(C) 4. 15% were warned of entry "months" ahead.

15% were warned of entry weeks ahead.

18% were warned of entry days ahead.

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Comment: Could these have been deliberately planted false rumors which would redound to the credit of NLF when the rumored invasion failed to materialize?

The actual invasion appears to be taken as "proof" of GVN strength rather than "proof" of the fore-knowledge of NLF leaders.

- (C) 5. 33% previously thought GVN might enter Cambodia; Item 4 minus Item 5 suggests rumors were generally credible.
- (C) 6. 66% say their own estimate of strength and determination of ARVN was much higher as a result of Cambodian entry; 10% say estimate was decreased.
- (C) 7. The morale and fighting spirit of NVA/VC as a result of operations in Cambodia:

Increased	NVA 13%	<u>VC</u>	
No Change	8	10	
Decreased	58	47	
Not Sure	21	32	

(C) 8. Hanoi leaders will react by:

Intensifying Operations	31%
No Change	. 3
Decreasing Intensity	8
Not sure	58

(C) 9. In March 1970, thought would win the war?

Now, think will win

NLF Certainly NLF Probably	37%) 11) ^{48%}	18%)
Stalemate	11	16
GVN Probably GVN Certainly	3) 14)	18) ₃₄
Not Sure	24	.31

Comment: Conviction of victory cut in half.

(C) 10. 23% heard NLF broadcasts since Cambodian entry.

77% did not hear NLF broadcasts since Cambodian entry.

Credibility was high; of the 23 that heard:

50% say all believable 28% say most believable 11% say half believable 11% say part believable

All 23 could remember some content of broadcasts.

-- 10 (43%) mention report of NLF victories in Cambodia.

(C) 11. 25% had leaders who discussed the Cambodian entry:

Example:

- -- "Front suffered losses, but world opinion now against US; Americans now standing up to fight their own government."
- -- "Front using a scheme to lure US into Cambodia to create an international political issue; world opinion will be resentful against US."

- -- "US troops sent to protect Lon Nol's golden days; this strongly denounced by world opinion."
- -- "...ensure Lon Nol's golden days but NLF and Cambodian population have already liberated almost all the 21 Cambodian provinces already."

Some reactions to what the leaders said:

- -- "I only somewhat believed it; will take a lot to re-establish rear bases."
- -- "What was said might be true; but it might be that ARVN had recently received more armament and are attacking to score victories."
- (C) 12. Opinion on effect on length of war?

Last longer	379
No difference	2
Shortened	35
Not sure	26

- (C) 13. Shorten or lengthen war? Why? (Random sample of 10 narrative answers)
 - -- "Will end more quickly because Cambodia where we have been concentrating our troops, stored our supplies for the troops has been attacked and a lot has been destroyed; the morale of the troops has decreased greatly. It is certain that Hanoi will more willingly negotiate."
 - -- "The war is expanding to Cambodia, Laos and is quick becoming an Indochina war. The world will intervene so as to bring a peace solution to Southeast Asia in accordance to the spirit of the Geneva Agreement of 1954. The war will end more quickly."

- -- "Will end because GVN/Allied troops will be dispersed to two fronts, in RVN and Cambodia, and thus a more favorable occasion will be provided the NVA/Front troops for increasing the fighting and bringing a quick end to the war."
- -- "Front bases in Cambodia have been destroyed, and it will be a long time before they can be set up again. The Front won't be able to win immediately. If Red China intervenes in this war by sending voluntary troops to give the NVA and Front a hand, the fighting will last much longer as was the case in Korea before."
- --"If this trend continues and if the GVN which
 is powerfully armed keeps launching offensive
 attacks upon attacks, the Front will not be
 able to sustain and indeed how can it when
 each one of us has only an AK for defense."
- --"Before I used to think the Front might win, but since the US/GVN operations in Cambodia I feel that the war has been expanded and will last longer with no solution in sight since Front military bases in Cambodia might have been completely destroyed. It will take the Front a lot of time to re-build its forces to the level where they had been. Moreover, having no longer a base in Cambodia from which to launch its attacks, the Front will meet with many more difficulties than before and thus, it will take it a lot before being able to score victory."
- --"I feel that the US and the GVN are already incapable of dealing with RVN alone, and now with the war having expanded to Cambodia and Laos, they have even less chance to win. But the Front too has no hope to score yet. The war will go on longer."

- -- "The Allies are very strong. If the Front fights back it will disintegrate. The war will end very quickly soon."
- -- "US and ARVN troops are fierce and powerful, and all Front rear service bases in Cambodia will be destroyed. If the Front fights back it will be defeated. The war will become shorter and end quickly."
- -- "I feel that giving their military strength the Allies and GVN will defeat the Front easily and speedily, in particular once they have destroyed all Front rear service bases in Cambodia. The war will become shorter and end quickly.

(C) 14. Overall

Some examples of extreme and emotional language not often used in other situations:

- -- "I was scared to death ... I was terribly frightened."
- -- "I was terrified, and couldn't think about anything, and was constantly concerned about getting killed."
- -- "I saw our men fleeing in all directions.

 I had a feeling we would all be captured,
 not to say killed."
- -- "They launch one attack after another like the wind and storms. It is indeed something to dread."
- -- "Their troops were impressive, their Army belligerent."
- -- "The ARVN have won in RVN and are moving on to attack the Front's safe bases."

- -- "Previously I used to think the Front might win very soon. But ... has prospect of lasting longer with no end in sight."
- -- "I thought we have come South to take over territory liberated by the Front but now I see nothing but bombing and shelling, death and suffering for the Army. I can't see any people in liberated areas."
- -- "Before, being influenced by propaganda, I had the idea that the NLF was winning everywhere; now with this large-scale operation, I think it over and I feel I had been misled by propaganda."

General Conclusions

- (C) 1. Entry into Cambodia has had a striking effect; during the first several weeks the NLF was completely demoralized.
- (C) 2. Some of the advantageous effect of Cambodian operations was lost when it became apparent that announced limitations on US operations would be honored.

 (Prisoners questioned later in the six-week period showed a greater tendency than those questioned earlier to believe communist forces would devise new strategy to compensate for the Allied attacks in Cambodia, based in part on regrouping farther back inside Cambodia.
- (C) 3. A line of approach for Allied psyop suggested by the communist tactics of news control and distortion is:
 - a. Consider the many differences between what Hanoi tells you and what you see now.
 - b. Hanoi can never let you and your friends return because then the truth would be known.

- c. If you are not allowed to return home you must stay and fight and risk death endlessly.
- d. Or, you can come to GVN, be treated fairly and stay alive.
 You will have as good a chance as those who stay in the field to return home when the war ends; your chance will actually be better because you are sure to stay alive.

NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY PRISONERS

CAPTURED IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

DURING THE ALLIED CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS: MAY-JUNE 1970

(U) This report describes results of interviews of 25 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) prisoners (PW's) taken within the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) during the time of the Cambodian operations in May and June 1970; these results are compared with results of interviews of 100 NVA PW's captured within Cambodia during the same time period. Where interpretative comments are made, it is against a background of additional results available from several lines of continuing research into the background and attitudes of NVA and Viet Cong (VC) soldiers.

Objectives

(U) This report is intended to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations on NVA soldiers who were stationed within RVN at the time the Cambodian operations were begun.

Background

(U) Two reports on major tasks involving identification of enemy vulnerabilities and obstacles to enemy defection were released by HSR in February 1970. In those reports it was concluded that NVA morale was firm; while available research data could support the notion that a trend might be developing toward erosion of morale and allegiance to the NLF cause, there was no evidence to indicate any active rejection of the "liberation" cause by the NVA soldier. The NVA soldiers' conviction of eventual NLF victory, instilled in him by indoctrination and propaganda, was identified as a major factor upholding morale that could be disrupted in the near term only by an unusual and extravagant action on the part of the Allies.

- (U) The example offered for the type of extreme action required to disrupt NVA morale was a surprise implementation of Vice-President Ky's recent remark about possible resumption of bombing of NVN coupled with announcements of RVN's intention to carry the war into NVN. Assuming hypothetically that an action of such magnitude were possible, the surprise, consternation, and disruption it could cause would be lost if it were to be publicized prior to occurrence.
- (U) The Allied operations in Cambodia precisely fitted the specifications for such a significant disruptive act; research conducted during these operations showed that the morale of NVA and VC soldiers stationed in Cambodia was shattered in the initial phases of the Cambodian campaign.

Procedure

(U) Twenty-five interviews with NVA PW's captured within RVN between May and June 1970, averaged about three hours and fifteen minutes in length; all PW's were interviewed within 1 - 30 days of their capture. The interviews were identical, except for necessary changes based on geographic location, to those conducted with 100 NVA PW's captured in Cambodia.

Results

(U) Results are treated in terms of enemy conviction that Cambodia is a safe haven, enemy reaction to the surprise invasion of the NLF safe haven, impact of Allied psyop programs, and effects upon enemy indoctrination and propaganda. Comparisons are made with results of interviews of 100 Cambodia-based NVA PW's.

Enemy Conviction that Cambodia is a "Safe Haven"

(U) A combination of indoctrination and propaganda (point 1) reinforced by personal experience and confirming information from comrades (point 2) caused NVA troops in RVN to be firmly convinced that Cambodia was their totally secure "safe haven" (point 3) in which they could rest, regroup, resupply, and organize for sorties into RVN (attachment "A").

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Conclusions

- (U) For the convenience of the executive reader, conclusions are given here, rather than in the usual sequence at the end of the report.
 - 1. The surprise entry of ARVN/US troops into Cambodia initially had a demoralizing effect upon NLF troops located in Cambodia but had much less impact upon NVA troops located in RVN. The effect was less marked upon NVA troops located in RVN for a combination of reasons: the element of unexpected personal danger was not present; disruption of communications resulted in comparatively little news reaching them about Cambodian events; and the news was not exploited vigorously through psyop efforts within RVN.
 - 2. The impact of the Allied Cambodian entry on the morale of NVA PW's captured in RVN caused a dramatic change of opinion on "who will win the war". Between March 1970 and June 1970 those who thought NLF would win were reduced by 18%; the number that thought RVN would win increased by 60%.
 - 3. The complete conviction possessed by enemy troops, created by long-term indoctrination and personal experience, that Cambodia was their "safe haven" caused the Allied Cambodian incursion to have an especially negative impact on enemy morale.
 - 4. Communications from higher levels to NVA troops in RVN were severely disrupted temporarily. Enemy morale was hurt by the inability of the Party indoctrination/propaganda machinery to transmit a set of "explanations" and "justifications" to the men in the field to provide the troops with a shared consistent understanding of the events in Cambodia in terms of Party policy.
 - 5. There is no evidence that any extra effort was exerted within RVN for timely psyop exploitation of the dramatic news of the Allied entry into Cambodia.

252

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6. Two items relating to NLF failure to meet expectations held by their troops, that were created by indoctrination and propaganda, are the firmly-planted belief that Cambodia represented assured safety and that NLF would be able to counterattack and retaliate in great strength. The concept of Cambodia as a "safe haven" was demolished (at least temporarily) and many months have passed in which the only semblance of retaliation is represented by inconclusive relatively small-scale activities against the comparatively weak and untrained Cambodian Army. This failure provides productive themes for psyop exploitation.

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if \$1. The question of why NLF troops were in Cambridge can been sign sussed by political officers or ladre with 40% of the sureale. One are to ment A . In almost all cases Cambodia had been described as a totally safe haven:

> Before the RVN/US troops entered Cambodia, did your leaders or political officers ever cissuss with you reasons why NLF troops were in Cambodia? What was said?

-- Not discussed

-- (Yes) Safe haven and regroupment

-- (Yes) Protect

Cambodia

(U) 2. Almost all of the RVN-based NVA PW's had personal knowledge of the pre-incursion conditions in Cambodia since most had passed through or spent some time in Cambodia:

Had been in Cambodia

Had travelled back and forth between RVN and Cambodia.

200. =

(U) 3. As a result of indoctrination and personal experience, ninety-six percent of the sample believed NLF troops were in Cambodia because it was their totally secure safe haven and regroupment area or rear base;

> Do you know why NLF troops were in Cambodia?

-- Safe haven

-- Rear base/re-

groupment area

Enemy Reaction to Surprise Allied Entry in Cambodian "Safe Haven"

(U) Although the RVN-based NVA troops raised their opinion of ARVN strength because of the objective demonstration of power provided by the ARVN/US entry into Cambodia (point 4), it was judged that there would be only a balanced effect on NLF troops' morale (point 5). Although it was thought that the NLF troops would counterattack and fight harder (point 6), the odds in favor of NLF winning the war had been greatly reduced (point 7).

^{*}Not mutually exclusive.

(U) 4. Twenty-eight persent of the sample increased their extincate of ARVN strength as a result of ARVN's entry into Cambodia while 12% decreased their estimate; the explanations of those who felt ARVN strength was decreased represented a mixture of propaganda and misinform attentions.

Have you raised or	Higher	285
lowered your estimate	Same	24*
of the strength and de-	Lower	12%
termination of ARVN		•
troops since they en-		
tered Cambodia	•	

(U) 5. Responses were fairly divided on the question of whether the Cambodian entry would decrease or increase the morale and fighting soirit of the NVA and VC soldiers:

		NVA	VC
•	*	Morale	Morale !
Would you say that the	Increase	44"	2.6
effect of the Cambodian.	No change	08%	1. ".
operations will increase	Decrease	40%	41.4
or decrease the morale	4		
of NVA and VC soldiers?		,	

(U) 6. Fifty-six percent believed that their troops would counterattack and fight harder as a result of the Cambodian incursion. Sixteen percent felt that the NLF would not be able to react strongly:

In general, how do you	Counterattack/	56%
think your own troops	fight harder	
will react to this new de-	NLF retreat/	16%
velopment in Cambodia?	morale shaken	

(U) 7. Between March 1970 and June 1970 the percentage of those who thought that NLF would win was reduced by 18%. The percentage of those who thought GVN would win increased by 60%:

	NLF Wine	RVN Wins
In March 1970:	**************************************	
Who did you think would	68%	20%
win the war?	,	
(In June 1970:)		
Who do you think will	56%	32%
win the war?		*****
Net Change:	-18%	+60%

impact of Allied Payops on RVN-based NVA

- (I) NVA PW's capture! in RVN during May and June 1970 were asked: "Six of the Allied Cambodian operations began and before you became a prisoner did you read any GVN leaflets!" This question was repeated for GVI, or opposers, GVN radio broadcasts, GVN airborne loudspeaker messages, Goi ground loudspeaker messages, and GVN television programs. For each modium further questions were asked about frequency, ability to understand the theme or content, believability of the content, and recall of themes or content.
- (U) Fifty-two percent of the sample read leaflets (32% once or twice; 26% once frequently); 40% found the words and language easy to understand, 40% is another meaning or theme to be clear all or most of the time; 12% found the massage to be believable all or most of the time; and 32% judge none of the massages to be believable. Forty percent recalled themes or content (20% in the timed rally appeals; 12% mention surrender appeals; 4% rally or surrencer appeals; and 4% mentions poem but no theme); none mentioned references to Cambodia.
- (U) Forty percent of the sample heard GVN radio broadcasts occasionally: the content or theme could be understood about half the time. Thirty-six percent judged none or only some portion of the content to be believable.

 Thirty-two percent recalled themes or content: 20% mentioned music, and 12% mentioned news of Cambodia.
- (U) Sixty-four percent of the sample heard airborne loudspeaker messages (200 once or twice; 36% more frequently). Twenty-four percent heard the broadcast clearly about half of the time and 36% seldom or never could hear it clearly. Theme or content was judged to be understandable most of the time by 16% and seldom or never understandable by 44%. Forty-eight percent recall themes or content (28% mentioned rally appeals; 12% mentioned surrender appeals; 8% mentioned rally/surrender appeals; none mentioned references to Cambodia.
- (U) Twelve percent mention reading GVN newspapers once or twice and 8" heard ground loudspeaker messages.

Effect on Enemy Indoctrination/Propaganda Machinery

(U) Interviews of PW's, which touch upon issues that have been treated over some length of time in enemy troop indoctrination and propaganda, show a consistent pattern of responses which can be traced rather directly to the content of their indoctrination programs. In other words, it is recognizable that the PW's are regurgitating what they have been force-fed.

256

- (I) The usual consistent pattern of responses may given by RVN-based NVA PW's to questions about an issue which has been treated during industrial nation over a lengthy person of time (paint 8).
- (U) In contrast to the usual consistent patterns of indoctrination-incolleated responses made by PW's to questions dealing with long-standing issues (as illustrated by point 8), very varied responses were made to two questions about recent events (points 2, 10). Where such unusual variability occurs, it is a safe assumption that indoctrination/probaganda has failed or, more likely in this instance, has not occurred. The degree of variability which characterizes these answers suggests that there had not yet been time for a standard answer to be provided through the NLF indoctrination and propaganda machinery.
 - (U) 8. "Was there ever any discussion of why the war has lasted for so many years? What reasons were given?"

'US intervention into the war, and by doing this the US is causing obstruction to our victory."

The US is a powerful country, the most powerful in the world, and its intervention into this war is the cause for this war going on for so long."

"US intervention in VN and aid to the puppet government in SVN."

"US intervention and aid to SVN."

"We fight Americans, and wage people's war and guerrilla warfare. This is the reason for the war to go on for so long."

"US intervention."

"The US stubbornness is the cause for this war and its widening to all over Indochina."

"Vietnam is a small country, and it has to fight against a country of the size of the US. It therefore has to resort to people's war tactics to drag on the war."

US intervention into VN.

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US intervention in SVN.

The US has got itself involved in the war and this is the reason for the war to go on for so long.

(U) 9. "Since the time when Allied troops first entered Can bedia: Have vour political officers or cadrelever told you anything about the entrance of the Allied troops and the consequences of the fighting in Can bedia?

They said we would have to pull back to SVN for we would not be able to put up opposition to APVN for we were out-numbered and we ran the risk of being cetected.

Then by launching attacks across the border to (archadia the US cannot widen the war for it has pulled out some of its troops already. We might meet difficulties at the battlefields in Long An because our supply route from there to Cambodia has been cut off.

"The US/GVN attacks on Cambodia are aimed at opening up the war and giving a hand to Lon Nol to massacre Nictanamese civilians in Cambodia."

"The US has widened the war to all over Indochina. The three countries of indochina -- Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos -- have formed an alliance to fight against US aggression of their territories and to liberate the whole population of Indochina."

"The CIA has staged the overthrow of Sihanouk, the former Gambodian Chief of State, and has put the reactionary and puppet Lon Nol clique into power. Lon Nol and his clique are nothing but a screen behind which the US expands the aggression into Cambodia."

"The US made its intervention in Cambodia as a means to save the situation in SVN. The US is doing this by implementing its policy of using Vietnamese to fight against Vietnamese, Asians to fight against Asians."

(U) 10. "Do you think now (in relation to the Allied Cambodian operations) that the wat will end more quickly or will last longer?"

"The GVN has succeeded in cutting off the NVA's route, so the NVA can no longer advance; thus the war will end more quickly."

With the war widening beyond SVN's borders, the fighting will become heavier and the quicker we will come to a coalition government.

The widening of the war across the border to the whole of Indochina indicates that the GVN must have used its last resort in launching attacks in Cambodia. The GVN wants to make a political gain by this action. It is incapable to fight in SVN and has to launch attacks against VC and NVA key organizations."

"If the attacks in Cambodia didn't take place the Front rear organization couldn't have been destroyed and lost. The Front then would be able to win sooner. But now a number of its organizations and bases have been destroyed, and it will take the Front some time to set them up again. As a result the war will go on longer, but in the end the Front will still win."

"This is the people's war, a war with a great cause. It necessarily has to be a protracted war before the final victory comes."

"With the war widening, the liberation forces will reconsolidate their strength and resort to guerrilla warfare, and so the war will go on for many more years."

"The American public and the whole world are against this war in Vietnam and demand that the U5 pull its troops out of Indochina."

"Both sides are equally strong; one side makes extra efforts and the other side puts up stronger opposition, and this goes on without either wanting to give in to the other, so the war will go on longer."

Before Vietnam was abore in its fight against ! Sage greating. Logical Strain has affect, that become any Locus. Thus, there is a pressiled for the war to end year second

comparison of Responses of WA PW's taken in Billiann has been e-

- for in respect to age in years, ago at start of collitary serves, a court of the sound on political inductrination during best training. Approved that at which they started the courtest to SVN tand consequently the account of their away from home and family, and the size of their and.
- (U) The two groups differed in extent of exposure to combat are talled actions; a larger percentage of the NVA PW is taken in PV% bed were but experience and had been in combat on more or asions for longer periods of time.
- (U) 2. The possibility of RVN/US entry into Cambodia was a popular runner among NLF troops stationed in Cambodia as evidenced by the fact that a sizeable percentage of troops in Cambodia were thought to have expected it. This was not true for the NVA troops located in RVN.

Question	Answer	Source of NVA Samuels	
		RVN	CAM
Before the Allied troops	No, none did	180	4.
entered Cambodia: Did	Yes, all did	087	227
the people you knew and worked with think that	Yes, some did	OR*	137
would ever come into Cambodia?		•	

(U) 3. A considerable percentage of the NVA PW's from RVN and Cambodia believed the top leaders in Hanoi would strike back after the Cambodian entry. Unless the NLF propagandists have been able to portray their modest efforts against the Cambodian troops in Cambodia as massive retaliation, some disillusionment should have occurred as time passed since the end of Allied Cambodian operations without any substantial NLF retaliation against RVN/US troops.

Question	Rating	Source of Sold Sousie	
distilling to the state of the		RVN	CASS
Die vieu think that the Care-	Intensify	5.95	3 1
bodian operations was	Sarrie	••	63.4
cause the Hanor bearers	Decrease	••	(1 h
to intensity or decrease			•
oftensive operations	•		

(U) 4. The three sets of responses to questions shown below may refree sent both a positive and negative varidation of the old saving that the place is breeds contempt." Based on first shallow analysis it would be easy to be sume that the RVN-based NVA were much more restrained in their interior tation of the implications and effect of the ARVN entry into Carchemis their were the Cambodian-based NVA who were directly affected, because the based NVA had survived considerably longer and more intense combations ments with the ARVN/US forces and were not directly and personally shoops by sudden demolition of the belief that Cambodia represented complete safe

But if the conclusions based on shallow analysis are accepted, now happens to the firmly-entrenched concept that morale is eroded by exposure to increasingly larger amounts of lengthy experience of hardships. It may be much more correct to reason, after more deeply searching analysis, to a RVN-based NVA are showing the appropriate and expectable degree of reaction and it is the factors of surprise, unanticipated destruction of an important cherished belief that Cambodia represented safety, and sustained intensity of aggressive attack that caused the exaggerated impact on moral of Cambodian-based NVA troops.

Question	Rating	Source	of NVA Samule
		RVN	CAM!
Have you raised or lowered	Higher	285.	635
your estimate of the strength	Same	24%	105
and determination of ARVN troops since they entered	Lower	12%	05 ^r
Cambodia?			
Is the general morale and	Increased	44%	13%
fighting spirit of NVA sol-	Same	08%	08%
diers increased now as a result of the Cambodian operations?	Decreased	40%	58%
Is the general morale and	Increased	28%	11%
fighting scirit of VC sol-	Same	16%	10%
diers increased or de- creased now as a result of the Cambodian opera- tions?	Decreased	40%	47% ·

(i) NVA PW's captured in RVN and Cambodia during the Ailied carebodian operations reported very substantial shifts in favor of CVN moning the mat.

Source of Sample	March 1970 thought NLF would win	In June 1970 thought NLF would win	Belief in MLF victory a reduced by:
NVA PW's taken in Cambodia	49°	21%	5,7x
NVA PW's taken in South Vietnam	68%	56%	16.5
Source of Sample	March 1970 thought RVN would win	In June 1970 thought RVN would win	Belief in RVN victory increased by:
NVA PW's taken in Cambodia	18%	34%	835
NVA PW's taken in South Vietnam	20%	32%	€ 0

ATTACHMENT: A

- The statements below are examples of answers to a question which asked, "Before the Cambodian invasion, did your political officers and cadre ever discuss with you the reasons why NLF troops are in Cambodia? The content of the answers makes it obvious that the "reasons" were reactived some time before the Cambodian operations began. It is significant to note that all responses emphasize safety or security in Cambodia.
- (1) Verbal promises of "safety in Cambodia" reinforced by personal experient or news from others which attested to the absence of Allied activity in formal bodia convinced enemy troops that Cambodia was, indeed, their "safe bases

"The GVN has lots of aircraft, large numbers of troops. In Cambodia we can rest assured of not being bothered by aircraft."

"We are only temporarily stationed along the border areas in Cambodia where we have set up our sanctuaries."

"The cadres explained that because of the heavy fighting in SVN it was necessary for us to set up our bases in a secure place in Cambodia as a means to relieve the pressure of the battlefield along the Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier."

"NVA troops must camp in Cambodia for we already have our VC counterparts in the delta in SVN. If too many of our troops are stationed in SVN they run the risk of being air-striked."

"We have been given temporary use of the border areas in Cambodia to concentrate our troops because it is completely safe there."

"The NVA has to be stationed in Cambodia to stand ready against the aggression of Cambodia by U.S. troops. Moreover, the Cambodian frontier being completely secure, the NVA is using it to set up its rear bases in order to safeguard its troops."

VIET CONG PRISONERS

CAPTURED IN THE REPUBLIC OF VILTNAM

DURING THE ALLIED CAMBODIAN OPERATIONS: MAY-JUNE 1979

(U) This report describes results of interviews of 25 Viet Cong (VC) prisoners (PW's) taken in the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN) during the time of the Cambodian operations in May and June 1970; these results are compared with results of interviews held with 25 NVA PW's taken in RVN and the results of interviews of 100 NVA PW's captured within Cambodia during the same time period. Where interpretative comments are made, it is against a background of additional results available from several lines of continuing research into the background and attitudes of NVA and VC soldiers.

Objectives

(U) This report is intended to provide fact-based information and perspective on the impact of the Cambodian operations upon VC soldiers who were stationed within RVN at the time the Cambodian operations were begun.

Background

(U) In reports released early in 1970, it was concluded that VC morale had deteriorated seriously as indicated by factors described as generalized deterioration of the will to fight; negative reaction against Party control methods; and recognition of unfulfilled promises, unachieved objectives, and absence of any positive rewards. On the other hand, it was concluded that NVA morale was firm and would require an extravagant surprise Allied action of the magnitude of a surprise bombing and ARVN invasion of North Viet Nam (NVN) to seriously damage the NVA morale.

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(U) Predictably, because of the comparatively lower VC morale, VC reaction to the "surprise extravagant Allied action" required to damage NVA morale should be more extreme than the reactions of NVA troops based in RVN but possibly would be less severe than the reactions of any NLF directly impacted in Cambodia. The surprise Allied entry in Cambodia precisely fitted the specifications for an extravagant disruptive action.

Procedure

(U) Interviews with twenty-five VC PW's captured within RVN between May and June 1970, averaged about three hours and fifteen minutes in length; all PW's were interviewed within 1 = 30 days of their capture. The interviews were identical, except for necessary changes based on geographic location, to those conducted with NVA PW's captured in Cambodia and in RVN.

Results

(U) Results are treated in terms of enemy conviction that Cambodia represents a safe haven; enemy reaction to the surprise Allied invasion of the NLF safe haven; impact of Allied psyop programs; and effects upon enemy indoctrination and propaganda. Additionally, comparisons are made between responses of the RVN-based VC, RVN-based NVA, and Cambodia-based NVA PW's.

Enemy Conviction that Cambodia is a "Safe Haven"

(U) A combination of indoctrination and propaganda (point 1) reinforced by personal experience and confirming information from
comrades (point 2) caused VC troops in RVN to be firmly convinced
that Cambodia was their totally secure "safe haven" (point 3) in which
they could rest, regroup, resupply, and organize for sorties into RVN
(Attachment "A").

Conclusions

- (U) For the convenience of the executive reader, conclusions are given here, rather than in the usual sequence at the end of the report.
 - The surprise entry of ARVN/US troops into Cambodia, which initially had a demoralizing effect upon NLF troops located in Cambodia, had almost the same effect upon VC troops located in RVN. The beavy impact upon the VC troops is thought to have occurred for a combination of reasons: even though the element of unexpected personal danger was not present and the news was not exploited vigorously through psyop efforts within RVN, comparatively little "official" news was reaching them through normal NLF communications channels. The consequent uncertainty about their situation, coupled with the low state of morale already existing, caused a temporary reaction that was probably at least as great as that experienced by the NLF troops in Cambodia.
 - 2. The impact of the Allied Cambodian entry on the morale of VC PW's captured in RVN caused a striking shift of opinion on "who will win the war". Between March 1970 and June 1970, those who thought NLF would win were reduced by 47%; the number that thought RVN would win increased by 114%. In March 1970, about 2 out of every 3 RVN-based VC believed NLF "would win the war"; in June 1970, 2 out of every 3 believed RVN would win.

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3. The complete conviction possessed by enemy troops, created by long-term indoctrination and personal experience, that Cambodia was their "safe haven" caused the Allied Cambodian incursion to have an especially negative impact on morale.

- 4. Communications from higher levels to VC troops in RVN were severely disrupted temporarily. Another factor which hurt enemy morale was the inability of the Party indocetrination/propaganda machinery to transmit a set of "explanations" and "justifications" to the men in the field to provide the troops with a shared consistent understanding of the events in Cambodia in terms of Party policy.
- 5. There is no evidence that any extra effort was exerted within RVN for timely psyop exploitation of the dramatic news of the Allied entry into Cambodia.
- b. Two items relating to NLF failure to meet expectations held by their troops, that were created by indoctrination and propaganda, are the firmly-planted belief that Cambodia represented assured safety and that NLF would be able to counterattack and retaliate in great strength. The concept of Cambodia as a "safe haven" was demolished (at least temporarily) and many months have passed in which the only semblance of retaliation is represented by inconclusive relatively small-scale activities against the comparatively weak and untrained Cambodian Army. This failure provides productive themes for peyop exploitation.

(1) I. The question of why NLF troops were in Cambodia had been discussed by political officers or cadre with 24% of the sample (see Atta ha ment. A.). In almost all cases Cambonia had been described as a totally safe haven:

> Before the RVN/US troops entered Cambodia, did your leaders or political officers ever discuss with you reasons why NLF troops were in Cambodia? What was said!

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and regroupment

([1] 2. A majority of the RVN-based VC PW's had personal knowledge of pre-incursion conditions in Cambodia or had spent some time in Cambodia;

Had been in Cambodia

Had travelled back and forth between RVN and Cambodia

*Not mutually exclusive.

As a result of indoctrination and personal experience, eighty-eight percent of the sample believed NLF troops were in Cambodia because it was their totally secure safe haven and regroupment area or rear base;

> Do you know why NLF troops were in Cambo

-- Safe haven

565.

dia?

-- Rear base/regroupment area 32%

Enemy Reaction to Surprise Allied Entry in Cambodian "Safe Haven"

(U) Three-quarters of the RVN-based VC sample raised their opinion of APVN strength because of the objective demonstration of power afforded by the ARVN/US entry into Cambodia (point 4). It was judged that there would be a balanced effect upon the morale of NVA troops but a very large decrease in VC morale had occurred (point 5). Although it was thought that the NLF troops would counterattack and fight even harder (point 6), the number of those in the sample that thought the NLF would win the war decreased by 47% and the number that believed RVN would win increased by 114% (point %).

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(I) 4. Seventy-two percent of the sample increased their extra are of ARVN strongth as a result of ARVN a entry into Cambridge while men concernant their estimator.

Have you rassed or	. History		
lowered your estimate	- Same		200
of the strength and de-	" Lower	•	
termination of ARVN		<i>.</i>	
troops since they en-	•	•	•
tered Cambodia			

(U) is a Responses were evenly divided on the question of another the floor in the question of another the floor in the operate and fighting science to the NVA soldiers but a majority felt that the contain of he tree passes, all he

cecreased:

	•	,	V €	NVA
•		- N	toral.	Marah
Would you say that the		 In rease	20".	
effect of the Cambodian		 No chang	e 12%	12"
operations will increase		 Decrease	v 5,•,•°	.≱ × 1
or decrease the morale				
of VC and NVA soldiers t				•

(C) n. Forty-eight percent believed that NLF morale was shaken or NLE would retreat while only in felt that their troops would counterattack arright harder as a result of the Cambodian incursion:

In general, how do you	Counterattack!	€• 📆
think your own troops	fight harder	
will react to this new de-	NLF retreat/	48%
velopment in Cambodia?	morale shaken	

(U) 7. Between March 1970 and June 1970 the number of those who thought that NLF would win was reduced by 47%. The number of those who thought GVN would win increased by 114%:

	NLF	RVN
	Wins	Wins
In March 1970:		
Who did you think would	60%	28%
win the war?		,
(In June 1970:)		,
Who do you think will	32%	60%
win the war?		
Net Change:	-47%	+1145

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- (1) VC PW scaptured in EVN during May and June 1970 were asked. Since the Allied Cambolian operations began and before you became a true for did you read any CVN leaflets. This question was repeated for fickless papers. GVN radio broadcasts, GVN airborne loudspeaker messages, in ground loudspeaker messages, and CVN television programs. For our example, further questions were asked about frequency, ability to proceed stand or bear the words, ability to independ the theorems confect, because the sability of the content, and recall of the theorems confect.
- frequently: 40° found the words and language easy to understand, 20° or the frequently: 40° found the words and language easy to understand, 20° or the meaning of most of the leaflets to be clear; less than half of the constant eagle could be believed. Fifty-six percent regalled themes; 30° mentioned news of Cambodia.
- We have percent of the sample heard GVN radio broadcasts once or to perthe the theme or content was understandable most of the time but the research over only partly believable. Twenty percent recalled themes or content.

 200 mentioned music; 4% mentioned news of Cambodia.
- Fifty-six percent heard airborne loudspeaker messages once or two extractions were heard clearly less than half of the time and believed only partive to all. Thirty-two percent recall themes or content (20% mention rally appeals: 12% mention rally or surrender appeals; none mention references to Cambodia.
- (U) Eight percent had read GVN newspapers and eight percent had heard GVN ground loudspeaker messages.

Fifect on Enemy Indoctrination/Propaganda Machinery

- (U) Interviews of PW's, which touch upon issues that have been treated over some length of time in enemy troop indoctrination and propaganda, show a consistent pattern of responses which can be traced rather directly to the content of their indoctrination programs. In other words, it is recentiable that the PW's are regurgitating what they have been force-fed.
- (U) The usual consistent pattern of responses was given by RVN-hased VC PW's to questions about an issue which has been treated during indoctrination over a lengthy period of time (point 8).

270

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- (U) In contrast to the usual consistent patterns of indostrination in about recognise made by PW's to questions dealing with long standing issues and illustrated by point 81, very varied responses were made to two questions about recent events (points 4, 10).
- Where such unusual variability in answers occurs, it is a safe assumption that indoctrination propaganda has failed or, more likely in this instance, the not occurred. The degree of variability which characterizes these answers suggests, in comparison to the consistent pattern of answers usually obtained for similar questions, that there had not yet been time for a "standard on a time swert obeprovided through the NLF indoctrination and propagance in a time.
- (U) 8. During indoctrination, was there ever any discussion of glassic war has lasted for so many years. What reasons were given:
 - (U) Answers to Question 8 shown below illustrate the consistent responses regarding issues which have received long-term consistent phasis during indoctrination.

"US intervention in SVN."

Because the US interferes in SVN.

"Because of US intervention in Vietnam and aid to the OVN pupper government.

"Although the Front is stronger, it still has many weaknesses, many shortcomings; therefore, it hasn't been able to defeat the enemy."

"Because the US interferes in SVN."

"Because the US interferes in Vietnam and because the US supports the GVN."

"Americans have sent in many modern armament, ammunition, and aircraft, as well as many men to fight such a small country as ours. This is why the war against Americans must necessarily be a long and dragging one before the final victory comes."

"The US has poured troops and heavy weapons into Vietnam in order to fight us; we are but a small country and have to fight a protracted war in order to win."

"Because of US intervention in Vietnam."

"Because the US interferes in SVN."

"Americans have brought aircraft and heavy weapons into here and this is the reason why we have not been able to win quickly.

271

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- (U) 4. Since the time when Allice trop is first-entered contents, jacyour political officers or cause over told you anything about the elitrates of the Allice troops and the consequences of the fighting in an horizan
- (U) Answers to Question Ashown below illustrate the variebility for in responses that are largely solf-generated.

1 5 A

The US/GNN-have ordered the war to far-hedra in order, to use Cambodia to en in To 40 tree (e. en SVN-but t). US/GNN will fait for up to ate a Front for the Eithersteep of Cambodia has been formed and a month is forces for the unification of the people of Indo hims set up; both these enganizations will fight Americans and like rate the month.

The sadres said that the 1.5 for oldered for Schanop's downfall and for the widening of the war. Amoreoans are also behind Lon Nolin the massaures of Vietnamese cutscens living in Cambodia.

The GVN has launched attacks in Cambodia and we now no longer have a place to stay. We all have to do everything we can to avoid being wounded.

The cadres informed us about Sibanouk's overthrow and the rise of the pupper Lon Nol to power by the US. They sain Americans were using Lon Nol as a screen to conceal their act of aggression in Cambodia for the US is being defeated everywhere in SVN and in order to be able to pull out of SVN it has to widen the war across the border to Cambodia, using Asians to fight against Asians in their place.

"Lon Nol has invited Thieu in to give him a hand to rule, enpress and exploit the Cambodian population, but the scheme of opening the war to all over Indochina has been denounced by world public opinion."

"By launching attacks in Cambodia the Allies did inflict a few material losses to the Front, but as far as Front Army's morale is concerned, it is still high, for now having the support of the Cambodian people who are now very resentful of Americans, they will wait for an opportunity to launch a counter-offensive and in the end will win."

- (C) 10. Driven think now in relation to the Allied Cambridge one rations that the war will end more queliffs or will last lenger?
 - (U) Answers to Question 16 also illustrate the absence of precompatible, in ulcated consistency in responses which are largely self-generated.

Than see clearly that the liberation forces have been defeated everywhere and it might be possible that the Front ; has no longer any men to carry on the war. It is our some will soon have to retreat back to NAN, and NAN will be endindependent and free under the GVN back rishin.

Front rear bases in Cambonia have been destroyed thus tre-Front has lost its springhoard from which of laurables attacks against the GVN. The Front will be defeated scan. The war will become shorter and end soon.

The more the war widens the thinner Albert troops are spread out and therefore more wilnerable. The US base created more batted of Americans among the Camberian and Laotian population. The Front, on the contrary, has found more allies; the wholework and even the American public are against this war and strongly protest the US government's action, demanding the withdrawal of US troops. The Front will be able to win more quickly.

I can now see that the US/GVN strength is really great: moreover, formerly Front-controlled or contested areas in SVN are now all under GVN control. The war will surely end very soon for the scale now leans in favor of the GVN for victory."

Neither side wants to yield. NVN also appeals for more aid, and so the war will go on for many more years.

"In my opinion, the GVN is winning more every day, while liberation troops are being defeated at every battle; presently there aren't any VC regulars in Can Duoc District any more, but only a handful of soldiers in hiding. It is certain that the VC will soon be defeated completely."

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The more the war sureads out to Cambodia and Lace, the quicker the US/GVN will be defeated, for even in SVN they are incapable of winning; wito more comment, Cambodia are Laos, the US has less chance and many more difficulties. The world will intervene and the US will have to pull back its troops. Peace will be restored somer.

But for the attacks against Front rear bases in Cambodia, the Front will have been able to win seen, but now the war will go on longer and will be more rigorous. However, it is certain that in the end the Front will win.

Having lost its rear bases the Front no longer has a supply base, a launching pad from which to attack SVN, and as a result it will soon be defeated, and the war will become shorter and end soon."

"The VC are bound to be defeated, and so the war will end very soon."

"The fighting is intensified so a peace solution can be arrived at for the liberation forces are now in very bad shape."

"The US still refuses to pull out its troops, the war is sure to go on for much longer."

"Both sides are intensifying the fighting in order to negotiate, and soon there will be a coalition government to bring about a settlement."

Comparison of Responses of VC PW's Captured in RVN and NVA PW's Captured in RVN and Cambodia

- (U) 11. VC PW's captured in RVN and NVA PW's captured in RVN and in Cambodia are essentially similar in respect to age in years, social class of family, availability of adequate food, and expectations of harsh treatment from the enemy. Religion is also grossly similar although no Catholics are found in the RVN NVA sample. A similar degree of acceptance is given to Party means of control and discipline such as group discussions, criticism sessions, and membership in 3-man cells.
- (U) The two NVA groups are essentially similar but differ from the VC in respect to:

- -- education: VC average & years of education; NVA average 5.
- -- means of entry into military service: 40% of VC are velucions and 48% are drafted; 40% of NVA are drafted,
- -- becoming probationary Harty members: VC claim 20% probationers; NVA about 8%, CTbe 20% figure for the #Vicebased -- VC is unusually high but is not incorrect,:
- -- benefits for disabled veterant 85% of NVA expect a lighty sure payment or a pension and job or training, 40% of VC dec.
- -- exposure to hostile action: VC have most, NVA in RVN cont.

 NVA in Cambodia have least.
- -- indoctrination at entry to service: 90% of NVA received an average of 5 hours; 50% of VC received an average of 5 hours (This factor not necessarily comparable).
- -- consider rally or other means of defection: VC twice as often as NVA.
- -- might defect if right opportunity: VC 50%; NVA-RVN 12%/NVA Cambodia 29%.
- (U) 12. The possibility of RVN/US entry into Cambodia was a rumor that varied in the extent to which it reached different enemy groups:

	,	Source	of Sa	umple
Question	Answer	RVN	RVN	CAM
	,	VC.	NVA	NVA
Before Allied troops	No, none did	36€	68%	44.50
entered Cambodia;	Yes, all did	20%	08%	22%
Did the people you	Yes, some did	20%	08%	10%
knew and worked with	•			٠.
think that RVN or US				
troops would ever				
come into Cambodia?	•		•	

(U) 13. A sizeable percentage of each of the three groups believed the top leaders in Hanoi would strike back after the Cambodian entry. Unless the NLF propagandists have been able to portray their modest efforts against the Cambodia troops in Cambodia as massive retaliation, some disillusionment should have occurred as time passed since the end of Allied Cambodian operations without any substantial NLF retaliation against RVN/US troops.

•		South	t v ∲	Supre print
Question	Rating	H V	PA	CAS
Company of the second	a grade of the second	VI	* . A	* \ A
Devou thing that the Carry	intensity	24	5.27	
bodian operations may	Sia teres	* * *		rije (m
cause the Hanor back re-	The grant	12"		· ***
to intensity or decrease				
offensive operations		-		

It 14. The three sets of responses here may represent both a mention and negative validation of the old saving that—familiarity breeds contempt. Based on first shallow analysis it would be easy to assume that the PV he based NVA were much more restrained in their interpretation of the limit lations and effect of the ARVN entry into Cambridia than we re the Cambrida based NVA who were directly affected, because the RVN-based NVA had survived considerably longer and more intense combat engagements with the ARVN/US forces and were not directly and personally shocked by surveyed demolition of the belief that Cambrida represented complete safety.

happens to the firmly-entrenched concept that morals is eroded by expected to the reasingly larger amounts of lengthy experience of hardships. It may be much more correct to reason, after more deeply searching analysis, that the RVN-based NVA are showing the appropriate and acceptable degree of reaction and it is the factors of surprise, unanticipated destruction of an inportant cherished belief that Cambodia represented safety, and sustained intensity of aggressive attack that caused the exaggerated impact on morals of Cambodian-based NVA troops.

	, •	Source	of	Sample
Question	Rating	RVN	RVN	CAM
		VC	NVA	NYA
Have you raised or lowered	Higher	72%	28%	e 7 77
your estimation of the	Same.	20%	24%	10%
strength and determina-	Lower	ù6€	125	05%
tion of ARVN troops since they entered Cambodia?				•
is the general morale and	Increased	24%	44".	13%
fighting spirit of NVA sol-	Same	12"	08	08%
diers increased or de- creased now as a result	Decreased	28%	40°.	58%
of the Cambodian operations				*•
Is the general morale and	Incressed	20%	38%	11%
fighting spirit of VC sol-	Same	12%	16%	10%
diers increased or de- creased now as a result of the Cambodian operations?	Decreased	*6**	400,	47%

276

(U) 15. The balance of opinion about "who will win the war" held by VC. PW's captured in RVN during the Allied Cambodian operations shifted to favor RVN by almost 2 to 1. Cambodia-based NVA troops were affected to almost the same extent.

Source of Sample	March 1970 thought NLF would win	In June 1970 thought NLF would win	Net Change: # Believe in NLF victory reduced by:
VC PW's taken in RVN	60%	32%	-47%
NVA PW's taken in Cambodia	68%	21%	-57 %
NVA PW's taken in RVN	68%	56%	-18%
Source of Sample	March 1970 thought RVN would win	In June 1970 thought RVN would win	Net Change: * Believe in RVN victory increased by:
VC PW's taken in RVN	28%	60%	+114%
NVA PW's taken in Cambodia	18%	34%	+89%
NVA PW's taken in RVN	20%	32%	+60%

UNCLASSIFED

ATTACHMENT AT

- the the statements below are examples of answers to a question with a skepting at the action with the political officers and padre about the reasons for NIF troops being in Cambodia! The content of the answers make it concepts that the Treasons were received some time before the functionisms or enteres began. It is significant to note that all responses or phasize and the received some time and responses or phasize.
- (C.) We chall provide so to safety in Cambodia? reinforced by personal expenses or ness around theirs which attested to the absence of Allied activity in a boost convenient or my troops that Cambodia was indeed their coast cases.

The forest is Cambodian operations did the cadre or political of the resource over most use with you about the reasons for NLF troops being or Cambodia's What was said?

Our army is temporarily taking refuge in Cambodia because it is a neutral country and free from US bombing and destruction; thanks to Cambodia our rear bases can be completely secure.

"While the fighting is fierce and heavy in SVN we have to go, across to the Cambodian frontier in order to safeguard our forces; Cambodia being a neutral country we are using it to set up our rear bases to stockpile our weapons, amountion and food supplies."

"In our country we are exposed to all sorts of US modern weaponry such as chemicals, napalm bombs, the B-52 bomber which is very destructive. This is the reason why our troops have to take refuge in Cambodia where they have been given temporary use of the border areas and where they can be in complete security."

"We are using Cambodia as a sanctuary to stockpile our weapons and ammunition depots."

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Front forces have more security in Cambodia for we think that the US will not take the risk of going across the border and attacking in Cambodia. In Cambodia our troops regroup, replenish their armament, ammunition, and food supplies, and get reinforcements for their ranks before going across the border again to fight in SVN. This, in my opinion, has been possible because of a secret agreement with the Sihanouk government.

"We are in Cambodia to be protected from the GVN sweep operations and the terrifying bombing by B-52 s." We are in Cambodia to rest and recuperate, to regroup and re-equip ourselves, to get reinforcements before going back to SVN to fight."

779

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APPENDIX I

CASE STUDY FOR TINH THUONG (AFFECTION)
CAMPAIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)

TINH THUONG CAMPAIGN RESULTS

- (U) Methods of data collection used in the Tinh Thuong Evaluation Study were field observations, official statistical records, and survey.
- (U) One member of the research team devoted full time during the campaign to collection of data from field areas and was responsible for maintaining accurate records during the six-week activity as to conduct of the campaign, coordination between agencies, actual activity as it varied from planned activity, interagency and interagovernmental operation, and the collection of pertinent data.
- (U) Sources of needed statistical records data were located, form and content for computer output specified, and delivery arranged.
- (U) A five-member all-Vietnamese interview team under direction of a Vietnamese supervisor was employed and trained to administer two specially developed comprehensive compartmentalized questionnaires, one for NVA ralliers and one for NVA prisoners during the campaign. One member of the HSR research team devoted full time during the latter part of the campaign to running the field interview program.
 - (U) Data which was furnished included:
 - (U) From the field:

Weekly Report from Combined Campaign Headquarters via G5 Advisor's Office

Weekly Summary of significant activities from II Field Force

Monthly Tabular Report of Psychological Operations Activities from MACJ3-11

Weekly and monthly Chieu Hoi Returnee Reports from National Chieu Hoi Center

Prisoner of war records compiled from files of Senior Advisor, G2, III Corps

Leaflet drop and loudspeaker broadcast records compiled by map coordinate from Campaign Headquarters

is a From official statistical records sources:

Finemy location, movement and strength, from CB 3

Statistical data printout of tactical operations through November from MACV, Data Management Agency


B-52 strike data from MACN, 12

the From survey:

Protocols on 22 railiers and prisoners taken in four campaign provinces (all who could be reached, five of the seven railiers and 17 of the 55 prisoners)

He lata Handling. Field observation and field record data saw inled in numulative summary form for the various types of pay melt. This data set was maintained under the headings used by the order sources. The Weekly Hoi Chanh Reports, and Psyop Directorate respects, were in their standard form. Leaflet and broadcast disservings additionally furnished by map coordinate.

A special output was arranged to show information on tactical consists of within the special portions of each of the four provinces. These performantial the special portions of each of the four provinces. These performantial englished and longitude, could be restined only by the squared coordinates. Also, the data that were necessarily a compounded error: activity could be within the parallelogram, are soft interest but one coordinate be just outside so the activity would not be shown, or the activity could be entirely outside the area of intent with the one coordinate on the line and be shown as a data item.



(C) Activity A would not be shown although almost entirely within the special area; activity B would be shown although almost entirely outside.

- (U) The same information had been requested for each proxince in RVN for comparison purposes and for use in future studies. Information needed for the immediate report was taken from these records for each of four campaign provinces and so provided data for the province as a whole rather than as a special portion.
- (C) Data on enemy location and movement were furnished in both consputer printout and computer graphics form. The graphic, on acetate over-law, showed positioned movement the enemy made during the period under investigation.
- (C) Bombing strike data did not enter computer records on a basis that could furnish timely princent. This information was furnished from original input records by map coordinate from the MACI2 office at MACI3.
- (U) The interview data was taken from the protocols of the 22 NVA ralliers and prisoners made available to the study. Fre-recorded responses were hand-tabulated; all free responses were translated and records for each individual and the total response set for each question categorized and placed in array for analysis.
- (U) Pata were arranged for presentation in tabular and matrix form. Data furnished by map coordinate was plotted, a separate acetate for each item, on a 1:25,000 scale map of the special area. This showed:
 - --- Each leaflet drop
 - --- Each aerial loudspeaker broadcast focus
 - --- Bomb strikes
 - --- Enemy location and movement
- (U) The necessity to coordinate many organizations and groups and to initiate certain procedures for the first time made difficulties in obtaining information and in coordinating campaign goals within campaign boundaries. Information which was obtainable is in three sections which follow. The Campaign Field Report gives results of field observation. Statistical Records Data presents findings from statistical data records obtained at MACV. Survey Data presents information obtained from the ralliers and prisoners interviewed.

Field Report - The Tinh Thuong Campaign

- provinces with the expressed purpose to test the effectiveness of their sitied psyop efforts in inducing North Vietnamese Army (NVA: troops to rally or surrender). This intensified six-week effort called for a secondary (operation by specific elements of the Republic of Vietnamese and government units with civilian participation of US military forces, using printed, voice, and face-to-face communication of the message to the enemy to rally or surrender and to the local mulitary and civilian populace to encourage rally or surrencer.
- (C) This section contains the information reported from field caser-vation and records three weeks after the close of the campaign. It is based upon documents, field observation, and field data collected during the six-wick period. It provides discussion of (1) policy and planning which guided the campaign, (2) implementation of the campaign, and its statistical data reported from the field at the time.

Policy and Planning

- (U) Two documents provided the basis for and structured the Tink Thuong (Affection) Campaign. One, the campaign guidance issued by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), set down policy boundaries and offered general situational observations regarding the enemy in the area. The second, the joint United States and the Army of the Pepublic-of Vietnam (US/ARVN) order, specified operational aspects of the campaign.
- (U) Conceptually, the idea for a "special effort" aimed at inducing North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces to rally or surrender had been suggested and discussed at various echelons for a number of months.
- (C) The policy guidance clarified approved practices in appealing to NVA audiences, and provided guidelines directed toward the dual objective of the campaign, to induce the North Vietnamese soldier to surrender as well as to rally. The stated intent was best summarized by the expression that the campaign sought to "get the NVA out of the war".

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- operations order by III Corps and III Corps Tastical Zone IIII CTZs and Second Field Force, Vietnams (II FFORCEV) headquarters, Long Binh. Produced by the Officerof the Chief of Staff, Political Warfare POLWAP, III CTZ, in communition with the US and the Vietnamese Armed Forces community in III Corps, it reflected the general concept of operation recommended by all parties involved.
- (C) Appreciation for the policy and order can best be gained by a general outline of main points included in the Payors Pelicy Guidance and the Campaign Order. Following is a summary of each document, as well as a discussion of the area in which the campaign was conducted.

Campaign Guidance

- (C) A specific policy guidance was struck to provide the doctrinal are developmental underpinning for the campaign. Titled "Special Effort to Induce NVA to Rally or Surrender", Psyop Guidance No. 87, classified Confidential, outlined the purpose, situation, and guidelines for what was to be termed the "Affection (Tinh Thuong) Campaign". (See Attachment 1.
- (C) This document stated that the purpose of a "special effort" was to make a controlled test of the capability of intensified psyon efforts to induce NVA troops to rally or surrender. It outlined the situation as one in which NVA soldiers were short of food and medicine, popular support, fearful of treatment if captured and uninformed on how to rally. A recent rise in NVA ralliers during a period of low intensity of military contact was pointed out, thus suggesting that it was the time to intensify psyop efforts and information aimed at civilian audiences. Following from this, a plan had been developed for III CTZ areas of enemy concentration and movement, execution of which could provide information for exploitation in other locales.
- (C) Special guidelines offered by this policy emphasized the following points:
 - --- producing local intelligence and credible payop
 - --- developing material locally
 - --- exploiting recent ralliers

- --- giving clear and process information on how to rally and how to surrender
- --- avoiding arguments about rally/surrender, rather specifying how to rally or surrender
- --- promising good treatment without exaggeration
- --- maximizing US coordination with GVN
- --- playing down US forces whole focusing on Vietnamese collection of prisoners from allies
- --- emphasizing secrecy regarding focus on special areas to avoid tightening of NVA security
- (C) Instructional information emphasized the wide-based GVN and US support of the program.

Campaign Order

- (C) The joint III Corps/III CTZ and IIFF order, Subject. "Tinh Thuong Campaign", of 9 November 1969, shown in Attachment 2, stated the purpose: To conduct a special six-week Chieu Hoi Campaign in SR-1 and selected areas...to test the effectiveness of intensified psyop efforts in inducing NVA troops to rally or surrender."
- (C) The enemy situation set forth in the policy guidance was stated together with recent enemy positions and activities, and specifying from this the campaign's target areas.
 - (C) Campaign objectives were listed as "three interrelated tasks":
 - (1) Conduct of Psychological Operations against enemy forces by leaflet drops and broadcasts in SR-1 and along border areas with the addition of handbills and posters in the former area.
 - (2) Indoctrination of local population in cooperating with Government of Vietnam (GVN), Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) to assist in contacting the enemy and aiding potential ralliers.

288

- (3) Quick-reaction exploitation of successes and continuous improvement of the campaign.
- (C) Primary responsibility for the campaign fell to the 5th ARVN Division, 32nd Division Tactical Area (DTA) with haison to be effected with other major commands in the area. Special instructions governing popular educational programs and industrination were issued to Bink Duong Sector while the other three sectors involved were directed to expedite the transfer of prisoners and Hoi Chanh to Binh Duong. The Combined Psychological Operations Center (CPOC) II CTZ, 6th Psyop Battalion and 30th POLWAR Battalion were directed to carry out the various support roles associated with leaflet and broadcast missions.
- (C) Among the coordinating instructions was reference to the policy guidance and material support logistics list which were appended. He porting requirements established were limited to daily telephonic report from the campaign headquarters through the Combined Psychological Operations Center to Commanding General, III Corps Tactical Zone, and Commanding General, II Field Force.

Campaign Area

- (C) While within the bounds of the III Corps Tactical Zone different locales had been advanced as suitable for such an effort, those that were subsequently chosen were selected by Saigon planners. One aspect that remained paramount was the importance of a campaign which fit the situation and offered the rally/surrender alternatives within the NVA frame of reference. Thought was given to specificity and scope of the targeted are
- (C) A consideration of the topography of the "Tinh Thuong Campaign area brings together a number of divergent aspects affecting the campaign as a whole. Essentially, the campaign area can be examined under a varied series of overlays. First, there is the Vietnamese Government Province and district (or sector and sub-sector) breakdown on the administrative level. Second, on the friendly tactical side, there are ARVN Division Tactical Areas (DTA's) and regimental areas of operation as well as US and FWMAF areas of operation. On the enemy side, there are communist military regions and subregions to be considered. Third, there exist those "selected areas" targeted for high altitude leaflet drops.

- four provinces: those of high broadest range of activities encountained four provinces: those of high brong. Tay Ninh, high long, and it of Long. (See Figure 3.) Only in the high brong Province was activity, coordinated and intensified, according to campaign plans, to include both "saturation" through hard media and extensive factorization of first Tamp, the Hoad of the first Cat. Therefore, in terms of provinces and district areas profinered in the overall campaign the four above-mentioned provinces are on equal footing with ground efforts being focused in three districts of a single province (Binh Duong).
- of the campaign area specified above falls into ARVN DTA's on the friendly side. Within each DTA's reduces to specific resimental areas of operation. Of the four provinces mentioned, Binh Duong, Binh Letter, and Phuoc Long comprise the entirety of the 32nd DTA which is the operating area of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Regiments of the 5th ARVN Timesion headquartered at Lam Son. It was this DTA and Division Headquarters that had primary responsibility for execution of the campaign. The lower province, Tay Ninh, is part of the 31st DTA (the 25th ARVN Division's tactical area of responsibility) together with Hau Nghia and Long An intervinces. Hau Nghia, while not a province either tasked or mentioned in the campaign order, does figure into the campaign as part of several indivisible areas from a reporting standpoint.
- (C) On the US forces side, prominent units operating in the area of the campaign included the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe, the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi, and the 1st Cavalry Division at Photo Vinh.
- is crossed by regional and subregional lines, one principal area is of concern. This is a single, defined and critical area of enemy activity known as Sub Region 1 or SR-1 in the terminology of communist military demarcation. Despite some periodic variations in the bounds of SR-1, it has consistently encompassed the western central and northern portions of Binh Duong Province, the eastern border areas of Tay Ninh and Hau Nghai Provinces as well as a small portion of southwest Binh Long Province. As it eclipses established GVN provincial boundaries, then, this area targeted as an area for campaign activity included parts of four provinces. It served as one of the three locations for high altitude leaflet drops and its boundaries are approximately congruent with the aforesaid districts of Binh Duong Province marked for intense face-to-face Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) and Armed Propaganda Team (APT) efforts.




Figure 3.

III Corps Tactical Zone/III Corps (Now MR3) showing four provinces (Binh Duong, Binh Long, Phuoc Long, Tay Ninh) involved in Campaign Tinh Thuong. Areas A, B, and C are the high altitude leaflet drops.

291

In addition to SR-1, two other areas, referred to in carries of term in high at increasing an east, were targeted for high attitude leaflet of missions. These form, rectangular blocks along the Cambedian between in his Not and Binh Long Provinces, shown in Figure 1. Unlike 16. I, more of these latter areas represent either friendly or enemy areas of speciation or military regions exclusively; but rather reflect zones to reach the principal Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units yere received, with a tigh degree of regularity. Each of the areas was restricted to tre leading of the respective provinces in which they were cited.

Implementation of the Campaign

The principal units and agencies involved in the Tinh Thinking in main were tasked to perform varying interrelated activities the out to ampaign order.

ampaign Activities

will outline, from one perspective, the scope and range of activities of formed. They are itemized in terms of assignment of responsibilities as shown in the order:

5th ARVN Division

- --- supervise the overall campaign
- --- disseminate propaganda materials through organic
- --- combine PSYWAR elements with VIS in Binh Duong Province to educate the population
- --- establish campaign headquarters

25th ARVN Division

--- liaise with 5th ARVN Division

Binh Dwing Sector

- --- conduct PSYWAR activities through territorial forces (RF/PF)
- --- utilize VIS, APT's, Revolutionary Development (RI): cadre and Pacification Teams to inform population on Chieu Hoi Program
- --- haise with 5th ARVN division
- --- receive ralliers from other provinces and campaign headquarters and insure exploitation

Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Sectors

- --- receive and transfer NVA and VC ralliers to Binh Duong Chieu Hoi Center
- --- receive and transfer all PW's

1st Air Cavalry, 1st Infantry and 25th Infantry Divisions

- --- instruct troops on receiving and handling ralliers
- --- disseminate special materials with tactical operations
- --- assist campaign headquarters in quick-reaction, exploitation of Hoi Chanh
- --- liaise with 5th ARVN Division

CPOC/III CTZ and 6th PSYOP Battalion

- --- receive and transfer material to campaign headquarters or organizations
- --- coordinate leaflet drops
- --- provide strategic leaslets
- --- provide quick-reaction exploitation and Hoi Chanh
- --- provide pre-planned and quick-reaction aerial mission support.

30th POLWAR Battalion

--- establish and staff Joint Operating Center of the campaign headquarters

- The execution of the tasks assigned the various agercies, in conjunction with off-shore leaflet massions and mass mental (garing) TV) programming, represented an attempt to cover the entire range of possible PSYOP activities. This was particularly appearent when viewing the scope of the effort in given locates. The case of these districts in Binh Duong Province targeted for VIS and APT activity provides an example. In addition to the hard media which blangaged the area, the face-to-face efforts frestricted to Binh Duong Sector; in the form of Armed Propaganta Teams and the various VIS programs brought in a long list of otherwise unnoted activities. While the six APT's were deployed one per village with the capability of visiting each household once every two weeks for a total of three vision tations per home during the campaignt, provincial, district and village VIS cadre performed cultural drama shows, conducted political rallies, showed movies, visited families, and disseminated posters, magazines, newspapers, hand leaflets and booklets. (See Table 12.)
- sources were otherwise diverted for special purposes of the camepaign, normal psyop and POLWAR activities were to be carried out in the area of the campaign (e.g., oth PSYOP Battalion Teams, 30th POLWAR Battalion units, S=5 and G=5 activities of principal tactical elements, etc.) Those activities together with the campaign effort are jointly tabulated in the monthly figures discussed in the statistical data section.

Campaign Reports

(C) Reporting procedures were established after the start of the campaign. Although not provided for in the campaign order, the advisability of transmitting written as well as verbal reports on a daily basis was recognized. Consequently, a daily report and weekly recapitulation (the latter herein referred to as Weekly Report), were generated by the staff of the combined campaign headquarters and provided in English via the G-5 Advisor's office, 5th ARVN Division. This report listed counts of the following activities: (1) PSYWAR Aircraft Missions: (2) Leaflets Dropped: (3) Aerial Loudspeaker Missions: (4) Ground Loudspeaker Missions: (5) Hand Disseminated Leaflets: (6) Revolutionary Forces Instructed: (7) Popular Forces Instructed: (8) Population Educated: (9) Hoi Chanh: (10) Weapons: (11) Ralliers with Special Leaflets (this category was only included in the first two of the Weekly Reports): (12) Remarks.

TABLE 12

BINH DUONG PROVINCE 1 VIS2

"AFFECTION CAMPAIGN" ACTIVITIES

Cultural Drama Shows Performed	32
Political Rallies Conducted	
Movies Shown	\$ 0
Families Visited by VIS Cadre	833
Posters Disseminated	4,826
Magazines Disseminated	5,480
Daily 4 Weekly Newspapers Disseminated	25,225
Hand Leaflets & Booklets Disseminated	26,060

Activities took place in Tri Tam, Phu Hoa, and Ben Cat Districts.

²Vietnamese Information Service

- It in addition to the daily and weekly activities reports, the Second field Force representative liaising with the combined campaign heads quarters filed a weekly summary of significant activities. This summary was largely descriptive in nature touching on various problem areas and incidents of significance to campaign conduct.
- (U) Reports listing aerial leaflet missions and airborns loudspeaker missions were compiled weekly by the CPOC. These reports detailed item numbers and quadrative breakouts by map coordinates. They provided details on all target areas (excepting high altitude leaflet drops and unrecorded quick-reaction missions) covered throughout the carmaign period.

Supplementary Records

- (U) For comparison of the volume of activity during the campaign with normal levels in the same areas, inferences can be drawn from the monthly records for the Corps area as a whole. The Monthly Tabular Report of Psychological Operations Activities produced by MACJ)-11 was the principal source in compiling these figures.
- (U) Counts of Hoi Chanh, while originally noted in Weekly Reports, were verified and clarified in most instances when matched against the Chieu Hoi Returnee Report prepared on a weekly and monthly basis by the Corps level advisory office.
- (U) Prisoner of war records, while omitted by the campaign's managers and not maintained in a tabulated form, were compiled from files of the G2 advisor at Corps.

Statistics from the Field

(U) Statistics reported from the field are shown here as psyop effort expended and enemy received in the campaign area.

Psyop Effort Expended

(U) Principal counts reflecting the weekly summary of activities and related campaign data were compiled in the <u>Weekly Report</u>. The reports and final synopsis (see Table 13) provide a running account of media, indoctrination, and related activities on the following psyop campaign efforts:

Table 11

Meetly and County Totals of Entropyal Society 2

kettrity	15-21 Nov	22 -2 3 Nov	29 Nev-5 Dec	6-12 Dec	1
Autoralt Tientune Flows	35	54	68	?7	
lessiets tir Jrapped	22,763,000	12,731,000	14,400,000	15,900,000	:
terial Louis easer Broadcasts	19 2/3 hrs	31 1/4 hrs	12 1/3 hrs	47 1/3 hrs	: L
Promit Lautspeaker Broadcasts	116 hrs.	177 3/4 hrs	154 1/2 ars	131 hrs	1
ientieta Land Disseminated	174,000	435,000	162,700	352,500	3
Impanies Instructed	27	16	34.	41	; <u>.</u>
7. Platoins Instructed	51	35	65	67	7
Population Educated	1,357	3,503	5,260	6,330	7
Chanh Received	62	74	62	97	5
engons: Individual	6	1ئەر	7	L9	1
Crew Servel		4	2	6	-

Reporting period ended as of 30 December; this is one day short of the around



² Actual total; cumulative totals of represented weekly figures.

³ Reported total; campaign totals as reported for the period 15 November to 30

Frincial Tours in Tiffection Carpaign

Dec	6-12 Dec	13-19 Dec	20-25 Dec	27-30 Dec ¹	(Actual total?	Resorted total
	77	69	67	<u>10</u>	(407)	421
x ∞	15,900,000	17,550,000	15,200,000	9,200,000	(111,5%,000)	111,532,440
128	47 1/3 hrs	U, 5/12 hrs	ដែ 1/6 hrs	21 1/2 hrs	(254 2/3 hrs)	259 3/4 are
pre	131 hrs	100 kms	231 1/2 hrs	132 hrs	(1102 3/4 hrs)	1212 3/4 trs
	352,500	313,500	361,500	491,000	(2,295,200)	2,495,000
,	L1	45	43	34	(245)	245
	67	77	74	50	(L22)	412
	e,330	7,330	3,170	L,650	(36,665)	34,605
, '	.77	, ś i	L 3	38	(দ78)	خبنيا
;	49	13	3	1	(53)	94
	6				(12)	9

y short of the ar sunced campaign closing date of 31 December.

pures.

ed 15 Movember & 30 December in final survey.



- 1. PSYWAR Air raft Measures
- 2. Leaflet Drops
- 3. Aerial Laudspeaker Missions
- 4. Ground Loudspeaker Missions
- 5. Hand Disseminated Leaflets .
- e. Revolutionary Forces Instructed
- 7. Popular Forces Instructed
- 8. Population Educated
- some comparison can be offered. If, as it has been asserted, the arms of the campaign normally received about 50% of all PSYOP activity carried on in the Corps, then comparing previous Corps-wide totals of investeems (leaflets and broadcasts) with those of the campaign should provide a vardstick for assessing the level of activity. Statistics from the MAC 11 Monthly Tabular Report, shown in Table 14, give campaign and Corps level figures against those of an eight-month time period, May through December.
- (U) Chart 16 presents these figures graphically for leaflets, and Chart presents graphic comparison of these figures for broadcasts.
- (U) Printed Psyop Messages. Of the more than one hundred million printed items disseminated during the course of the campaign, most were developed and produced prior to the commencement of the campaign. A listing of those printed materials together with the total number disseminated and indicating the principal appeal of each is shown in Table 15.
- (U) The difference between the reported number of leaflets dropped (112 million) and the number produced for campaign use (87 million) lies in a number of factors. First, more leaflets than are actually ordered for an effort are usually printed and delivered (estimates run about a half-million excess per item). Second, leaflets produced on a quick-reaction basis are often distributed by totals while the specifics including timing and location of such missions go unrecorded. Last, the inclusion of on-hand strategic leaflets further inflates previously determined quantities of leaflets.

Estimate of G5, IIFF

299

(13) Table 14

MACY "Monthly Tabular Report of PSYOP Activities Sur

For III Corps (U)

provinces and community and co		overy a perform served are reproductive, weathers because	المستعلق المستعلم المستعلق الم	
Month	Leaflets (X 1000i	Weekly Average	Broadcasts (hours)	Average
May	272,548.2	68,137.0	3,386.7	***
June	251,536.0	62,884.0	3,733.2	• 1.
July	203,183.8	50,795.95	4,639.5	1,152.*
August	220,083.6	55,020.9	4,685.0	1,171.4
September	256,424.9	64,106.2	7,069.3	1,747.3
October	189,579.2	47,394.8	6,216.5	1,554.1
November	159,618.6	39,904.7	5,547.9	1,387.0
December	262,947.6	65,736.9	8,467.7	2,116.3
			·	
^l Campaign Totals	114,480.0	19,080.0	1,472.5	245.4


Campaign totals are those reported for the period 15 November to 30 December 1969.

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Chart 16

NAME AND SELLY AND AGE COMPARISON FOR TRAPLETS DEOFFED IN

III CTZ (MAY - DECEMBER 1969)




301

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BRAL WINGS WELLS BY FRED TO ACHOMOTOR IN 121 ST.

COMPARTSON MAY = DECEMBER EH + STEEL AMPRICATION OF TOTAL



502

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ICE TABLE IN

Twist received Listing of After took Campaign' Printed Material His

Item No.	Title or Longistian	Ameat	Tetal translater
3400	t hieu fieri Henefits A. Weatting Romand	Wally	12.015.00
•			
t 4+ 1	What the Chieu Hen Program deans	Hally	, 12. 637 . 94
5 &+ &	How to Rally	Kaliy	12. 455€.11
1471	To My Commander"	Relly	14,066,077
t 44a	Cadres and Soldiers of the NVA Regu- lar Army +2"	Rally	the reference
1501	If You do not Choose to Rally	burrender	Lanne, w
gott.	Safe Conduct Pass	Rally/ Surrencer	12,000,36
20ne	Treatment of Wounded PW'	Surrender	1,256,76
296.7	Normal Life of PW in PW Camp"	Surrender	1,250,65
2704.8	"Protection of PW Health"	Surrenner	1,250,603
2969	Sorritual Life of PW"	Surrender	1,250.00
2470	To be Alive Waiting for the Day to Return to the Family"	Surrender	1,250,960
2971	"Spring Comes to a PW Camp"	Surrender	1,250,00%
3591	Tu Do (Newspapert; issues 21A & 21B	Rally/ Surrender	1,000,000
3502	"I'ow to Treat Persons Desiring to to Rally" (Handbill)	22	30,00 0 ³
3476	"140 VC/NVA Choose to Live" (Poster)	Rally/ Surrender	50,000
2964	Chieu Hoi Guidebook (Booklet)	2	55,0 00
3434 4	"Howare VC/NVA Prisoners Treated?"	Surrender	4 #-#
3435 4	"Where is the Truth?"	Surrender	
		(Total)	86,740,000

¹All items are leaflets unless otherwise indicated.

²Item directed or targeted at friendly or neutral audiences (non VC/NVA).

³While 50,000 copies of this handbill were produced as coriginally planned, only 30,000 were disseminated.

Leaflet was developed and forwarded for art work yet never produced for campaign use.

- (U) Spoken Psyop Messages. In addition to the hard media listed above, other mass media efforts were conducted. Spot announcements were broadcast every half hour on two radio networks from 10 November to 30 November and every hour from 1 December to 31 December. Television appeals were limited to the regular hourly Chieu Hoi messages.
- (U) Also, a qualifying note can be added to the loudspeaker messages utilized. Four aerial tapes and two ground tapes were developed and produced for distribution; 36 and 15 copies respectively.
- (U) Intensive Area Effort. Finally, there were quantifiable activities conducted that do not appear in campaign totals. Neither political rallies nor the number of families visited were listed separately. However, figures do appear which reflect the volume of people educated or territorial forces indoctrinated by such activities. Similarly, many items of material were disseminated by means other than mass media (e.g., door-to-door distribution of provincial newspapers and handbills by visiting cadremen) which consequently, is not readily apparent in scanning figures on printed items. (Refer again to Table 12.)

Enemy Received in Campaign Area

- (C) Prisoners. No official or systematic count of prisoners taken during the campaign period was maintained by any of the staffs or agencies involved in its execution. Consequently, no reporting formats, campaign summaries, briefing charts, etc., included reference to prisoners gathered from the immediate or general area of the effort. In light of the dual stated objectives of the campaign (i.e., to induce the enemy to rally or surrender) the lack of even some approximations of the volume of prisoners taken represents a significant vacuum in rendering a full account of the principal measurable events.
- (C) While no count of prisoners appears in Tinh Thuong Campaign reports, other non-campaign agencies having primary intelligence and internment control over prisoners of war furnished figures which relate partially and on a more general plane, on the volume and range of PW's taken. An abstract of G2 summaries of prisoners broken down to two DTA's is shown in Table 16. These two areas represent roughly the whole of four provinces. A total of 101 prisoners, 53 VC and 48 NVA were reported by the two.

Table 16

Prisoners of der Collected from Campaign Provinces

	310	e vas)2nd	DEA.3	dockly	Totals*
Hook of Ca-paign	MY	7C	Yil	sc	X/L	π
15 Yer - 21 Ker	- 2	2	9	4	11	10
22 Nov - 23 Nov	2	2	3	. 7	5	9
29 hav = 5 Jee	3	5	o	3	3	à
6 Dec = 12 Dec	2	2	7	6	9	ď.
13 Dec - 19 Jec	. 3	2	ð	5	n	7.
20 Dec - 26 Dec	6	2	5		n	6
27 Dec - 31 Dec	. 2	0	1	0	3	0
Total	20	15	33	33	53	IJ

All figures are those provided by the Office of the Senior Advisor, G-2, III CTZ.

Only those portions of the DTA that fall within UTM Grid Designation "KI" are included above. That area encompasses a section of Hem Mghia (roughly the same area eclipsed by SR-1) and the bulk of Tay Nink.

This DTA is cosposed of the provinces of Bish Deong, Bish Long and Phwee Long.

Totals are incomplete and partial in each case for the period 27 to 31 December and, in a few instances, for the week of 20 to 26 December.

- high altitude leaflet drops along the border of two provinces. Tay high active leaflet drops along the border of two provinces. Tay high active Binh Long) reveals the set of data on PW's collected shown in Table 17. The figures are those provided at the time by the office of the benior Activisor, G2, III Corps Tactical Zone and totals are incomplete for the last two weeks of the six-week campaign. The figures obtained show 45 prisoners taken in these specific areas, 20 of them VC and 23 of them. SAA.
- (C) Additional data, in the form of 1009 monthly totals of FW staken in the targeted provinces will provide perspective on the campaign figures. These totals, also from G2 channels, are shown in Table 18.
- Chanh received on a weekly basis were most difficult to ascertain. This stemmed from both the institutional problem of delay that occurs in processing and classifying ralliers and the fact that subsequent reclassification or change of status can cause variations in cumulative statistics. The Tinh Thuong Campaign was not spared these built-in obstacles to keeping a firm and current count of the actual number of Ho? Chanh. Additionally, other than the basic figures on the number of ralliers per province and category that were reported for a given week, there was no attempt in the Weekly Report to update or amend previous weeks statistics and to keep a cumulative total of the ralliers yielded during the campaign period. A final statistical synopsis that accompanied the last Weekly Report (i.e., the period from 27 to 30 December) listed the total number of ralliers for the period 15 November to 30 December yet offered no comment on the makeup of the group.
- (U) As compiled from copies of the <u>Weekly Report</u> (see Table 19), 448 ralliers, two of them NVA, were officially reported at the end of the campaign.
- (U) An examination of the number of Hoi Chanh recorded by the CORDS Chieu Hoi Advisory Staff at III Corps for the four provinces concerned and contained in that agency's Chieu Hoi Returnee Report portrays another set of figures during the course of the campaign. According to these figures, the four provinces as a whole produced 524 ralliers during the entire campaign period with seven of these being NVA. These statistics have the benefit of constant review and amendment as status changes or reclassification takes place and, accordingly, will deviate from those cited in national recapitulations. The returnee reports for the campaign period as verified on 6 January 1970 are shown both for the four provinces and III CTZ as a whole in Table 20.

Table 17
Prisoners of War Collected from Compaign "Selected Arous"

Work of Campaign		ub iva 1		MTUD		Long res ²		cly
	XVA.	7C	NVA	УC	AVi.	TC .	Xea .	:с
15 hov = 21 hov	3	6	1	С	1	0	٤	÷
22 dov - 25 Nov	1	h.	1	0	0	1	5	5
29 Nov - 5 Dec	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
5 Dec - 12 Dec	1	3	1.	0	0	0	2	3
13 Dec - 19 Dec	3	3	- 1	0	0	0	4.	, 3
20 Dec - 26 Dec	5	3.	С	0	0	.0	5	3
27 Dec = 31 Dec	1	O	1	0	0	o	2	O
fotal	14	22	5	0	. 1	1	20	23

All figures are those provided by the Office of the Senior Advisor, G-2, III CTZ.

307

^{2 &}quot;Special Area" along province's border targeted for massive high altitude leaflet drops.

³ Totals are incomplete and partial in each case for the period of 27 to 31 December and, in a few instances, for the week of 20 to 26 December.

Table 18
Prisoners of War Collected from Campion Provinces

rionth	3lut	UTA ²	32nd	ora ^{3.}	7at	al ·
(1969)	NA.7	AC	74.5	ïĊ	874	AC.
Jamary	11	14	22	17	33	31
February	13	5	16	14.	29	19
riarca ·	>0	ш	29	14	59	25
April	26	18	15	19	Į.	37
, ray	16	1)	я	21	147	34
June	31	13	45	14.	76	27
July	2	3	52	li li	24	1.9
August	5	8	24	13	29	26
September	24	6	20	13	1	19
October	15	114	20	19	35	33
November	n .	16	24	23	35	39
December	13 .	7	n	13	34	25
7otal	197	133	239	231	136	36 4

^{1 111} figures are those provided by the Office of the Senier Advisor, G-2, III CTZ.

308

² July those portions of the DTi that fall within UTi Grid Jesignation "(I" are included above. That area encompasses a section of Ham Nghia (roughly the same area eclipsed by SR-1) and the bulk of Tay Ninh.

Itis Whi is emposed of the provinces of Sinh June; with Long and Phuce Long.

Raillers by Category and Province as Noted in Neekly Report

			Cat	Category	,	. ,		Province	8 . c		,
Meek of Campaign	ALL LAT	Political	Laborer	Cadire	r-denon-mox	(VAK)	Swore with	Bran Long	gest sourt	dożi yst	Koacly total
15 - 21 Nov	35	22	۰	:	,	(2)	:	1	;	ł	73
22 - 2d Mov	i		1	ŧ	•		29	Ħ,	A	4	2
29 Nov - 5 Dec	×	1	i	o	91	:	콨	•	3	٠ نظ	621
6 - 12 Dec	3	x	:	1	2	:	*	14	. 2	22	7.6
13 - 19 Dec	3	2	:	:	ផ	Į.	\$	₩,	4	53	3
20 - 26 Des	\$	a		. :	w	:	38	1		ግ	7,
27 - 30 Dec ²	\$	w	•	;	:	1	1		•		2
Campaign Totals	1	:	:			į		2	:	*	10.43

the total of figures represented. As explanation of these marries

CONFIDE

						-
Week of Campaign	Binh Duong	Tay Minh	Binh Long	Jung pony	Tow1	(III CTZ tous)
15 Nov - 21 Nov	(0) 22	13 (1)	(0) 21	1 (0)	53 (1)	201 (1)
22 Nov - 23 Nov	(c) n	20 (0)	(0) 12	(0) 22	97 (2)	133 (6)
29 Nev - 5 Des	(1) (2)	(3) CT	(0) 0\$	7 (0)	107 (2)	135 (2)
6 Dec - 12 Dec	32 (2)	(0)	(0) &	(0) CI	(2) 25	(O 69t
13 Dec - 19 Dec	33 (0)	(o) 7K	(0) 7	(0) 2	(0) [2	162 (3)
20 Dec - 26 Dec	(0) (2	(o) 11	33 (0)	1 (0)	§ 9	332 (0)
27 Dec - 31 Dec	(o) %	15 (0)	(0) 2	1 (0)	74 (0)	152 (3)
Province fotals	2h3 (5)	119 (2)	124 (0)	35 (0)	(a) 725	102) 1211

(U) In order to place the Hoi Chanh figures during the campaign in context, the monthly rates by provinces concerned (and III CTZ totals) as found in CORDS Chieu Hoi Records are itemized for the year of 1909 in Table 21.

Statistical Records Pata

- (U) Information was collected from MACV official records sources; Sources of needed information from intelligence and operations records were located, form and content for computer output specified on the bas a of data-keeping procedures in use in various agencies.
- (l') In addition to information collected on field activity from field chaservation and reports discussed in the last section, statistics were sought and some collected from official records sources to provide factual information on location and movement of the enemy, tactical operations in the area and the losses sustained, that would impact the enemy together with a specific psyop campaign. All represent important psychological factors for campaign assessment. Both tactical pressures and psychological pressures exerted upon the enemy are so integrally related as to make analysis of effect of one without consideration of the other meaningless. Statistics made available on these factors are presented in this section.
- (U) Available data on three types of enemy responses are included here: (1) enemy strength and operating area during the six-week period: (2) tactical pressure brought to bear; (3) losses sustained.

Enemy Location and Movement

(C) Information on enemy location and movement was obtained from computer graphic output from Combined Intelligence Center automated data records. These records are assembled from intelligence reports based on latest information screened from prisoner interrogation, field intelligence reports, captured documents, and other official information sources. The picture of enemy strength, location, and condition is updated and modified retroactively on the basis of new information received, and at all times represents best information at the time the data is requested.

Table 21

Raillers per Min is from Provinces in Campaign Area and III CTZ for 1969.

(NVA Hot Chank parenthetically indicated)

Hanth (1969)	Binh Deong	Tay Minh	utah Long	Phuse Long	Total	(III CTZ tetal)
January	(o) U	(1) 92	(0) 72	(0) 7	(1) 221	10) 400
Pobruary	(O) #	(0) 52	(O) TI	(0) 1	(0) اس	(0) 212
March	73 (3)	(C) 7Z	(0) 9	3 (0)	112 (6)	(01) 667
April	(±) SS	(0) 12	3	1 (0)	122 (5)	(6) (5)
3	1,5 (1)	l ₂ 2 (5)	(0)	(2) 9	135 (6)	(6) (9)
Sure	(S) #	y (7)	13 (0)	1 (0)	10((20)	670 (23)
Arra	S (E)	(o) %	(0) 91	7 (0)	112 (L)	74.5 (11)
August	61 (L)	(0) 27	15 (9)	(S) 21	150 (16)	766 (25)
September	3	d1 (S)	(9) 25	\$3 (0)	273 (16)	(72) pox
October	(o) on	153 (2)	(0) 27	157 (0)	(2) 267	1200 (11)
Koveaher	97 (S)	75 (2)	(0) 25	(o) PK	\$62 (7)	737 (14.)
December	€ 3	(0) 06	(O) ¶8	15 (0)	333 (2)	143 (10)
Province Totals	932 (43)	(14) (7)	(9t) ¶O¶	899 (S)	8276 (35)	4007 (151)
6-week period 15 Nov. 10 Dec	213 (5)	119 (2)	(0) +21	1K (0)	7.7	

- (C) Elements of eleven enemy units were known to be in the fourprovince area during the campaign period. These, together with movement detected during the time, are shown in Table 22.
- (C) Three weeks after the close of the campaign when the evaluation report was made to sponsors, known enemy strength in the campaign areas at the start of the campaign was shown as 9,750: 7,130 NVA are: 2,620 VC. At the end of the campaign, enemy force in the area was shown as 9,505: 6,980 NVA and 2,525 VC.
- (C) Enemy strength represented by these units at the start and the close of the six-week period is shown in Table 2).
- (C) In III Corps as a whole, total enemy strength was reduced star (about 25,000 troops) during November and December. This is shown Table 13. Reduction was primarily in VC forces, however, while 50% forces gained. Comparing Tables 23 and 24, no large net reduction is shown with only a 245-man reduction in NVA/VC forces in the four-province area indicated.

Tactical Pressure

Tactical Pressures Exerted by ARVN/US

- (C) The psyop printed and spoken messages directed to the enemy soldier to induce surrender or rally, and the psyop messages addressed to friendly populations to urge their effort in furthering reception of ralliers were only part of the psychological pressures exerted on the enemy during the campaign. Tactical operations and combat experience was a major component of campaign effect.
- (C) The enemy was engaged in a total of 147 contacts, both small unit and large scale within the four provinces during the six-week period. Table 25 shows the losses sustained by the enemy as a result of ARVN and Allied attack, both in personnel casualties (a total of 4,547 for the area in six weeks) and in weapons captured (1,202, both individual and crew-served).
- (C) B-52 attacks delivered a heavy toninge of bombs within the four provinces during the campaign period.

ich Table 22

Enemy Units in Special Area During Campaign (1')

	Unit	Number of Movements Detected:
101	NVA Infantry Regiment	7
208B	NVA Rocket Regiment	4
141	NVA Infantry Regiment	4
165	NVA Infantry Regiment	2
271	VC Infantry Regiment	2
272	VC Infantry Regiment	4
95C	NVA Infantry Regiment	5
209	NVA Infantry Regiment	2
D14	VC Infantry Battalion	3
C168	VC Local Forces Battalion	3
96	NVA Artillery Regiment	3

(C) Table 23

Known Enemy Strength in Four-Province Arca at Start and End of Six-Week Campaign Period

	Start of Campaign Period	End of Campaign Period	Change
۸c	2,620	2,525	. 95
AVA	7,130	086*9	- 150
TOTAL	9,750	\$0\$'6	. 245

315

(C) Table 24

Total Enemy Strength in III Corps November and December 1969

Chemy Strength in III Corpe	November 1969	31 December 1969
/let Cong	50,970	26,490
Vorth Victnamese Army	19,665	20,240
TOTAL	70,635	46.740

(C) Table 25

Tactical Pressure Exerted on Enemy in Special Area 15 November - 31 December 1969

Province	Number of Contacts	Weapons Lost	Casualties
Binh Duong	74	18	15
Binh Long	£1	07	88
Phuoc Long	77	69	16
Tay Ninh	89	1,082	608'+
TOTAL	2+1	1,202	1+6*+

217

(C) Self-Initiated Pressures on Enemy. The enemy sustained losses in conflict which he initiated. Table 26 shows that in a total of 416 contacts resulting from enemy-initiated action, he suffered 258 casualties, while losing 31 weapons.

Losses Sustained by Fnemy

- (C) Table 27 shows the intensity of tactical pressure in ground attack experienced by the enemy in the four provinces (both that he initiated and that inflicted by Allied forces). He suffered 4,805 casualties in 563 contacts in the six-week period.
- (C) Comparison of Tables 23 and 27 raises questions. A total of 4,805 casualties was reported from tactical operations in a four-proving area, while integrated information sources showed a net reduction in enemy strength of only 245 troops in the same four-province area. On the other hand, as shown in Table 24, there was a reported 25,000-troop reduction in III Corps as a whole during November and December, must of this occurring in December.

Survey Data

- (U) Interest in campaign results centered on the number of NVA ralliers and prisoners received from the special effort. Many factors of assessment could only be obtained from these individuals. A five-member all-Vietnamese interview team was employed and trained to administer a specially-developed questionnaire to NVA ralliers and prisoners during the campaign. One member of the research team devoted full time to conduct of the field test program.
- (U) Three factors should be noted regarding data reported here. One, the area from which the totals of the population of interest (60 NVA troops received) exceeds the special areas where intensive payop activity occurred. Two, accurate count of troops taken was difficult even for those elements coming under campaign operations procedure; a major factor of interest, surrender as prisoner of war, was completely outside the campaign operation. Three, numbers interviewed, while representing substantial proportions of the total population of interest, are small and survey results are shown in raw numbers.

(C) Table 20

Self-Initiated Tactical Preseure on Enemy in Special Area 15 November - 31 December 1969

Province	Number of Contacts	Weapons Lost	Casualtica
Binh Duong	601	•	11
Binh Long	59	E	10
Phuoc Long	103	83	911
Tay Ninh	137	11	113
TOTAL	416	16	258

(C) Table 27

Tactical Pressure in Ground Contact Experienced by Enemy in Four-Province Area in Six-Week Campaign Period

Tectical Engagoment	Number of Contacts	Weapone Lost	Casualties
ARVN Allied Action	147	1,202	245*4
Enemy-Initiated Action	416	31	258
TOTAL	563	1,233	4,805

GUNFIUENTIAL

noted in the section titled "Campaign Area", the intensive payop effort was confined to three districts of one province and only one portion of the effort (high altitude leaflet drops) was conducted in a defined portion of each of the other three provinces involved. Records, where they were obtainable, were maintained by province totals however; therefore, tigures represent the total number of individuals reported received in the four campaign provinces between In November and 31 December 1949. In other words, while the special effort took place only in portions of the four provinces, statistics were obtainable only on a province-wine basis. These totals, presented in the section titled "Enemy Received in Campaign Area", are summarized here in Table 25. The count reported as shown in the table includes that obtained from Corps records and from central Chieu Hoi records.

(C) Table 28

Prisoners and Ralliers Reported Within a Four-Province Area 15 November - 31 December 1969

Category	<u>vc</u>	NVA	Total
Prisoner	48	53	101
Rallier	517	7	524
Total	565	60	625

(U) As discussed in the field report section, handling and count of prisoners did not come under campaign procedure. A count was obtained from sources outside campaign channels, but no official records were furnished as to whether a prisoner had surrendered or had deliberately put himself in a position to insure capture as some of the messages urged. Access to any of this group was obtained late and through extraordinary effort.

(U) The survey data-collection effort sought to obtain information from the 60 NVA soldiers (53 prisoners and 7 ralliers) officially reported as received by the GVN during the campaign period within the four-province

trea which included the campaign area. Five of the even ralliers are 1% of the 53 NVA prisoners were made available for interview. At the these numbers are small, it should be noted they represent respectable proportions: twenty-two individuals from a population of sixty represents it. 6%. The five ralliers are 71% of the total rally group are the 1% prisoners are 32% of the total prisoner group.

This section reports the information obtained from these of NVA recops who responded to comprehensive compartmentalized questions above to comprehensive compartmentalized questions above to these pertinent to the questions the campaign itself was conserved test. These were:

- 1. Do needs for medical care and shortage of food supplies represent NVA vulnerabilities?
- 2. Would information as to procedures for rally and surrender and the treatment to be expected overcome obstacles in the way of defection?
- 3. What was the extent of exposure and attention to psyop messages?
- 4. What was the impact of tactical pressure?
- 5. What was the attitude toward defection?
- 6. How and why did these NVA troops rally or surrender? Would local populace assist rally?
- 7. What attitude do they express toward treatment received at the time of coming into GVN hands and toward their current situation?

Vulnerabilities

(U) Appeals were to be made to two major vulnerabilities the stiffice in previous studies. These were: (1) need for medical care and (2) shortage of food. Survey data was obtained to questions of physical condition and attention to medical needs, and on conditions regarding food supplies. Tables 29 - 31 present responses to these items.

Table 29

Medical Needs in Respondent's Unit During Trip to RVN

Question	Response	Prisoner (n×17)	Rallier (n:5)	Total
Some men in unit ill	Yes	17	5	22
during journey?	No	•	•	• •
Prevalent illness	Malaria	17	5	22
Some men too iil to	Yes	13	4	17
continue journey"	No	1	1	2
Continue journey	Not sure	3	0	3
Some men in unit died	Yes	6		
	No	9	4.	13
during journey?	Not sure	2	i	, 3
General physical	Bad	10	4	14
condition of most men	Normal	5	•	5
in unit on arrival in	Good	1	-	1
RVN	Not sure	1	1	3
Respondent's own	Bad	9	4	13
physical condition	Normal	7	1	. 8
on arrival in RVN?	Good	1	, •	1

Table 30

Respondent's Own Medical Needs

•		During Trip South		In R	VN .
Question	Response	Prisoner (n=17)	Rallier (n=5)	Prisoner (n=17)	Rallier (n = 5)
Respondent	No	5	2	4	5
ill?	Yes	12	3	13	0
Needed medi-	No		_	1	
cal care?	Yes	12	3	12	5
	•		•		٠.
(Of those re- sponding Yes):		(n=12)	(N=3)	(n=12)	(n=5)
		,			
Received medi	- No	3 ·	1.,	4	· 4
cal care?	Yes	9	2	8	1
				•	
Take to	No	4	1	y 3	3
hospital?	Yes	5	2	6	2
	No Need	d 3	· • · · ·	3	

Need for Medical Care

- (U) Need for medical care for the NVA soldier could arise under two conditions: while on the journey South and after arrival in RVN.
- South, the prevalent illness being malaria, with half the men in some units being affected and some of them unable to continue the trip. Questioned as to the health of the unit on reaching the South, one rallier was not sure, one reported complete exhaustion and three reported fatigue and poor health. As to the condition of the five individuals themselves on arrival in RVN, two reported complete exhaustion, two reported fatigue and ill health, and one reported he was in nearly normal condition. Three of the five who rallied were themselves ill during the trip, two of these illnesses serious. None carried out normal duties while sick; all needed medical care, medicines and drugs. Two received adequate medical care, medicines and hospitalization; one did not. After arrival in RVN and before rallying, all experienced various periods of illness. All reported needing medical care and medicines; four reported that they received adequate treatment (see Tables 29 and 30).
- (U) The seventeen prisoners of war, too, all reported illness among the men in their units on the trip south from North Vietnam. As many as 100 men in some units were too ill to continue the journey, and some deaths occurred. The general condition of most of the men in the units was reported as "completely exhausted" for one, "not very strong" by nine of the seventeen; "about normal" by five; and "healthy" by one. Asked about their own physical condition on arrival in RVN, nine of the seventeen prisoners reported complete exhaustion; seven, about normal; and one reported good condition. Twelve of the seventeen had one or more bouts of illness during the trip. None of them carried out their normal duties while sick, all twelve needed medical care; nine of these received adequate care while three did not. All twelve needed medicine or drugs, and all but three received them. Five were sent to a hospital, two were not; the others did not require hospital care. After arrival in RVN and before becoming a prisoner, thirteen of the seventeen prisoners had illnesses (malaria, with one reporting epilepsy in addition). None carried out their normal duties while sick. Twelve reported needing medical care; eight reported receiving it. All thirteen needed medicine or drugs, but only seven received them while six did not. Six were sent to the hospital, three were not; the other four did not need hospital care (see Tables 29 and 30).

325

Food Supply

- (U) For the most part, the units of both prisoner and rallier respondents carried supplies of food during the journey south, did not know the location of caches of food in RVN, and did not report drawing from such caches (see Table 31).
- (U) Of the five NVA ralliers, only one reported as a general condition not having had enough food, while two said lack of food occurred sometimes and two others reported always having sufficient food. None reported ever being severely reduced in strength and energy due to lack of food. One mentioned hunger as a reason for considering rally; two described receiving needed food from families as they decided to rally (see Table 32).
- (U) Of the seventeen NVA prisoners, five reported having had enough food sometimes, seven reported having enough food all of the time, and only one reported experiencing reduced strength and energy due to lack of food (see Table 32).

Obstacles

(U) The Tinh Thuong Campaign made an attempt to overcome two major obstacles to defection which had been noted in an earlier study; these were: (1) fear of danger while attempting to defect, and (2) not knowing how to rally or surrender. Information was obtained from the ralliers and prisoners interviewed on attitudes toward expected treatment and toward rally, surrender or capture.

Attitude Toward Expected Treatment

- (U) The treatment expected by NVA troops on defection or capture was investigated. In very few indoctrination sessions was the subject of treatment of prisoners, instruction on behavior as a prisoner, or kind of treatment to be expected. No discussion of the Chieu Hoi program was reported.
- (U) One of the five ralliers reported being told by leaders in the North and two by both superiors and other men in their units in the South that GVN treatment of prisoners was bad. During indoctrination two were told of the Geneva agreement and two received instructions on how to behave when becoming a prisoner. One reported having a good understanding of how it would be to be a prisoner (Tables 33 and 34).

Table 31

Arrangements for Food

On Trip to South Vietnam

Question	Response	Prisoners (n=17)	Ralliers (n=5)
Group carried food af-	No	1	1
ter leaving NVN?	Yes	16	4
		_	
Unit knew location of	Not sure	5	-
caches of food in RVN?	No	7	5
	No answer	5	-
	•		
Unit drew food from	No	6	4
such caches?	Yes	-	1
	No answer	11	•

Table 32
Food Supply While in South Vietnam

Question	Response	Prisoners (n=17)	Ralliers (n=5)
Had sufficient food?	No answer	5	· · · · · ·
	No	-	1
•	Sometimes	5	2
	Always	7	2
Strength and energy	No answer	5	-
severely reduced	No	11	. 5
from lack of food?	Once or twice	1	-
Mentioned hunger as	Yes	٠_	1
reason for rally?	No	- ,	-
Mentioned food as part	Yes	<u>-</u>	2
of rally situation?	No	-	3

(U) Table 33

Attitude Toward Expected Treatment

Question	Response	Prisoners (n=17)	Ralliers (n=5)	Total (n=22)
		•		
While in unit dis-	Yes	7	2	9
cussed treatment expected as a GVN prisoner?	No	10	3	13
(Of those answering "Yes"):		(n=17)	(n=2)	(n=9)
Treatment expected?	Normal fairness Bad Very bad	1 2 4	- 2 -	1 4 4

(U) Table 34

Understanding of Prisoner Status

Question	Response	Prisoners (n=17)	Ralliers (n=5)	Total (n=22)
Had prior know-	No	7	3	10
ledge of Geneva	Yes	9 .	2	11
Agreement?	Not sure	1 .	•	1
Had received instruc-	No	15	3	18
tions on how to behave as prisoner?	Yes	2	. 2	4
Had prior under-	No	10	4	. 14
standing of how it would be to be prisoner?	Yes	7	1	8

- (U) Two of the prisoners had been told of GVN treatment of prisoners during political indoctrination in the North ("bad"), five and seven by superiors or men in the unit or civilians in the South, as in all "bad" with one exception. One prisoner reported being told by a superior in RVN that he could expect normal fairness.
- (U) The Geneva convention had been a subject of indoctrination discussion for more than half the seventeen PW's, but only two reported receiving instructions on behavior if he should become a prisoner. Seven of the PW group felt they had a good understanding of how it would be to be a prisoner before being taken.
- (U) Several mentioned fear of what would happen from either side while attempting to defect, but none discussed fear of treatment after coming into GVN hands.

Need for Knowledge on how to Defect

- (U) Information received from GVN leaflets by the total group on rally and surrender was investigated (see Table 35).
- (U) Of the five ralliers, all reported seeing leaflets asking them to rally with information as to how to rally. Two of these reported that the information seemed to reduce the chance of being shot while trying to rally. One of the ralliers reported seeing leaflets asking the soldier to surrender, some of these giving instructions on how to surrender. He felt these instructions seemed to reduce danger in attempting to surrender. Four of the ralliers read leaflets suggesting desertion. Three remembered instructions on how to desert. One of these felt the reformation did reduce danger in trying to desert.
- (U) Three of the seventeen prisoners reported they had considered rallying before becoming a prisoner; all gave as reasons for considering it that they wanted to stay alive. Two of these said the reason they did not rally was because they did not know the way; the third was afraid he might be killed on the way to rally, or that it would harm his family. The fourteen prisoners who reported they did not consider rallying gave as reasons the affecting of their family and personal future, shame and dishonor, reluctance to betray the revolution, feeling they had experienced little hardship, and not knowing of the Chieu Hoi Program (see Table 36).

(U) Table 35

Obstacles: Need for Information on How to Defect

(Effect of Information in Psyop Message) (U)

(U)	Type Defection	Read P		Mess Cave Inst		Instru Reduced	ctions Danger
	1	PW	ис	$-\mathbf{p}_{m}$	НС	PW	HC
	Rally	9	8	7	5	5	2
•	Surrender	4	1	3	1	2	1
	Desertion	7	4	3	2	3	1

(U) Table 36

Obstacles: Need for Knowledge on How to Defect

(Prisoner Prior Consideration of Rallying) (U)

(U)	Question	(U)	Response	(U) # of PW's
	Before becoming a		Yes	3
	prisoner, had you ever considered rallying?		No	14
	Why had you considered rallying?		Want to stay alive	3
	Why didn't you consider		Shame and dishonor	2
	rallying?		Would affect family and personal future	2
			Didn't want to betray revolution	5
	,		Hadn't had many hard- ships	3
			Didn't know about Chieu Hoi	2
	Why did you not rally?		Didn't know the way	2
			Might be killed	1

(U) Of the seventeen PW's seven reported seeing messages that gave information on how to rally. Five of them reported the messages made it seem more safe to rally. Four of the seventeen PW's reported seeing leaflets asking them to surrender; three of these reported that the leaflets gave instructions on how to surrender. Two of these three reported the instructions seemed to make it safer to surrender. Of the seventeen PW's, seven saw leaflets asking them to desert. Three of these felt the instructions seemed to reduce danger while trying to desert.

Exposure and Attention to Leaslets and Messages

Printed Messages

- (U) Leaflets reached the enemy sampled. All ralliers and prisoners interviewed reported seeing leaflets and most of them read them. Most found them average to easy to read as far as word difficulty was concerned (see Table 37).
- (U) Of the five ralliers, all saw the leaflets frequently, two read them occasionally and three read them frequently. Two found the word level average, and three found it easy; all found the meaning clear but three reported feeling none of the messages believable; one found some of the messages believable and one found most believable.
- (U) Thirteen of the seventeen NVA PW's had read leaflets; eleven read them occasionally and two read them frequently. Only one of these thirteen who read them found them hard to read. For ten of these thirteen, the meaning was clear (two others found half the meaning clear while one reported only some of the meaning clear) but only three reported all messages they read believable. Three reported half of them believable, three reported some; four of the thirteen stated none were believable.

Spoken Messages

- (U) All but one of the total group of prisoners and ralliers heard air loudspeaker messages (see Table 38).
- (U) All of the five ralliers heard GVN air loudspeaker messages; four could usually hear them clearly and understand the message; one could seldom hear or understand. Only one reported usually finding the messages believable. None of the five ralliers reported ever hearing GVN ground loudspeaker messages.

Table 37

Exposure and Attention to Leaflets

Question	Response	Prisoners	Ralliers
In RVN, before becoming a prisoner, did you ever read any GVN leaflets?	Yes	13	5
•	•	, <u> </u>	_
How often?	Frequently	2	3
	Occasionally	11	2
	Once or twice		÷,
Words easy or hard to	Hard	1	0 .
understand?	Average	7	2
	Easy	, 5	3
Was the meaning	A11	10	3
clear?	Most		2
	About half	2	· .
,	Some	· 1	. 🗝
	None	·	-
Could the messages be	A11 .	-3	-
believed?	Most		1.
	Half	3	· 🕳
	Some	3	1
	None	4	3

Table 38

Exposure and Attention to Loudspeaker

Question	Response	Prisoners	Ralliers
In RVN, before coming	No	1	-
into GVN hands, did you ever hear any GVN air	Yes	16	5
loudspeaker messages?	·		
How often?	Frequently	6	4
	Occasionally	6	-
	Once or twice	4	1
Could you usually hear	Always	•	3
it clearly?	Mostly	4	1
	Half the time	3	
•	Seldom	3	1
	Never	6	-
Could you usually under-	Always	2	3
stand the message or	Mostly	1	1
theme?	Half the time	2	- .
	Seldom	5	1
	Never	6	•
Could the message	Always	1	-
usually be believed?	Mostly	2 .	1
	Half the time	3	1 ·
	Seldom	4	1
	Never	6	3 .
Did you ever hear any	No	17	. 5
GVN ground loudspeaker messages?			

336

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- (U) Sixteen of the seventeen prisoners heard GVN air loudspeaker messages; seven could usually hear them clearly, but three could selsom hear clearly and six, never. Only two could always understand the message or theme; three could understand it most or half the time; eleven, seldom or never. Three reported finding the messages usually believable; three found them believable half the time. None reported remembering any main points or themes.
- (U) None of the seventeen PW's reported ever hearing GVN ground loudspeaker messages.
- (U) Attention to specific messages (on defection) is discussed under "Attitude Toward Defection" in a following section.

Impact of Tactical Pressure

- (U) The psyop printed and spoken messages directed to the NVA soldier were only part of the psychological pressures exerted during the campaign. Tactical operations and combat experience was a major part of the total effect.
- (C) B-52 attacks dropped a considerable tonnage of bombs on the four provinces during the six-week period. There was a total of 563 contacts (small unit, large scale, and enemy initiated) reported during the campaign period within these four provinces, resulting in 4,805 enemy casualties (refer to Table 27). The individual response of the prisoners and ralliers was investigated (see Table 39).
- (U) All five of the ralliers had experienced air strikes, four had been under artillery fire, four had experienced B-52 bombing attacks, two had had their unit surrounded, and had been in combat. Men in their units had been killed or wounded in such actions. Two of the five had themselves been wounded but these wounds had occurred before rallying and did not influence the decision to rally (see Table 40).
- (U) Fourteen of the prisoners had experienced air strikes, ten had been under artillery fire, seven had experienced B-52 bombing attacks. Three had been in units surrounded by attacking forces and four had been in combat. All had had men in their units killed and wounded in these actions. Five of the seventeen had been wounded, only one of these at the time he became a prisoner. One reported an old wound; one, both old and newly received wounds which did not relate to being taken prisoner (see Tables 39, 40).

337

Table 39

Tactical Pressure Felt by Respondent Unit Attack

Question	Response	Prisoners (17)	Ralliers (5)
Experienced air strikes?	Yes	14	5
·	No	. 3	- .
Under artillery fire?	Yes	10	4
	No		1
Experienced heavy bombing?	Yes	7	4
	No	10	1
Unit ever surrounded?	Yes	3 .	2
•	No	14	3
Ever in combat?	Yes	4	2
	No	13	3

Table 40

Tactical Injury Received by Respondent

Question	Response		Prisoners (17)	Ralliers (5)
Were you ever wounded?	No	•	12	. 3
	Yes	•	5	2
Dr. mhat		•		
By what weapon were	Artillery	fire	•	2
you wounded?	Cannon	-	1	•
	Napalm	•	1	· •
	Rocket	··.	2	- .
	Shot gun		1	-
Able to move about	Not sure			and the second s
after being wounded?	Yes		1	•
•	No		-	1
			•	
Were you wounded at	Yes	.•	2.	_
the time you came into GVN hands?	No		3	2
		•	• • •	
Did your wound have	Yes		-	· _
anything to do with your being taken by GVN?	No		2	. 2

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THE RESERVE

Attitude Expressed Toward Defection

Some discussion of types of defection had occurred with superiors in NVN and from other men in the units or from civilians in RVN. The terms used during the interview defined: capture (being taken prisoner against will); surrender (gives up voluntarily but does not join the other side); rally (joins the other side). Five of the POW's had been told of treatment to expect if captured (bad); only one reported being told of treatment to expect if he surrendered (good). Four reported being told of treatment to expect if he rallied, three of these saying it was bad, one of the four saying it was very good. Prior consideration of their own defection was explored.

Before rallying, two of the five Hoi Chanh had considered surrender, because of the hardships, stresses of war and lack of food. One of
the ralliers had heard of people putting themselves in a position to induce
their own capture. Four felt this could happen under certain circumstances. These were: if hardships were unendurable; due to anger with
supervisors for treating them badly; to avoid being killed; if tired of
fighting; if the soldier changed his mind about remaining in NVA ranks
and no longer wanted to fight. Two felt intentional capture was the same
as surrender; three felt it was different. Four felt sure their leaders
believed they could not surrender with honor when in a hopeless situation;
one was not sure. All were sure their leaders thought they should fight
until death in a hopeless situation (Table 41).

Before becoming a prisoner, five of the POW's had considered surrendering; twelve had not. Only one of the prisoners said he had heard of men intentionally entering a situation that would insure capture. Nine said that it was possible that soldiers would intentionally get themselves into a situation when they could be captured, but four were not sure, and four said it was not possible. Eight felt that intentional capture was the same or almost the same as surrender while eight felt it was different and one was not sure. Fifteen of the POW's said their leaders did not believe a soldier could surrender with honor even when in a hopeless situation; only one prisoner said his leaders probably did feel he could surrender with honor under this condition; one was not sure. Fourteen of the prisoners stated their leaders believed they should fight on until killed when in a hopeless situation; twelve of these termed this definitely so and two probably so. Only three felt this was not the case (Table 41).

Table 41

Prior Consideration of Defection

Question	Response	Prisoner (17)	Rallier (5)
Prior consideration of	No	12	3
surrender.	Yes	5	. 2
Had heard of people putting	Not sure	2	<u> -</u>
	No	13	4
themselves into situations where capture unavoidable.	Yes	2	1
Felt soldiers could inten-	Not sure	4	1
tionally put themselves into	No	5	1
situation where capture	Yes	8	. 3
unavoidable.			
Felt leaders would condone	Not sure	1	1
surrender in a hopeless	No	15	4
position.	rould condone Not sure hopeless No Yes	1	-
Felt leaders would expect	Not sure	1	
fight to death in a hopeless	No	. 2	-
situation.	Yes	14	5
Prior consideration of rally	Yes	. 3	4
7 7107 65.151467241611 62 62—7	No	14	1
Prior consideration to leaving	Yes	4	1
NVA ranks, method other than	No	12	4
rally.	Not exactly	1	•

Conditions of Rally/Capture

How They Rallied

- (U) Each of the five men had thought of rallying before he actually came out to rally. Four gave as reasons for thinking of rallying:
 - (1) He would receive financial help from the people of the South; it would lessen bloodshed.
 - (2) So many killed; so much hardship endured; felt his side would not win; was sick and exhausted.
 - (3) Future looked dark; felt his side would not win; disappointed and frustrated because of hardships; saw the truth about SVN.
 - (4) To avoid getting killed; to get away from hunger and hardships.
 - (U) Five gave these reasons for not rallying earlier:
 - (1) The situation did not permit.
 - (2) Didn't have the opportunity.
 - (3) Would have had a bad name for displaying low morale and being unable to endure hardships.
 - (4) Didn't have the opportunity to carry it out.
 - (5) Because I was afraid if I came out I might be shot down by the GVN or Allied soldiers while on my way to rally.
- (U) Five expressed what had happend to make them change their minds as follows:
 - (1) Found the war did not solve anything; too much blood has been shed in this war.

- (2) I was sick and exhausted. If I remained with the unit I would be killed for sure so when I was sent to the hospital I went to the highway to wait for someone to come and asked them to take me to the Chieu Hoi Center.
- (3) I got lost, was hungry and cold and went to a civilian home to ask for food and water. The old man of the house told me to rally and kept me there. He then told his son to go get the GVN soldiers who came to fetch me and take me to Phu Giao District, Binh Duong.
- (4) I went on a mission for one entire month with a VC cadre. We contacted the cadre's mother and she fed us well. Finally both of us desired to contact the cadre's uncle who was then working at the police station in Binh Duong to rally. The police sent a car to pick us up.
- (5) Because I did not want to remain with the VC side because we were being bombed and had to endure hardships and hunger constantly.

How Did They Become Prisoners?

(U) Three of the PW's had considered rallying before becoming prisoners. Their reasons for thinking of it are quoted:

Because I want to stay alive, to better myself. I don't like to fight. I would be better off materially.

The situation was too tense. I was too worried and too disenchanted.

I didn't want to fight so I could stay alive until the day when I could return to my family.

It is very difficult to come out to rally. I was afraid I might be shot down by the cadre and didn't know the way to the Chieu Hoi Center. I was afraid I might get caught by the cadre or other soldiers in combat and might be killed.

343

Because the cadres gave us the wrong directions; because I didn't understand the Chieu Hoi Program and didn't dare to come out although I had opportunities.

- (U) Four of the prisoners had considered leaving the NVA ranks by methods other than rally or surrender. Five of the seventeen PW's had previously considered surrender. Reasons given for contemplating surrender were:
 - --- avoid fighting, bombing, shooting
 - --- was surrounded; under attack
 - --- tired of war, hardships, seeing people killed
 - --- knew will be killed or captured; no hope of returning north
 - --- when thought of the two wars, felt GVN too strong to be defeated
- (U) Reasons were given for not doing so by a larger number of the prisoners. Some of these:
 - --- will reflect adversely on my family and my political future
 - --- my family is still in the north; if I am captured,
 I will be the only one who has to suffer
 - --- came to liberate south; cannot surrender because must unify country
 - --- once volunteered to liberate south, would rather be killed or captured
 - --- because why come all the way from north to south to surrender? Our family could be mistreated.

 They would get 60% of what other families get.
 - --- would be ashamed of myself. It would give my family a bad name

- --- as an NVA fighter, you can't leave your ranks and your just cause
- --- now that I have come south, am willing to endure all hardships and can endure them all...also, afraid of getting beaten up
- --- because I haven't had to endure much hardship
- --- yes, because I didn't know what I would get from GVN at all
- (U) Only one of the seventeen said he had any other possible choice to avoid becoming a prisoner; he felt he might have escaped. Three of the seventeen did not know what to expect at the time. Fourteen expressed variously the belief they would be beaten, shot, tortured for information, and sent to prison.

How Were the Ralliers Treated?

- (U) All five of the ralliers reported being well treated both at the time of being taken and between that time and reaching the classification center.
- (U) Two felt they were being treated well and three, with normal fairness at the Province Chieu Hoi Center. Three thought the treatment much better than expected and one, better than expected; one respondent had not been told what to expect.
- (U) Two of the five felt they could not evaluate how they felt about being there; three said they felt very fortunate to be in their present circumstances.

How Were the Prisoners Treated?

(U) Nine of the seventeen prisoners reported being treated badly (two of these said "very badly") at the time of becoming a prisoner; seven felt they were treated with normal fairness and one reported being treated well.

- (U) As to treatment between the time of becoming a prisoner and reaching the classification center, ten reported being treated badly (two, "very badly"; eight, "badly"). Four reported being treated with normal fairness and three reported being treated well.
- (U) Two considered they were being treated badly at the PW camp; nine felt they were being treated with normal fairness and six felt they were treated well.
- (U) One had not been told how he would be treated, but for seven of the group, treatment was about the same as expected; for nine, it was better than expected and for two of these, "much better". Eight felt very fortunate and four felt fortunate to be there now; one felt neutral. Four felt unfortunate, one of these, "very unfortunate".

ATTACHMENT 1

POLICY GUIDANCE

POLICY NUMBER 87

15 October 1969

SPECIAL EFFORT TO INDUCE NVA
TO RALLY OR SURRENDER

DISTRIBUTION: LIMITED

APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR, JUSPAO

OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANS AND RESEARCH JUSPAO SAIGON, VIET-NAM

Psyop Policy Guidance No. 87

SPECIAL EFFORT TO INDUCE NVA
TO RALLY OR SURRENDER

I. PURPOSE

To make a controlled test of the capability of intensified psyop efforts to induce more NVA troops to rally or surrender. This test will take priority over all existing psyop efforts.

II. SITUATION

Information gathered in the last six weeks from intelligence reports and interviews of NVA hoi chanh and POW's indicates that:

- a. Communist soldiers in South Viet-Nam are short of food and medicine, are not receiving adequate support from the local population, and are war-weary;
- b. NVA soldiers do not have sufficient information on how to rally;
- c. NVA soldiers fear they will be badly treated, perhaps tortured or killed, if they rally or surrender.

Additionally, we note that in the last six weeks 76 NVA have become hoi chanh. This represents 25 per cent of the total NVA ralliers in all of calendar 1969 to date. The period of the last six weeks generally has not been a time of intense military contact.

The situation appears, therefore, to be propitious for intensified psyop efforts, supported by command instructions to GVN and US forces and an information program directed to the Vietnamese inhabitants in or near NVA-occupied areas.

Accordingly, a plan has been developed to conduct as speedily as possible a controlled test in a representative III CTZ area of large NVA concentration and through traffic. Lessons learned will be adapted for explcitation in other areas of South Viet-Nam.

III. GUIDELINES

- 1. The keys to success are good local intelligence and credible psyop messages.
- 2. Some media output can be developed in Saigon on the basis of information available at MACV and JUSPAO and in GVN Ministries. The texts of other products should be prepared locally. In some instances the framework of the message can be prepared in Saigon, with details on enemy units and means of rallying or surrendering added locally.
- 3. Whenever possible, use voices, photos and messages of recent ralliers or prisoners whose companions are still with the enemy in the field. Testimonials from NVA soldiers are preferable in messages addressed to NVA forces;
- 4. Be clear and precise in giving instruction on how to rally or surrender.
- 5. Do not engage in polemics with the enemy. The assumptions in this special program are that for practical reasons he is ready to opt out of the war. If our assumptions are correct, he wants aid and comfort now, not propaganda. For the same reason, do not argue the relative advantage of rallying or surrendering. Tell him how-to-do either one, and leave the choice to him.
- 6. To the maximum extent feasible US forces should coordinate actions with GVN forces.
- 7. Do not exaggerate the kind of treatment the enemy will receive. Promise him good treatment but do not overstate the case or he will not believe it.
- 8. In order to allay suspicions of mistreatment at American hands do not overplay the role of US forces, in fighting or providing care for prisoners and ralliers. State that ralliers and prisoners may give themselves up to Vietnamese or to American forces who will pass them on to Vietnamese authorities.

9. We can expect Communist forces to make special efforts to tighten security over their troops if they believe we are making special inducement efforts in selected areas. We should take precautions to avoid disclosing the fact that we are focusing on the particular area chosen for the III CTZ test. During the four to six weeks of special effort there psyop efforts to induce rallying or surrendering probably will be conducted at normal levels elsewhere in South Viet-Nam. The III CTZ will represent an intensification of effort in that area and will also employ some new messages and techniques, as described below.

IV. ACTION PROGRAM

Instructional Information

- l. Using all appropriate psyop media (leaflets, aerial tapes, radio broadcasts, APT teams, publications), beginning October 15 we will tell NVA soldiers in the selected area in simple language and in detail how to rally or surrender. All existing psyop material of this nature has been reviewed. Standard items suited to this special program will be used. Other material is being developed.
- 2. The instructional material for enemy troops should include suggestions on how to evade surveillance and other controls imposed by cadre and officers to prevent access to friendly psyop messages, rallying or surrendering.
- 3. Simultaneously, in the test area appropriate media (posters, ground tapes, radio broadcasts, publications, culture-drama toam performances) will be used to instruct the local population on how to receive communist soldiers who wish to rally or surrender. This instructional program will include details on which places and which officials rallying or surrendering troops should be directed to in the local area.
- 4. Through command instructions and through information media (GVN and US radio, television, publications) GVN and US forces throughout Viet-Nam will be directed to assist communist troops who show disposition to rally or surrender.

Motivational Information

- 1. The same means will be used to tell communist troops, especially NVA, that they will be well treated if they rally or surrender. Specific promises of proper food and medical care will be made. Postwar repatriation will be promised to NVA prisoners of war only. The philosophy of the chieu hoi program will not be argued. In other words, messages for this intensive campaign will not be in ideological terms but will be pragmatic in nature.
- 2. Details of rewards for bringing in weapons will be reiterated to communist troops.
- 3. Details of inducement rewards will be repeated to South Vietnamese living in the area.
- 4. It would be highly desirable to institute and to publicize special commendations or other awards to GVN and US forces responsible for bringing in ralliers or prisoners.

ATTACHMENT 2

CAMPAIGN ORDER

HEADQUARTERS
II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96266

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM RVNAF III CORPS AND III CTZ

AVFBE

9 Nov 1969

SUBJECT: TINH THUC

TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) PURPOSE: To conduct a special six week Chieu Hoi Campaign in SR-and selected areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces to test the effectiveness of intensified PSYOP efforts in inducing NVA troops to rally or surrender.

2. (C) GENERAL:

- a. Communist soldiers in South Vietnam have recently experienced shortages of food and medical supplies and have not received adequate support from the local population. There are indications that some NVA soldiers are beginning to be disillusioned with the war and are ready to rally, but do not have sufficient information on how to rally and fear they will be treated badly, tortured or killed.
- b. Following a series of military reverses, major NVA/VC units within III CTZ (1 NVA Div, 5th VC Div, 7th NVA Div, 9th VC Div) are presently located in dispersed positions along the Vietnamese/Cambodian border in the areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces for resupply and refitting operations. Additional enemy units with significant NVA concentrations operating separately in SR-1 (Binh Duong) include 101 NVA Inf Regt, 268 VC MF Regt, 2 Quyet Thong Bns, 8th and 9th Arty Bn's and K35 Bn.
- c. SR-1 (Binh Duong Province) is the primary target area, while the Vietnamese/Cambodian border areas of Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces are designated as secondary target areas. All available PSYWAR/PSYOP assets for broadcasting and dissemination of leaflets will be employed in both target areas to inform NVA soldiers and the local population of Chieu Hoi policies, rallying procedures, reward policies for weapons and caches, and good treatment for ralliers and PW's. In the primary target area additional appeals will be disseminated to elicit the assistance of the local population in establishing contact with and encouraging NVA soldiers to rally to GVN agencies or ARVN/US forces.
- 3. OBJECTIVES: The campaign will be conducted to accomplish three interrelated tasks:

357

AVFBE

9 NOV 1969

SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

- a. Task I: Psychological operations conducted against enemy forces leaflet drops and broadcasts along the Cambedian border by III CTZ CPOC controlled PSYWAR aircraft. Leaflet drops, broadcasts, and distribution of handbills and posters in the SR-1 (Binh Duong Province) area.
- b. Task II: Indoctrination of local population to include proper rallying instructions to be given by the populace to enemy soldiers. Appeals to the population to cooperate with GVN, RVNAF, and FWMAF units and agencies to assist in contacting the enemy. Encouragement of civilians to aid potential ralliers in leaving their units.
- c. Task III: Quick reaction exploitation of successes and continuous improvement of campaign.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. 5th ARVN Division/32d DTA:

- (1) The Commanding General 5th ARVN Infantry Division/32d Division Tactical Area or his authorized representative will supervise the campaign.
- (2) Utilize organic infantry elements operating in SR-1 to distribute leaslets, handbills, posters, and conduct broadcasts during operations and civic action activities.
- (3) Instruct PSYWAR elements at the unit level to combine with Provincial and Village VIS cadre of Binh Duong Province to educate the people.
- (4) Establish a combined headquarters for the direction of the campaign Representation will be drawn from US units in the 32d DTA, 25th ARVN Division/31st DTA, provincial (Binh Duong) government, and a detachment from the 30th POLWAR Battalion.
 - b. 25th ARVN Division/31st DTA:

Establish liaison with the Combined Campaign Headquarters of the 5th ARVN Division/32d DTA.

c. Binh Duong Sector:

- (1) Direct dissemination of leaflets, posters, handbills, and conduct of broadcasts by Territorial Forces (RF/PF).
- (2) Conduct educational programs to inform the population of objectives and procedures of the Chieu Hoi program. Elicit voluntary assistance and cooperation from the population in the conduct of the campaign. Employ provincial, district and village VIS cadre, APTs, RD Cadre, and Pacification Teams for conduct of educational programs.

358

AVFBE ...

9 NOV 1369

SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

a. Task I: Psychological operations conducted against enemy forces leaflet drops and broadcasts along the Cambodian border by III CTZ CPOC controlled PSYWAR aircraft. Leaflet drops, broadcasts, and distribution of handbills and posters in the SR-1 (Binh Duong Province) area.

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- (2) Conduct educational programs to inform the population of objectives and procedures of the Chieu Hoi program. Elicit voluntary assistance and cooperation from the population in the conduct of the campaign. Employ provincial, district and village VIS cadre, APTs, RD Cadre, and Pacification Teams for conduct of educational programs.

358

GUNTIUENTIAL

AVFBE

9 NOV 1969

SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

- (3) Establish liaison with the Combined Campaign Headquarters.
- (4) Provide for receipt of ralliers from other provinces and Combined Campaign Headquarters and insure PSYOP exploitation.
 - d. Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Sectors:

Receive ralliers from the Allied forces and arrange for immediate transfer to Binh Duong Sector Chieu Hoi Center. All NVA and VC ralliers/PW's received as a result of this campaign will be transferred.

- e. 1st Air Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division:
- (1) Insure objectives of this campaign and detailed instructions on receiving and handling of ralliers are disseminated to all US personnel.
- (2) Disseminate special leaflets, handbills and posters in conjunction with tactical operations.
- (3) Assist the Combined Campaign Headquarters in quick reaction exploitation of Hoi Chanh's by providing organic leaflet drop and broadcasting assets.
- (4) Establish liaison with the Combined Campaign Headquarters for the duration of the campaign.
 - f. CPOC/III CTZ And 6th PSYOP Bn:
- (1) Receive propaganda materials from support agencies and transfer them to Combined Campaign Headquarters of participating organizations as directed. Schedule and prepare aerial drops of provided materials as directed.
 - (2) Provide strategic leaflets as required.
- (3) Produce quick reaction exploitation of Hoi Chanh's as directed by III CTZ/II FFORCEV PSYOP.
- (4) Provide both preplanned and quick reaction aerial mission support on request.
 - g. 30th POLWAR Battalion:

Provide necessary personnel to establish and staff the Joint Operating Center of the Combined Campaign Headquarters.

- h. Coordinating instructions.
 - (1) This campaign will be initiated on 15 November 1969.

GUNTIVENIIAL

AFVBE

9 NOV 1969

SUBJECT: TINH THUONG Campaign (Affection)

- (2) Loudspeaker appeals will be in clear and simple wording avoiding ideological language and self-praise.
- (3) The "Early Word" systems will be used to the maximum extent possible for ralliers to appeal directly to members of their former units. Standard "Early Word" frequency will be 43.80 FM.
- (4) Ralliers obtained as a result of this campaign will be turned over to province Chieu Hoi Centers as soon as possible for subsequent transfer to the Binh Duong Chieu Hoi Center.
 - (5) All ralliers and PW's must be treated well.
 - i. Policy Guidance for participating elements: See Incl 1.
 - j. Logistics of propaganda printed matter and aerial support: See Incl 2.
- k. The Combined Campaign Headquarters will be operational not later tha 13 November 1969.
- 5. (U) REPORTS REQUIRED: Daily telephonic reports will be submitted to Combined Campaign Headquarters by ARVN/US divisional units and Sector Heaquarters. Reports will include results and/or problems encountered. Comma Commanding General, III CTZ and Commanding General, II FFORCEV.

DO CAO TRI
Lieutenant General, ARVN
Commanding General
III CORPS AND III CTZ

JULIAN J. EWELL Lieutenant General, USA Commanding General II FFORCEV

2 Incl

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CG, 1st CAV Div

DEPCORDS, III CTZ

Prov Chief, Binh Long

(Distribution Continued on Page 5)

Psyop Policy Guidance No. 87

ENCLOSURE I

SPECIAL EFFORT TO INDUCE NVA TO RALLY OR SURRENDER

I. PURPOSE

To make a controlled test of the capability of intensified psyop efforts to induce more NVA troops to rally or surrender. This test will take priority over all existing psyop efforts.

II. SITUATION

Information gathered in the last six weeks from intelligence reports and interviews of NVA Hoi Chanh and POWs indicates that:

- a. Communist soldiers in South Viet-Nam are short of food and medicine, are not receiving adequate support from the local population, and are war-weary;
 - b. NVA soldiers do not have sufficient information on how to rally;
- c. NVA soldiers fear they will be badly treated, perhaps tortured or killed, if they rally or surrender.

Additionally, we note that in the last six weeks 76 NVA have become Hoi Chanh. This represents 25 per cent of the total NVA ralliers in all of calendar 1969 to date. The period of the last six weeks generally has not been a time of intense military contact.

The situation appears, therefore, to be propitious for intensified PSYOP efforts, supported by command instructions to GVN and US forces and an information program directed to the Vietnamese inhabitants in or near NVA-occupied areas.

Accordingly, a plan has been developed to conduct as speedily as possible a controlled test in a representative III CTZ area of large concentration and through traffic. Lessons learned will be adapted for exploitation in other areas of South Viet-Nam.

A TRUE COPY:

STEPHEN M. GRIFFITH Colonel, General Staff ACofs, G5

III. GUIDELINES

ENCLOSURE I

- 1. The keys to success are good local intelligence and credible PSYOP messages.
- 2. Some media output can be developed in Saigon on the basis of information available at MACV and JUSPAO and in GVN ministries. The texts of other products should be prepared locally. In some instances the framework of the message can be prepared in Saigon, with details on enemy units and means of rallying or surrendering added locally.
- 3. Whenever possible, use voices, photos and messages of recent rallier or prisoners whose companions are still with the enemy in the field. Testimonials from NVA soldiers are preferable in messages addressed to NVA force
- 4. Be clear and precise in giving instructions on how to rally or surrender.
- 5. Do not engage in polemics with the enemy. The assumptions in this special program are that for practical reasons he is ready to opt out of the war. If our assumptions are correct, he wants aid and comfort now, not propaganda. For the same reason, do not argue the relative advantages of rallying or surrendering. Tell him how-to-do either one, and leave the choice to him.
- To the maximum extent feasible US forces should coordinate actions with GVN forces.
- 7. Do not exaggerate the kind of treatment the enemy will receive. Promise him good treatment but do not overstate the case or he will not believe it.
- 8. In order to allay suspicions of mistreatment at American hands do not overplay the role of US forces, in fighting or providing care for prisoners and ralliers. State that ralliers and prisoners may give themselve up to Vietnamese or to American forces who will pass them on to Vietnamese authorities.
- 9. We can expect Communist forces to make special efforts to tighten security over their troops if they believe we are making special inducement efforts in selected areas. We should take precautions to avoid disclosing the fact that we are focusing on the particular area chose for the III CTZ test. During the four to six weeks of special effort there PSYOP efforts to induce rallying or surrendering probably will be conducted at normal level elsewhere in South Viet-Nam. The III CTZ will represent an intensification of effort in that area and will also employ some new messages and technique as described below.

ACTION PROGRAM

ENCLOSURE 1

Instructional Information

- 1. Using all appropriate PSYOP media (leaflets, aerial tapes, radio broadcasts, APT teams, publications), beginning October 15 we will tell NVA soldiers in the selected area in simple language and in detail how to rally or surrender. All existing PSYOP material of this nature has been reviewed. Standard items suited to this special program will be used. Other material is being developed.
- 2. The instructional material for enemy troops should include suggestions on how to evade surveillance and other controls imposed by cadre and officers to prevent access to friendly PSYOP messages, rallying or surrendering.
- 3. Simultaneously, in the test area appropriate media (posters, ground tapes, radio broadcasts, publications, culture-drama team performances) will be used to instruct the local population how to receive communist soldiers who wish to rally or surrender. This instructional program will include details on which places and which officials rallying or surrendering troops should be directed to in the local area.
- 4. Through command instructions and through information media (GVN and US radio, television, publications) GVN and US forces throughout Viet-Nam will be directed to assist communist troops who show disposition to rally or surrender.

Motivational Information

- 1. The same means will be used to tell communist troops, especially NVA, that they will be treated if they rally or surrender. Specific promises of proper food and medical care will be made. Post war repatriation will be promised to NVA prisoners of war only. The philosophy of the Chieu Hoi program will not be argued. In other words, messages for this intensive campaign will not be in ideological terms but will be pragmatic in nature.
- 2. Details of rewards for bringing in weapons will be reiterated to communist troops.
- 3. Details of inducement rewards will be repeated to South Vietnamese living in the area.
- 4. It would be highly desirable to institute and to publicize special commendations or other awards to GVN and US forces responsible for bringing in ralliers or prisoners.

363

ENCLOSURE 2

Reference: Message, CONF, MACJ3-11, CITE 59113, DTG 2102262 Oct 69

Subject: PSYOP Exploitation: Special Effort to Induce NVA to Rally or Surrender (U)

1. Distribution Materials.

a. Objectives

- (1) Reinforce the purpose of the Chieu Hoi program within the RVNAF/FWMAF units in SR-1 and Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces.
- (2) Indoctrinate the local populace of Binh Duong Province in methods of assisting ralliers and induce them to cooperate with GVN/RVNAF/FWMAF agencies to obtain ralliers.
- (3) Induce the VC/NVA of SR-1 and the four enemy divisions to rally of surrender to GVN/RVNAF/FWMAF agencies.
- b. Leaflets. The following leaflets will be available for the campaign at 12 million each for the six week period.
 - (1) Leaflet #3460: The Chieu Hoi benefits and rewards for weapons.
 - (2) Leaflet #3461: The Chieu Hoi policy.
 - (3) Leaflet #3464: How to Rally; Assurance of good treatment.
 - (4) Leaflet #3473: Various means for learning unit and rallying.
 - (5) Leaflet #3499: Declarations of former ralliers and surrenderees.
 - (6) Leaflet #3501: Special Chieu Hoi appeal.
 - (7) Leaflet #8930: Safe Conduct Pass.
- c. Posters and Handouts. The following posters and handouts will be available for the campaign in the numbers indicated:
 - (1) Poster #3476, 17"x22", two color: VC/NVA choose to live (50,000
- (2) Handout #3502, 8''x10'', two color: How to treat persons desiring to rally (50,000).
 - (3) Booklet, 16 pgs, three color: Chieu Hoi Guidebook (50,000).
 - d. Tapes. Four aerial messages and two 30 minute ground messages ha

ENCLOSURE 2

been developed and will be available for use during the campaign. Present planning calls for maximum use of the "Early Word" system to supplement prepositioned tapes.

- e. Radio and Television. Broadcast spots and interviews will be conducted to further inform the people of the Chieu Hoi Program and its benefits.
- f. Newspaper. Two special additions of the TUDO newspaper will be available during the campaign.
- g. Tactical support. In addition to the above preplanned strategic materials, an allowance of 8,000,000 tactical exploitation leaflets will be provided for support of the campaign through Saigon agencies. For smaller amounts of quick reaction leaflets, the 6th PSYOP Bn and 30th POLWAR Bn will support as directed by III CTZ POLWAR and II FFORCEV PSYOP through the CPOC.

2. Distribution Methods

- a. Leaflets Number 3460, 3461, 3464, and 8930 will be dropped by air in preplanned target areas in a mix of 2 million each per week for the six weeks (Total for the period is 45,000,000 leaflets).
- b. Leaflets Number 3473, 3499 and 3501 will be dropped twice by Frantic Goat assets during the campaign in a mix of 4,000,000 each (12,000,000 per drop for 24,000,000 total).
- c. The TUDO newspapers will be dropped twice by Frantic Goat assets during the campaign in batches of 250,000 each (500,000 for the campaign total), in the same flight as 2b.
- d. Hand dissemination of leaflets listed in 2a will be performed by operational infantry elements in the field to the extent possible.
- e. Aerial broadcasts will be employed over intelligence and contact targets throughout the campaign. Air assets will be provided to the extent possible from CPOC controlled aircraft. CPCON units will endeavor to utilize organic aircraft for exploitation (quick reaction) of Hoi Chanh whenever possible.
- f. Posters, handouts and Chieu Hoi Guidebooks will be disseminated by Provincial agencies to insure maximum distribution to the civil populace. These materials will be prepositioned in Binh Duong Province through the VIS/APA/PSYOP.
- g. Broadcast of Radio and Television testimonials, spots, and indoctrination will be conducted by the Chieu Hoi Ministry, Ministry of Information and the CORDS/JUSPAO advisory staffs.

ENCLOSURE 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL OFERATIONS AGAINST ENERY FORCES REPORT

RCS: AVFBE-M-2


REPORTING PERIOD:

REFORTING UNIT:

9 LDSPR HRS	
d LDSPR GRD, ATR	
7 CATALOG NUMBER LEAF/ POST USED	
UNIT MAK CATALOG ING COMIACT NUMBER IEAF/ POST USED	
5 L C A B L E) HUMBER OF CONTACTS	
L A P P L I NUMBER/SIZE COPERATIONS AGAINST UMIT	
3 STRENGTH	
2 LOCATION	
1 Target Units	1

CONFICENTIAL

1. Form is CONFIDENTIAL when completed. 2. Report will be prepared on 6 x102 size paper.



MECEDING PACE MANY - NOT FILMED

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APPENDIX II

CASE STUDY FOR OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT CAMPAIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)

CLASSIFIED TABLES

TABLE 19

SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT ITEMS FOR OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT

When did you first hear of Chieu Hoi program?

When did you first think of rallying?

Why did you rally at this time? (Interviewer to obtain at least 3 reasons, then ask which is most important.)

- *Have you heard of the TET appeal "Light of Freedom"?
- *Did you see any leaflets, handbills, posters or hear any loudspeaker broad-casts concerning the TET appeal "Light of Freedom"?

Did you hear an aerial loudspeaker broadcast?

If so, were you able to hear and understand the message clearly (Always, Mostly, Half the time, Seldom, Never). NOTE: In conjunction with this question interviewer is to determine the source's general intelligence, whether he is hard of hearing, the type of terrain he was in at time of broadcast, any background noises or battlefield conditions that might affect the audibility of the broadcast, and proximity of source to broadcast target area.

- *Did you believe the TET appeal message?
- *Did the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" influence your decision to rally?
- *If so, what specifically in the message influenced you to rally?
- *Did the message give instructions to rally?
- *Do you believe the instructions reduced the danger involved in rallying?
- *Did any of your friends who heard about the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" persuade you to rally?
- *Was there anything in the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" that was unclear?
- *Did you or anyone in your unit have any suspicions about the TET appeal "Light of Freedom"?

Were you influenced by the TET appeal "Light of Freedom" but prevented from rallying until a later date?

Is there some appeal which would have increased your motivation to rally that was not used by US/RVNAF/GVN PSYOP/POLWAR personnel?

(Questions marked with asterisk to be asked until 28 Feb 71)

				G	JN	H	UEN	TIA
1 7 1	Total	Enemy	400 21,835	6,390 17,805	11,990	7,690	6,920	66,240
2 × 4	Total Total Ad- Tot	min		6,390	1,620 6,040 11,990	2,275 3,065	2,385 2,705	18,600
S R U A	Total	NC.	205	1,710				8,195
14 14 14	Total	Y A N	21,230	9,705	4,330	2,350	1,830	39,445
7 1	Total	Enemy	400 18,715 21,230	6,390 17,805	6,040 12,195	3,065 7,425	506*9	63,045
JANUARY 1971	Total Total Ad- Total	min	400	6,390	6,040	3,065	2,705	18,600
NUAR	Total	۸C	205	1,710	4,720 1,435	2,175 2,185	1,830 2,370	7,905
JA	Total	N V A	18,110	9,705	4,720	2,175	1,830	36,540
0 4 0	Ad- Total	min Enemy	400 18,715 18,110	6,390 17,805	5,040 12,195	7,425	906,9	7,600 63,045 36,540 7,905 18,600 63,045 39,445 8,195 18,600 66,240
ER 1	-p V	min	400	068'9	5,040	3,065	2,705	17,600
EMB	Total	၁ ^	205	1,710	2,435	2,185	2,370	8,905
DEC	Total	e A N	18,110	9,705	4,720	2,175	1,830	36,540
PROVINCE DECEMBER 1970			Quang Tri 18,110	Thua Thien	Quang Nam	Quang Tin	Quang Ngai 1,830	TOTALS

(C) TABLE 42

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTH AT TIME OF OPERATION SEARCHLIGHT IN MRIAND IN PERIODS PRECEDING AND FOLLOWING

	Week	of 16-2.	Week of 16-23 January	Week	of 23-3	Week of 23-30 January
Province Name	L/S Cont.	Small Unit	Enemy Casualties	L/S Cont.	Small Unit	Enemy Casualties
MR 1	Days	Acts	Total	Days	V Cte	10191
Quang Tri	8	1	32	. 2	9	32
Thua Thien	5	3	09	m [']	2	31
Quang Nam	80	36	158	6	43	113
Ouang Tin	17	3	110	11	7	54
Quang Ngai	12	14	130	6	12	141
TOTAL	50	57	490	37	20	371

(C) TABLE 43

TACTICAL OPERATIONS DATA

MR.1

(Early Estimates Based on Initial Reports)

APPENDIX III

SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT

CONCERNING PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS

SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT

CONCERNING PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS

- a. (C) REQUIREMENTS: The following requirements concerning PSYOP effectiveness are for levy on Hoi Chanhs and PW's: This SICR superseded SICR U-UPE-U1600.
 - (1) Message Content:
 - (a) How many different times during the past year have you seen Allied leaflets? Heard broadcasts (air, surface)?
 - (b) What was the message theme?
 - (c) What action did the message suggest you take?
 - (d) What pictures or drawings accompanied the message?
 - (2) Circumstances of Exposure:
 - (a) What was the source/media which delivered the message (printed, broadcast, face-to-face, family/friend)?
 - (b) Which particular person did the message come from?
 - (c) What made it difficult for you to receive/understand the message?
 - (3) General Situation:
 - (a) Where were you when you received the message?
 - (b) What were your, or your unit's, activities at the time of message reception?
 - (c) What problems were you and your unit experiencing?
 - (d) What were your main sources of news and information?
 - (e) What travel restrictions were imposed when you traveled from your base area?

377

- (4) Reactions to Message Content:
 - (a) What was your reaction to the message?
 - (b) What action did you consider taking as a result of the message?
 - (c) What action was taken as a result of the message?
 - (d) What did other members of your unit do as a result of the message?
 - (e) What prevented you from taking the action suggested by the message?
 - (f) Prior to your rallying/capture what were your major personal concerns? (Find the relative importance of: Personal survival, physical discomforts, concern for family welfare, Communist cause/goals, and VC/NVA conflicts).

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a number of specific research tasks designed to provi	
identified by a Project Advisory Group composed of	
community. The applied research tasks are generally	
data from VC and NVA prisoners of war and defector	ors, and analysis of the impact of selected
government publications upon the general public. A	special feature of this volume is a report on the
impact of the First Cambodia Operations on VC and	NVA attitudes. Volume II also includes three
classified appendices which belong with Volume I.	
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APPENDIX I

CASE STUDY FOR TINH THUONG (AFFECTION)
CAMPAIGN (REPORTED IN VOLUME I)